XIX. spotism, and collusively sought pretext in the BOOK Scheld and the Netherlands. In all decisions on peace or war, it was important to consider 1793. what we might lose and what we could gain. Extension of territory was neither expected nor eligible. On the other hand, would any man say that the events of war might not, with too great probability, produce a change in the internal state of Holland, and the political situation of the stadtholder, too afflicting to anticipate? Was the state of Ireland such as to make war desirable? This was said to be a subject too delicate to touch upon; but he approved not of that delicacy which taught men to shut their eyes to danger. The state of Ireland was indeed alarming, the gross misconduct of administration having brought the government and legislature into contempt in the eyes of the people. He hoped the plan to be pursued would be conciliatory; that concession to the claims of the people would be deemed wisdom; and the time of danger, contrary to the maxims of policy hitherto adopted, the fit time for reform.After a most able and eloquent, though unavailing, speech from this truly great and illustrious statesman, the question was put, and the address carried without a division. A very few days subsequent to this debate, BOOK Message from the king an. nouncing declaration of war. the intelligence was received that France had declared war against Great Britain and Holland; 1793. and on the 11th of February, 1793, a royal message vas delivered to the two houses of par- . liament, announcing, "That the assembly now the French exercising the powers of government in France have, without previous notice, directed acts of hostility to be committed against the persons and property of his majesty's subjects, in breach of the law of nations, and of the most positive stipulations of treaty; and have since, on the most groundless pretences, actually declared war against his majesty and the United Provinces. Under the circumstances of this wanton and unprovoked aggression his majesty has taken the necessary steps to maintain the honor of his crown, and to vindicate the rights of his people. And his majesty relies with confidence on the firm and effectual support of the house of commons, and on the zealous exertions of a brave and loyal people, in prosecuting a just and necessary war; and in endeavouring, under the blessing of Providence, to oppose an effectual barrier to the progress of a system which strikes at the security and peace of all independent nations, and is pursued in open defiance of every principle of moderation, good faith, humanity, and justice. In a cause of such general concern XIX. his majesty has every reason to hope for the cor- BOOK dial co-operation of those powers who are united with his majesty by the ties of alliance, or who 1793. feel an interest in preventing the extension of anarchy and confusion, and in contributing to the security and tranquillity of Europe." Such is the famous message, upon the peculiar phrases contained in which, the changes have so long been rung with so much noise and so little meaning. Upon this occasion Mr. Pitt contented himself with examining the several articles of the French declaration; and he concluded with asserting, that he found in it nothing but pretexts and allegations too weak to require refutation. "We had (he said) in every instance observed the strictest neutrality with respect to France. We had pushed to its utmost extent the system of temperance and moderation. We had waited to the last moment Proceedings for satisfactory explanation." He then moved tions for an the address to the throne. Mr. Fox expressed his astonishment that the minister should pretend to have acted on a system of temperance and moderation, when every conciliatory proposition on the part of the French had been disdainfully rejected. Every step on our part seemed to indicate a desire to break with France. To have continued earl YOL. IX. on the mo address to the throne BOOK Gower at Paris after the event of the 10th of XIX. August, would have implied no recognition of 1793. the validity of the government which succeeded to the monarchy, nor approbation of their proceedings: and it was certainly more eligible to treat in a direct than an indirect mode, with those who exercised the powers of government. As the prohibition of exporting corn to France, when it was allowed to other countries, was a positive infraction of the subsisting treaty; and the order received by M. Chauvelin to depart the kingdom was an act of open hostility on our part; he could not allow the declaration of war to be an unprovoked aggression on that of France. He moved, therefore, a suitable amendment to the proposed address. Mr. Burke pronounced a vehement Philippic, affording a melancholy contrast to the speeches of his better days. Among other extravagances, he took upon him to affirm, "that the members of opposition had no right to demand from ministers the avowal of any specific object as necessary to the justification of the war. For his part, he had never heard or read of any such principle in theory, or of any such avowal in practice. The first question he conceived to be, whether there was just cause or foundation for the war? The second, how it should be carried on to the greatest effect?-IA XIX. no instance whatever had any power, at the BOOK *Notwithstanding the amazing effrontery of this assertion, it is an incontrovertible historical fact that the present is the only war since the Revolution which has been entered upon without an avowed and definite object. Nothing analogous to it has taken place in our annals since the war against Holland in 1672, the object of which was never avowed, though well known to be the subversion of the existing government, and the eventual partition, of the country. The object of the war immediately succeeding the Revolution was, to compel France to a recognition of the new settlement. Of the war of queen Anne, the restitution of the Spanish monarchy to the house of Austria. Of the war of 1718, the evacuation of the island of Sicily by Spain on the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. Of the maritime war of 1740, the renunciation by Spain of the pretended right of search in the American seas. Of the continental war, the defence of the Pragmatic Sanction. Of the war of 1755, to repel the encroachments of France upon the territorial rights of our colonies in North America. Of the American war, the establishment of the supremacy of Great Britain, and the right of taxation over the same colonies. Even the last of our wars, that with the Dutch in 1780, had a specific object, insignificant and contemptible as it confessedly was, viz. the exemplary punishment of the pensionary of Amsterdam, M. Van Berkel. € 2 ་ |