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of

BOOK in the papers, Mr. Whitbread declared he could find no justification of the conduct of administra1793. tion. He thought the maintenance of peace in the power of the ministry, in perfect consistency with the honor, dignity, and interests, of this country; but their conduct and words denoted war. He had still, however, a hope peace remaining. That hope was founded on the knowledge he had of the character of his majesty's present servants. He knew that they had the faculty of enlarging or reducing objects precisely to the form in which they wished to consider them :-that at one time the fortress of Oczakow had deranged the balance of power in Europe; at another the whole kingdom of Poland had been thrown in without making a vibration in their political beam. He knew that they had never advanced too far to recede; that they had never threatened too much to retreat. versatility and weakness of their counsels, though it inspired this hope, made it nevertheless, he confessed, a faint and desperate one; and he concluded with saying he could not give his assent to the address."

The

Mr. Fox commenced a very energetic speech by complaining of the gross misrepresentations and misconstructions of what he and those who thought with him had spoken during the course

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of the present session. They were calumniated BOOK as partisans of France, and as the worst enemies of the country. This only served to shew that 1793. they were engaged in a service of danger as well as honor; and if he concealed his sentiments, or deserted his station, from any motive of intimidation, he should betray his trust, and degrade his character*.

Mr. Fox allowed that the trial and execution of the French monarch were acts of the grossest inhumanity and injustice. But the invariable maxim of policy was, that crimes perpetrated in one independent state were not cognisable in another. Had we not treated, and even formed alliances, with Portugal and with Spain at the very time when those kingdoms were disgraced and polluted by the most barbarous acts of superstition and cruelty-of racks, torture, and fire, under the abominable tyranny of the Inquisition? Much of the enormities committed by France had been with great probability ascribed to the at

* The high popularity of Mr. Pitt at this crisis, and the extreme unpopularity, resentment, and even national rage, displayed against Mr. Fox, (for nations are no less subject to paroxysms of passion than individuals,) recall to recollection a famous anecdote of antiquity. "The Athenians," faid Demosthenes to Phocion, "will in some fit of phrenzy put you to death."-" And you," replied Phocion, "should they recover their senses."

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BOOK tack of the combined powers. This, however, he would neither urge as an excuse nor as a pal1793. liation; but he would aver that a combination more dangerous to the tranquillity of Europe, and the liberties of mankind, had never been formed. It had been said that Austria was not the aggressor in the war with France. Had those who said so seen the declaration of Pilnitz? Let them look at that declaration, take the golden rule of putting themselves in the situation of the French, and then pronounce upon the question of aggression. He would not go over the atrocious manifestoes that preceded or followed the march of the combined armies. There was not a man in the house, or at least but one, who would attempt to defend them. But these it seemed were not to be executed he hoped they were not; but the only security he knew of was, that those who issued them had not the means. Mr. Fox stated the grounds of the war to be three-The opening of the Scheld; the decree of November 19; and the danger to Europe from the progress of the French arms. As to the first, ministers did not, and could not, state that the Dutch had called upon us to fulfil the terms of our alliance, The plain truth was, that to force the Dutch into a war at so much

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peril to them, which they saw and dreaded, was вOOK not to fulfil but to abuse the treaty; and the conduct of ministers, as to this ground of com- 1793. plaint, was wholly disingenuous. Secondly, The decree of the 19th of November he regarded as an insult, and the explanation of the executive council as no adequate satisfaction. But the explanation, imperfect as it was, shewed that the French were not disposed to insist upon that decree, and that they were inclined to peace. It was surely the extreme of arrogance to complain of insult without deigning to state the nature of the reparation required. When it was said we must have security, we ought at least to declare what that word was meant to import. Thirdly, With respect to the danger of Europe and the balance of power; we had seen the entire conquest of Poland, and the invasion of France, with such marked indifference, that it would be difficult now to take it up with the grace of sincerity. For satisfaction upon this point we had demanded no less than the immediate withdrawment of the French troops from the Austrian Netherlands. Were we then come to so high pitch of insolence as to say to France You have conquered a part of an enemy's territory who made war upon you. We would not interfere, at your request

BOOK to mediate a peace, but we now require you to XIX. abandon the advantages you have gained, while 1793. he is preparing to attack you anew?' Was this

the neutrality we meant to hold out to France"If you are invaded and beaten we will be quiet spectators; but if you defeat your enemy, if you enter his territory, we will declare war against you?' That the invasion of the Netherlands ought to alarm us, if the result of that invasion were to make the country an appendage to France, there could be no doubt. The French had promised to evacuate the country at the conclusion of the war: Was this naked promise sufficient? Certainly not. But it was for us to state candidly and explicitly the security which would be deemed sufficient. What security would they be able to give us after a war which they could not give now? Was it clear that they would refuse that security, if we would condescend to propose it to them in intelligible terms?

But all these grounds of hostility against France, Mr. Fox said, differed totally from the avowed object of the combined armies, our eventual allies in this war; which was no less than the destruction of the republican government of France recently established. To this, then, we came at last-that we were ashamed to own engaging to aid the restoration of des