น The reply of Chryfippus to those who denied a Pro- TH vidence. HEY who think that the world was not pro- think The beginning of this chapter was wanting in all the B tome think that they urge a powerful argument when they affert, that if there were a Providence there would be no evils. For nothing, they affirm, can be less confiftent with a Providence, than that in that world, on account of which the Deity is faid to have created man, there should exist fo great a number of calamities and evils. Chryfippus, in his fourth Lactantius tome ejufdem operis in libro uno ακεφαλον *.” flourished in the fourth century; before the end of which St. Jerome wrote his Catalogue. But in the year 1712, Profeffor Pfaffius found a MS. at Turin, that had been complete, but by accident had fince loft five chapters. To this edition our readers are indebted for the fupplement; in confideration of which they are requested favourably to receive, or at least to pardon this little digreffion. In fome manufcripts we are given to understand, that this book was placed after the feventh. This can be of no importance. Many and perplexing are the difputes concerning Fate and Providence, among the ancient philofophers; each, perhaps, containing fomething to admire and approve, but refembling an unpolifhed gem, enveloped by extraneous matter, which obfcured and defaced its beauty. The opinions of thefe fects will be found accurately detailed in Enfield's Hiftory of Philofophy.-On thefe fubjects, ingenious and pleafing as the investigation of them may be, our best knowledge is the knowledge of ourselves, and our trucft virtue refignation to the order of Providence. Hope humbly, then-with trembling pinions foar, In pride, in reafoning pride, our error lies, All quit their fphere, and rush into the skies. The common reading is åxapán, but a Paris MS. 900 years old gives the reading which I have quoted. book book concerning Providence, difputing against thefe, obferves that nothing can be more abfurd or foolish than their opinion, who think that there can be good, without the existence of evil. For as good is contrary to evil, and it is neceffary that both fhould exift, oppofite to each other, and as it were dependent upon mutual and oppofite exertions, fo there can be no oppofing thing exist, without its particular oppofite. For how could there be a fenfe of juftice, if there were no injuftice? or what indeed is juftice, but the absence of injustice? In like manner what can we imagine of fortitude, but as oppofed to pufillanimity? What of temperance, but from intemperance? What would prudence be, but for its oppofite imprudence? Why alfo fhould unwife men not require this, that there fhould exift truth, and not falfehood? In like manner exift good and evil, happiness and mifery, pain and pleasure. Each, as Plato remarks, is confined to the other by contrary and oppofing vortices, fo that if you remove one you take away the other. This Chryfippus in the fame book a Vortices.-This doctrine is the diftinction of the Car V tefian philosophy, where it was applied to explain the pha nomena of the heavenly bodies. That it is inadequate to this, is what admits of mathematical proof. Thefe vortices exist in imagination only; the principle which actually and fatisfactorily explains these phænomena is known to have existence in nature, and that is gravity. Notes on the subject of this chapter might be extended to an infinite length B 2 and book examines, investigates, and thinks it an important fubject of enquiry, whether the imperfections of men are according to nature; that is, whether the fame nature and Providence which formed this univerfe and the race of men, created alfo the defects and diforders to which men are fubject. He thinks that it was not the first defign of Providence to make men obnoxious to disorders, for this never could be confiftent with the Author of nature, and the Creator of all good things. But as, he continues, he produced and formed many and great things, most convenient and useful, there are other kindred inconveniences, adhering to the things which he created. These he fays were not produced by nature, but by certain neceffary confequences, which he denominates κατα παρακολέθησιν.--Thus he remarks, when nature creates the bodies of men, a more fubtle caufe, and the very usefulness of his work, required that the head fhould be compofed of certain very minute and very delicate bones; but another external inconvenience attached to this usefulness in fomewhat of more importance, that the head was lefs fubftantially defended, and was liable to be broken by blows and flight refiftances.-In like manner diforders and fickness are obtained whilst health is produced. And thus it is, he remarked, that when, by the and I fhould certainly have indulged myself with fome greater latitude, did I not fear to exceed the limits prefcribed me. purpofe |