ON THE PROPER LINE OF CONDUCT TO BE PURSUED BY A PATRIOTIC MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Whoever has had any experience in the business of Parliament, must have been disgusted with the unsound opinions too generally propagated, respecting the proper conduct to be pursued by a member of the House of Commons, whose object is, "To promote the public good." These opinions are principally to be attributed to want of discrimination, and an inattention to the changes which have taken place in times and circumstances.

Formerly, the power of the Crown was the chief object to be dreaded, being in a great measure undefined, and requiring nothing but the right of imposing taxes to be perfectly uncontrollable. Until the powers of the Crown were limited, it was proper to watch its measures with unceasing jealousy. But now, the case is totally altered; for the aristocratical and democratical branches of the constitution have become so extremely strong, that the Crown requires rather to be upheld than to be resisted.

The fact is, that all power now rests in the House of Commons, and the Crown is obliged to make up a Government, by selecting as ministers, some of the chiefs of the different parties which exist in that department of the State, with ramifications in the other House of Parliament.

With the view of obtaining popular favour, it is usual for the parties who are not in power, to propose reforms in Parliament,- -diminutions of places and pensions,-reduction in the public expenditure, &c. But such plans ought not in general to be given way to, and their success is often not desired by the very parties who propose them. The proper system to pursue is, gradually to make such changes as may be necessary; but to prevent, as much as possible, any risk of public convulsion, which would soon level the whole of our valuable institutions in the dust.

When the Parliament is divided into two parties, the opposition on the one side, and the adherents of the ministers on the other, many respectable supporters of the administration are puzzled how to act, when a question is brought forward in which they are inclined to think, that the opposition are right, and that the ministers are wrong. But the dilemma should be solved on the following grounds: If the opposition is systematic, that is to say, if every measure brought forward by the administration, whether right or wrong, is opposed, every upright adherer ought to support the measures of Government, even where they are not, perhaps, entirely unexceptionable, otherwise the contest is not conducted on an equal footing. In short, the Government ought to have a fair trial; and, if it shews imbecility or bad intentions, it ought not to be gradually undermined, but avowedly and totally deserted; and the reasons for such an alteration of system ought to be publicly explained.

No Minister can carry on the business of the country without the confidence of Parliament, and unless he is certain of being able to carry through the measures he brings forward. But, if he is under the necessity of consulting the humours of one man, the prejudices of another, and the selfish interests of a third, before he can bring a question under the consideration of the House, it is impossible that he can do any good in his official situation, and the sooner he quits his office the better.

Expressions are often used, implying, that there is some disgrace in holding lucrative official situations under Government; and every endeavour is made to hold forth " a placeman," as a corrupt and despicable character. These are absurdities to which no man of common sense will pay any attention. Offices are necessary in all Governments, and more especially when the empire is extensive. Those who hold such places, and carry on public business, are entitled to be indemnified for their time, and the injury they sustain from neglecting their own private affairs. They are likewise exposed to heavy ex

penses; and hence there is hardly an instance of a person whose property has not been impaired, rather than improved, though he has enjoyed the pecuniary advantages of an office. Were public services not to be remunerated, none but rich men could get the appointments,-who are not always properly qualified for such situations,-whose attention must partly be directed to their own important private concerns,—and who are too wealthy to undertake great labour, and, consequently, cannot carry on public business successfully.

It is fortunate that there are men, with ambitious and active minds, who are willing to hold the anxious and laborious offices of the State; for ministers are, in general, more to be pitied than envied, especially in times of disturbance, faction, or commercial difficulty. Nevertheless, where men are qualified by their birth, education, and talents, and the purity of their intentions, to hold high offices in the State, it is their duty to accept of them, to prevent those who are not equally well fitted to hold them, and whose intentions are not so pure and upright, from attaining power. Such men, if placed in high situations, might do material injury to a State;-the power they had acquired, might be employed for destructive purposes;—they might exhibit a wretched example in high employments; and might be the means, of injuring the religious principles, and moral character of their countrymen.