never become a Thing, nor be treated as such without wrong. But the distinction between Person and Thing consists herein, that the latter may rightfully be used, altogether and merely, as a Means; but the former must always be included in the End, and form a part of the final Cause. We plant the Tree and we cut it down, we breed the Sheep and we kill it, wholly as means to our own ends. The Wood-cutter and the Hind are likewise employed as Means, but on an agreement of reciprocal advantage, which includes them as well as their Employer in the end. Again: as the faculty of Reason implies Free-agency, Morality (i. e. the dictate of Reason) gives to every rational Being the right of acting as a free agent, and of finally determining his conduct by his own Will, according to his own Conscience: and this right is inalienable except by guilt, which is an act of Selfforfeiture, and the Consequences therefore to be considered as the Criminal's own moral election. In respect of their Reason* all Men are equal. The measure of the Understanding and of all other Faculties of Man, is differ-ent in different Persons: but Reason is not susceptible of degree. For since it merely decides whether any given thought or action is or is not in contradiction with the rest, there can be no reason better, or more reason, than another.

REASON! best and holiest gift of Heaven and bond of union with the Giver! The high Title by which the Majesty of Man claims precedence above all other living Creatures! Mysterious Faculty, the Mother of Conscience, of Language, of Tears, and of Smiles! Calm and incorruptible Legislator of the Soul, without whom all its' other Powers would "meet in mere oppugnancy.' Sole Principle of Permanence amid endless Change! in a World of discordant Appetites and imagined Self-interests the one only common Measure! which taken away,

"Force should be right; or, rather right and wrong
(Between whose endless jar justice resides)
Should lose their names and so should justice too,
Then every thing includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;

And appetite, an universal wolf,

So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey!"

See this position fully explained, and the sophistry grounded on it detect

ed and exposed, at the conclusion of the 21st No. of THE FRIEND,

Thrice blessed faculty of Reason! all other Gifts, though goodly and of celestial origin, Health, Strength, Talents, all the powers and all the means of Enjoyment, seem dispensed by Chance or sullen Caprice-thou alone, more than even the Sunshine, more than the common Air, art given to all Men, and to every Man alike! To thee, who being one art the same in all, we owe the privilege, that of all we can become one, a living whole! that we have a COUNTRY! Who then shall dare prescribe a Law of moral Action for any rational Being, which does not flow immediately from that Reason, which is the Fountain of all Morality? Or how without breach of Conscience can we limit or coerce the Powers of a Free-Agent, except by coincidence with that Law jn his own Mind, which is at once the Cause, the Condition, and the Measure, of his Free-agency ? Man must be free; or to what purpose was he made a Spirit of Reason, and not a Machine of Instinct? Man must obey; or wherefore has he a Conscience? The Powers, which create this difficulty, contain its solution likewise: for their Service is perfect Freedom. And whatever Law or System of Law compels any other service, disennobles our Nature, leagues itself with the Animal against the Godlike, kills in us the very Principle of joyous Welldoing, and fights against. Humanity.

By the Application of these Principles to the socialState there arises the following System, which as far as respects its' first grounds is developed the most fully by J. J. Rousseau in his Work Du contrat social. If then no Individual possesses the Right of prescribing any thing to another Individual, the rule of which is not contained in their common Reason, Society, which is but an aggregate of Individuals, can communicate this Right to no one. It cannot possibly make that rightful which the higher and inviolable Law of Human Nature declares contradictory and unjust. But concerning Right and Wrong the Reason of each and every Man is the competent Judge: for how else could he be an amenable Being, or the proper Subject of any Law ? This Reason, therefore, in any one Man cannot even in the social state be rightfully subjugated to the Reason of any other. Neither an Individual, nor yet the whole Multitude which constitutes the State, can possess the Right of compelling him to do any thing, of which it cannot be

demonstrated that his own Reason must join in prescribing it. If therefore Society is to be under a rightful constitution of Government, and one that can impose on rational Beings a true and moral Obligation to obey it, it must be framed on such Principles that every Individual follows his own Reason while he obeys the Laws of the Constitution, and performs the Will of the State while he follows the Dictates of his own Reason. This is expressly asserted by Rousseau, who states the problem of a perfect Constitution of Government in the following Words: Trouver une forme d' Association-par laquelle chacun s'unissant a' tous, n'obeisse pourtant qu' à lui même, et reste aussi libre qu' auparavant. i. e. To find a form of Society according to which each one uniting with the whole shall yet obey himself only and remain as free as before. This right of the Individual to retain his whole natural Independence, even in the social State, is absolutely inalienable. He cannot possibly concede or compromise it: for this very Right is one of his most sacred Duties. He would sin against himself, and commit high treason against the Reason which the Almighty Creator has given him, if he dared abandon its' exclusive right to govern his actions.

Laws obligatory on the Conscience, can only there fore proceed from that Reason which remains always one and the same, whether it speaks through this or that Person like the voice of an external Ventriloquist, it is indifferent from whose lips it appears to come, if only it be audible. The Individuals indeed are subject to Errors and Passions, and each Man has his own defects. But when Men are assembled in Person or by real Representatives, the actions and re-actions of individual Self-love balance each other; errors are neutralized by opposite errors; and the Winds rushing from all quarters at once with equal force, produce for the time a deep Calm, during which the general Will arising from the general Reason displays itself. "It is fittest," says Burke himself, (see his Note on his Motion relative to the Speech from the Throne, Vol. II. Page 647. 4to Edit.) "It is fittest that sovereign Authority should be exercised where it is most likely to be attended with the most effectual correctives. These correctives are furnished by the nature and course of parliamentary proceedings, and by the infinitely diversified Characters who compose the two

Houses. The fulness, the freedom, and publicity of discussion, leave it easy to distinguish what are acts of power, and what the determinations of equity and reason. There Prejudice corrects Prejudice, and the different asperities of party zeal mitigate and neutralize each other."

This, however, as my Readers will have already detected, is no longer a demonstrable deduction from Reason. It is a mere probability, against which other probabilities may be weighed: as the lust of Authority, the contagious. nature of Enthusiasm, and other of the acute or chronic. diseases of deliberative Assemblies. But which of these results is the more probable, the correction or the contagion of Evil, must depend on Circumstancs and grounds of Expediency: and thus we already find ourselves beyond the magic Circle of the pure Reason, and within the Sphere of the Understanding and the Prudence. Of this important fact Rousseau was by no means unaware, in his Theory, though with gross inconsistency he takes no notice of it in his Application of the Theory to Practice. He admits the possibility, he is compelled by History to allow even the probability, that the most numerous popular Assemblies, nay even whole Nations. may at times be hurried away by the same Passions, and under the dominion of a common Error. This Will of all is then of no more value, than the Humours of any one Individual and must therefore be sacredly distinguished from the pure Will which flows from universal Reason. To this point then I entreat the Reader's particular attention for in this distinction, established by Rousseau himself, between the Volonté de Tous and the Volonté generale (i. e. between the collective Will, and a casual over-balance of Wills) the Falsehood or Nothingness of the whole System becomes manifest. For hence it follows, as an inevitable Cousequence, that all which is said in the Contract social of that sovereign Will, to which the right of universal Legislation appertains, applies to no one Human Being, to no Society or Assemblage of Human Beings, and least of all to the mixed Multitude that makes up the PEOPLE: but entirely and exclusively to REASON itself, which, it is true, dwells in every Man potentially, but actually and in perfect purity is found in no Man and in no body of Men. This distinction the later Disciples of Rousseau chose completely to forget and, (a far more

melancholy case!) the Constituent Legislators of France forgot it likewise. With a wretched parrotry they wrote and harangued without ceasing of the Volante generalethe inalienable sovereignty of the People: and by these high-sounding phrases led on the vain, ignorant, and intoxicated Populace to wild excesses and wilder expectations, which entailing on them the bitterness of dis appointment, cleared the way for military Despotism, for the satanic Government of Horror under the Jacobins, and of Terror under the Corsican.

Luther lived long enough to see the consequences of the Doctrines into which indignant Pity and abstract ideas of Right had hurried him-to see, to retract and to oppose them. If the same had been the lot of Rousseau, I doubt not, that his conduct would have been the same. In his whole System there is beyond controversy much that is true and well reasoned, if only its' application be not extended farther than the nature of the case permits. But then we shall find that little or nothing is won by it for the institutious of Society; and least of all for the constitution of Governments, the Theory of which it was his wish to ground on it. Apply his Principles to any case, in which the sacred and inviolable Laws of Morality are immediately interested, all becomes just and pertinent. No Power on Earth can oblige me to act against my Conscience. No Magistrate, no Monarch, no Legislature, can without Tyranny compel me to do any thing which the acknowledged Laws of God have forbidden me to do. So act that thou mayest be able, without involving any contradiction, to will that the Maxim of thy Conduct should be the Law of all intelligent Beings-is the one universal and sufficient Principle and Guide of Morality. And why? Because the object of Morality is not the outward act, but the internal Maxim of our Actions. And so far it is infallible. But with what shew of Reason can we pretend, from a Principle by which we are to determine the purity of our motives, to deduce the form and matter of a rightful Government, the main office of which is to regulate the outward Actions of particular Bodies of Men, according to their particular Circumstances? Can we hope better of Constitutions framed by ourselves, than of that which was given by Almighty Wisdom itself? The Laws of the Hebrew Commouwealth, which flowed from the pure Reason, remain and