and therefore is not qualified to compare selfish and fo. cial pleasure; but a man after acquiring a high relish for the latter, lofes not thereby a tafte for the former : he is qualified to judge, and he will give preference to focial pleafures as more fweet and refined. In fact they maintain that character, not only in the direct feeling, but also when we make them the fubject of reflection: the focial paffions are far more agreeable than the selfish, and rife much higher in our esteem.

There are differences not lefs remarkable among the painful paffions. Some are voluntary, fome involuntary the pain of the gout is an example of the latter; grief, of the former, which in fome cafes is fo voluntary as to reject all confolation. One pain foftens the temper; pity is an instance: one tends to render us favage and cruel, which is the cafe of revenge. I value myself upon sympathy: I hate and despise myself for

envy.

Social affections have an advantage over the selfish, not only with refpect to pleasure, as above explained, but also with refpect to pain. The pain of an affront, the pain of want, the pain of difappointment, and a thousand other felfifh pains, are cruciating and tormenting, and tend to a habit of peevishness and difcontent, Social pains have a very different tendency: the pain of fympathy, for example, is not only voluntary, but foftens my temper, and raifes me in my own esteem.

Refined manners, and polite behaviour, must not be deemed altogether artificial: men who, inured to the fweets of fociety, cultivate humanity, find an elegant pleasure in preferring others, and making them happy, of which the proud, the selfish, fcarce have a conception.

1

Ridicule, which chiefly arifes from pride, a felfish paffion, is at best but a grofs pleasure: a people, it is

true,

true, must have emerged out of barbarity before they can have a tafte for ridicule; but it is too rough an entertainment for the polifhed and refined. Cicero difcovers in Plautus a happy talent for ridicule, and a peculiar delicacy of wit: but Horace, who made a figure in the court of Auguftus, where taste was confiderably purified, declares against the lownefs and roughness of that author's raillery. Ridicule is ban ifhed France, and is lofing ground in England.

Other modifications of pleafant paffions will be occafionally mentioned hereafter. Particularly, the modifications of high and low are to be handled in the chapter of grandeur and fublimity; and the modifications of dignified and mean, in the chapter of dignity and grace.

PART III.

Interrupted Existence of Emotions and Paffions.-Their Growth and Decay.

WE ERE it the nature of an emotion to

continue, like colour and figure, in its prefent ftate till varied by fome operating cause, the condition of man would be deplorable: it is ordered wifely, that, emotions fhould more refemble another attribuit of matter, namely motion, which requires the conftant exertion of an operating cause, and ceafes when the caufe is withdrawn. An emotion may fubfift while its caufe is present; and when its caufe is removed, may fubfift by means of an idea, though in a fainter manner but the moment another thought breaks in and engroffes the mind, the emotion is gone, and is no longer felt if it return with its caufe, or an idea of

its caufe, it again vanifheth with them when other thoughts crowd in. The reafon is, that an emotion or paffion is connected with the perception or idea of its caufe, fo intimately as not to have any independent existence: a ftrong paffion, it is true, hath a mighty influence to detain its caufe in the mind; but not fo as to detain it for ever, because a fucceffion of perceptions or ideas is unavoidable.* Further, even while a paffion fubfifts, it feldom continues long in the fame tone, but is fucceffively vigorous and faint; the vigour of a paffion depends on the impreffion made by its caufe; and a caufe makes its deepeft impreffion, when, happening to be the fingle interesting object, it attracts our whole attention :† its impreffion is flighter when our attention is divided between it and other objects : and at that time the paffion is fainter in proportion.

When emotions and paffions are felt thus by intervals, and have not a continued existence, it may be thought a nice problem to determine when they are the fame, when different. In a ftrict philofophic view, every single impreffion made even by the fame object is diftinguishable from what have gone before, and from what fucceed: neither is an emotion raised by an idea the fame with what is raifed by a fight of the object. But fuch accuracy not being found in common apprehenfion, is not neceffary in common language the emotions raised by a fine landfcape in its fucceffive appearances are not diftinguishable from each other, nor even from thofe raifed by fucceffive ideas of the object; all of them being held to be the fame a paffion alfo is always reckoned the fame as long as it is fixed upon the fame object; and thus love

See this point explained afterwards, chap. 9.

See the Appendix, containing definitions, and explanation of terms, feat. 33.

love and hatred are faid to continue the fame for life. Nay, fo loose are we in that way of thinking, that many paffions are reckoned the fame even after a change of object; which is the cafe of all paffions that proceed from fome peculiar propenfity: envy, for example, is confidered to be the fame paffion, not only while it is directed to the fame perfon, but even where it comprehends many perfons at once: pride and malice are examples of the fame. So much was neceflary to be faid upon the identity of a paffion and emotion, in order to prepare for examining their growth and decay.

The growth and decay of paffions and emotions, traced through all their mazes, is a fubject too extensive for an undertaking like the prefent: I pretend only to give a curfory view of it, fuch as may be neceffary for the purposes of criticism. Some emotions are produced in their utmoft perfection, and have a very fhort endurance; which is the cafe of furprise, of wonder, and fometimes, of terror. Emotions raised by inanimate objects, trees, rivers, buildings, pictures arrive at perfection almost inftantaneously; and they have a long endurance, a fecond view producing nearly the fame pleasure with the firft. Love, hatred, and fome other paffions, fwell gradually to a certain pitch; after which they decay gradually. Envy, malice, pride, fcarce ever decay. Some paffions, fuch as gratitude and revenge, are often exhausted by a single act of gratification other paffions, fuch as pride, malice, envy, love, hatred, are not fo exhaufted; but having a long continuance, demand frequent gratification.

To handle every fingle paffion and emotion with a view to thefe differences, would be an endlefs work: we must be fatisfied at prefent with fome general views. And with refpect to emotions, which are quiefcent becaufe not productive of defire, their growth and decay

are

are easily explained: an emotion caufed by an inanimate object, cannot naturally take longer time to arrive at maturity, than is neceffary for a leifurely furvey: fuch emotion alfo must continue long ftationary, without any fenfible decay; a fecond or third view of the object being nearly as agreeable as the first: this is the cafe of an emotion produced by a fine profpect, an impetuous river, or a towering hill: while a man remains the fame, fuch objects ought to have the fame effect upon him. Familiarity, however, hath an influence here, as it hath every where frequency of view, after fhort intervals efpecially, weans the mind gradually from the object, which at laft lofes all relifh: the nobleft object in the material world, a clear and ferene fky, is quite difregarded, unless perhaps after a courfe of bad weather. An emotion raifed by human virtues, qualities, or actions, may, by reiterated views of the object, fwell imperceptibly till it become fo vigorous as to generate defire: in that condition it must be handled as a paffion.

As to paffion, I obferve, firft, that when nature, requires a paffion to be fudden, it is commonly produced in perfection; which is the cafe of fear and of anger. Wonder and furprife are always produced in perfection: reiterated impreflions made by their caufe, exhauft these paffions inftead of inflaming them. This will be explained afterward.*

In the next place, when a paffion hath for its foundation an original propenfity peculiar to fome men, it generally comes foon to maturity: the propenfity, upou prefenting a proper object, is immediately enlivened into a panion; which is the cafe of pride, of envy, and of malice.

In the third place, the growth of love and of hatred is flow or quick according to circumftances: the good