portion of dwa to one. While, therefore, wesview the fplendours of this victory with every degree of admiration, and joyful exultation it fo eminently deferves, it becomes us ferioufly to confider, whether the circumftance alone does not loudly call on us to inftitute an inquiry into the conduct of the first, lord of the admiralty, for his neglect of reinforcing the fquadron which was in a service fo diftant as that of the Mediterranean, when he knew that the Spaniards added to the lift of our naval adverfaries. In my opinion, in the fame degree of proportion in which we praife and admire the glorious victory which fir John Jervis has obtained-a victory, the confequences of which must be fo valuable and important to the first interests of this country; in an equal degree ought we to affix blame and culpability for fo grofs and glaring a neglect as that of leaving him with fuch a prodigious inferiority of force. We are told, fir, by the right honourable fecretary of ftate, in the detail which he has juft given the house of this for tunate and gallant atchievement, that with fifteen ships fir John Jervis. has defeated a fleet of the Spaniards, which confifted of twenty-feven line of battle fhips, of which he has taken four. Fortunate and glorious. as this action has proved, to the reputation of the British navy, and thofe who command and conduct it, we cannot help calling to mind how dreadful it would have been the reverfe of the fate of that memora ble day, had victory declared itself in favour of the enemy. What fir, at this moment must have been the fenfations of the people of this Country What would they have said, if, in ipite of the bravery, the

difcipline, the judgement, and glory of fir John Jervis for glory, I maintain, fir, does not always confift in fuccefswhat would they have faid, if, in defiance of all thofe fuperior abilities for which the cha→ racter of the British officers and feamen are fo eminently confpicuous, the reverfe of the pleating picture of this brilliant victory had this night been held up to us, and we had been told that fir John Jervis had been defeated, in confequence of the immenfe fuperiority of numbers in the fleet which the enemy brought into action against us? I have no doubt, fir, but the voice of the country at large would undoubtedly and inevitably have called loudly and univerfally for an impeachment of the first lord of the admiralty. I think, fir, that this houfe would, in fuch a cafe, have been pretty ready to join the voice of the people, and to fecond them in fo neceffary a meafure. The unparalleled fuccefs which has attended the skill and bravery of our fleet, by no means alter the state of the queftion. It was the duty of the firit lord of the admiralty, and of his majesty's minifters in general, to have taken care that our fleet should bear fome degree of proportion to that of the enemy; and, therefore, it evidently appears, that the inferiority being fo very great, it is high time an inquiry into the conduct of minifters fhould immediately take place, I hope, fir, the time is not far diftant, nay, I flatter myself it is very near, indeed, when this house will think it necessary to go seriously and actively into an extenfive and deep inquiry into the nation at large. Such an inquiry has long been wanted. The very momentous in formation which has been laid be

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Fore the house, and which has engaged their most serious and deliberate, as well as anxious confideration, fince Monday laft, fhews, beyond a poffibility of doubt, the inevitable neceffity of inquiry, upon the broadeft and most efficacious bafis." Mr. Whitbread proceeded to notice the melancholy change that had taken place in the afpect af public affairs in the space of one week: public credit fhaken to its foundation. The mifmanagement, he faid, of his majefty's minifters, had become notorious to every beholder, and the cry of inquiry into their conduct was not now confined to the members of oppofition in that houfe alone, but was echoed back upon them from every corner of the kingdom. Having touched on the expences of the war, and the numerous captures of our merchant fhips, though we had a fleet of more than five hundred fhips of war, of various denominations, he came to fpeak of that particular neglect and mifconduct, which more immediately gave rife to the prefent motion. The firft intimation, on authority, he faid, which that houfe received relative to the intention of the enemy to invade this country, was conveyed by his majefty's fpeech on the opening of the prefent feffion of parliament. Information had been received, through various channels, that Ire land was one object of the meditated attack. Yet it appeared from a letter from general Dalrymple, that, instead of any effectual means having been previously taken for an efficient defence, every thing remained to be done, even after the appearance of the enemy in Bantry-Bay: in which part of the country there was not any thing VOL. XXXIX.

like an adequate force for her defence: not more, if fo many, as three thousand regular troops, to oppofe to the whole force of the French. The city of Cork was, therefore, in danger of falling into their hands, with all its fiores and provifions: to the amount of nearly, if not quite, a million and a half. Mr. Whitbread, after these and other obfervations, went through a regular statement of the numbers of the French fleet, and thofe of our own, from the time of the enemy quitting the harbour of Breft, and a fhort time before. On the twenty-first, the enemy caft anchor in Bantry-Bay; fo that they were at fea, and on the coaft of Ireland, from the eighteenth of December, to the fixth of January. On. the twentieth of December, news arrived in England, that the French test had quitted Breft. From the twenty-third to the twen ty-fifth, the wind was favourable for the fquadron, under the command of lord Eridport, to have failed. It continued fair on the twenty-fixth and twenty-feventh, after which it camne a-head, and the fleet could not fail for fame days. On the thirty-first, intelligence came to this country, that the French fleet was off the coaft of Ireland; and, on the fame day, exactly, admiral Colpoys, with the fleet under his command, arrived at Portfmouth. The reafons given for his return, with this fquadron, are various and contradictory. One was, that his force was not fufficient to encounter those of the enemy. If that was a true reafon, it furnishes an additional cause of inquiry into the conduct of minifters, and of the firft lord of the admiralty in particular. What, when they had received information [Q]

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of the active and extenfive prepaTations going forward at Breft, fhall we be told, after the large fums confumed in fecret fervice-money, and with the immense navy in our poffeffion, they ought not to have fent out freth hips to reinforce that fquadron It is abfurd on the face of it. Admiral Colpoys, however, must have received intelligence of the failing of the Breft fleet. Did he fail in purfait of them? Did he fail towards the coaft of Portugal after, where it might, perhaps, have occurred to him they were gone? No. 'Did he fail after them towards the coaft of Ireland No: he failed directly for Portsmouth, where he arrived on the very day that information was brought they were on the Trith coast. Another reafon which has been given for the return of this fquadron into port was, that it was fhort of provifions. In every view of every reafon for its return, the moft glaring misconduct and culpability ftare us in the face. Is it poffible to conceive, that in all the time admiral Colpoys lay with his fquadron off Breft, either freth Thips, properly victualled, could not have been fent to relieve him, or tranfports, with provifions, have "been forwarded to re-victual his feet? The queftion anfwers for itfelf. Numerous, as well as various are the objections which have, from time to time, been made to any and every fpecies of inquiry, pending a war. Notwithstanding all this, we have an inftance, faid Mr. WhitBread, of an inquiry having been granted, towards the clofe of the laft war, in which the right honour able gentleman oppofite to him, Mr. Pitty acted a very confiderable part, in moving for various papers, in fupport of the motion.

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Mr.

Whitbread then faid, I cannot conclude in more apt or proper terms, than by ufing the words of a celebrated predeceffor of yours, fir, in that chair, who, after the failure of the fleet, in 1744, when he prefented the bill of fupplies, told the higheft authority in this country,

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that in circumftances fo difmal and diftreffing, the houfe ought to exercife the beft, and the dearest of their privileges, that of inquiring into the application of every part of the fupplies." I therefore move, fir, "that it be referred to a committee, to inquire into the conduct of minifters, with respect to the late attempt of the French, in the invafion of Ireland."-To the charges of Mr. Whitbread, it was answered by

Mr. Dundas, who faid, that it was impoffible to decide, whether the object of the French fleet was Ireland or Portugal. It was the wifeft meafure that could be adopted, to divide our fleets, ftationing one off Breft, for the purpofe of watching the enemy, and intercepting the failing of the expedition; and the other at home, to relieve it, if neceffary. A fleet, under fir Edward Pellew, was appointed to cruize off Breft, and did actually cruize there. But notwithftanding the diligence and fkill of the admiral, and the experience and courage of fir Edward, their exertions were in vain; for the ftate of the weather was fuch that it was impoffible for the admiral to keep his own fleet under his obfervation, and the air was fo hazy, that the fog-guns were continually fired. Could any man doubt fir Edward's inclination to have given, if poffible, the intelligence to the admiral, that the

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enemy

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Enemy had put to fea; or that admiral Colpoys was not defirous to fee it? Was it likely we should be unwilling, when he had a fleet, under his command, fo fuperior to that of the enemy? It was the wifeft refolution he could take, not to follow them to Portugal, or frefand, till he knew their certain deftination; and he kept his ftation for the chance of intercepting all, or part, of the fleet, in cafe of difperfion by a form; he recollected allo, that the circumftance of their having failed would be known to the admiralty, and, by remaining where he was, he thould receive fuch authentic intelligence as he could not otherwife expect to obtain. With regard to the charge of the want of provifions, Mr. Dundas could not but admit the fquadron had remained longer on its station than was at first fuppofed neceflary, and not relieved as foon as the admiralty had intended; the reafon was, fir Roger Curtis fhould have been in port the beginning of November, and did not come till the eighteenth. He had been appointed to cruize off Rochford, where he remained a fortnight longer than was expected, to intercept the return of Richery's fquadron from Newfound land.

Sir Roger's fquadron confifted of feven fail of the line, and was to have been sent to the relief of the fleet off Breft; but the wind was fo adverfe as to render it impofible for them to come to Spithead before the eighteenth of November. As to the interval which took place between the arrival of admiral Colpoys and the failing of lord Bridport, the inftructions of Gr Edward Pellew reached the ad

miralty on the twentieth of December; and on the twenty-firft he received information of the failing of the French fleet from Breft, and immediately returned for anfwer, that all the fleet would be ready four days after, namely, the twenty-fifth. [Here Mr. Dundas read the orders of the admiralty, iffued on the twenty-firft, and another order flued after, counteracting fome part of them, and defiring him to proceed off Cape Clear immediately.] He wished it to be obferved, that, although the French fleet arrived off the coaft of Ireland on the twenty-first of December, intelligence of them was not received, in this country, till the thirty-firft. The admiralty had taken the chance of finding admiral Colpoys on the flation where they expected him to have been, off the Lizard, in cafe of any adverfe winds removing him from the French coaft. Lord Bridport had always been not only a gallant but a fuccefsful admiral; yet it fo happened, that, although admiral Colpoys had been hover ing, with his fquadron, off Breft, to intercept the enemy upon their leaving that harbour, although lord Bridport afterwards proceeded off Cape Clear and the Irish coaft with the fame defign; and although the Duke and the Majeftic, with two other fhips of war, were fent in fearch of them, they were fo covered by the fog, and protected by fortune, as to escape them all. The honourable gentleman, Mr. Whitbread, had laid, that Ireland was faved by the elements; but he thould have remembered, that the fame wind which difperfed the enemy, prevented our fleets from meeting them.