of which Congreve, in the Mourning Bride, gives one beautiful example:

Gonfalez. Have comfort.

Almeria. Curs'd be that tongue that bids me be of
comfort,

Curs'd my own tongue that could not move his pity,
Curs'd thefe weak hands that could not hold him here,
For he is gone to doom Alphonfo's death.

Act 4. fc. 8.

I have chofen to exhibit anger in its more rare appearances, for in these we can beft trace its nature and extent. In the examples above given, it appears to be an abfurd paffion, and altogether irrational. But we ought to confider, that it is not the intention of nature to fubject this passion, in every instance, to reason and reflection: it was given us to prevent or to repel injuries; and, like fear, it often operates blindly and inftinctively, without the leaft view to confequences: the very firft apprehenfion of harm fets it in motion to repel injury by punishment. Were it more cool and deliberate, it would lofe its threatening appearance, and be infufficient to guard us against violence. When fuch is and ought to be the nature of the paffion, it is not wonderful to find it exerted irregularly and capricioufly, as it fometimes is where the mifchief is fudden and unforeseen. All the harm that can be done by the paffion in that state is instantaneous; for the fhortest delay fets all to rights; and circumftances are feldom fo unlucky as to put it in the power of a paffionate man to do much harm in an instant.

Social paffions, like the selfish, fometimes drop their character, and become instinctive. It is not unusual to find anger and fear refpecting others fo exceffive, as to operate blindly and impetuously, precifely, as wher they are selfish.

SECT.

SECT. VII.

Emotions caufed by Fiction.

THE attentive reader will obferve, that hith

erto no fiction hath been affigned as the caufe of any paffion or emotion: whether it be a being, action, or quality, that moveth us, it is fuppofed to be really exifting. This obfervation fhows that we have not yet completed our tafk; because paffions, as all the world know, are moved by fiction as well as by truth. In judging beforehand of man, fo remarkably addicted to truth and reality, one fhould little dream that fiction can have any effect upon him; but man's intellectual faculties are not fufficiently perfect to dive far even into his own nature. I fhall take occafion afterward to fhow, that the power of fiction to generate paffion is an admirable contrivance, fubfervient to excellent purposes: in the mean time, we must try to unfold the means that give fiction fuch influence over the mind.

That the objects of our external senses really exist in the way and manner we perceive, is a branch of intuitive knowledge: when I fee a man walking, a tree growing, or cattle grazing, I cannot doubt but that these objects are really what they appear to be: if I be a spectator of any tranfaction or event, I have a conviction of the real existence of the perfons engag ed, of their words and of their actions. Nature determines us to rely on the veracity of our fenfes; for otherwise they could not in any degree answer their end, that of laying open things exifting and paffing around us.

By the power of memory, a thing formerly feen may be recalled to the mind with different degrees of accuracy. We commonly are fatisfied with a flight recollection of the capital circumftances; and, in fuch recollection, the thing is not figured as in our view, nor any image formed: we retain the consciousness of our present fituation, and barely remember that formerly we faw that thing. But with refpect to an interefting object or event that made a ftrong impreffion, I am not fatisfied with a curfory review, but muft dwell upon every circumftance. I am imperceptibly converted into a spectator, and perceive every particular paffing in my prefence, as when I was in reality a fpectator. For example, I faw yefterday a beautiful woman in tears for the lofs of an only child, and was greatly moved with her diftrefs: not fatisfied with a flight recollection or bare remembrance, I ponder upon the melancholy fcene: conceiving myself to be in the place where I was an eye-witnefs, every circumftance appears to me as at firit: I think I fee the woman in tears, and hear her moans. Hence it may be justly faid, that in a complete idea of memory there is no past nor future: a thing recalled to the mind with the accuracy I have been defcribing, is perceived as in our view, and confequently as exifting at prefent. Paft time makes part of an incomplete idea only: I remember or reflect, that fome years ago I was at Oxford, and faw the first stone laid of the Ratcliff library; and I remember that, at a still greater diftance of time, I heard a debate in the Houfe of Commons about a ftanding army.

Lamentable is the imperfection of language, almost in every particular that falls not under external fenfe. I am talking of a matter exceedingly clear in the perception: and yet I find no fmall difficulty to exprefs it clearly in words; for it is not accurate to talk of incidents

cidents long paft as paffing in our fight, nor of hearing at prefent what we really heard yesterday or at a more diftant time. And yet the want of proper words to describe ideal prefence, and to diftinguish it from real prefence, makes this inaccuracy unavoidable.When I recal any thing to my mind in a manner fo diftinct as to form an idea or image of it as prefent, I have not words to defcribe that act, but that I perceive the thing as a fpectator, and as exifting in my prefence; which means not that I am really a fpectator, but only that I conceive myself to be a fpectator, and have a perception of the object fimilar to what a real spectator hath.

As many rules of criticifm depend on ideal prefence, the reader, it is hoped, will take fome pains to form an exact notion of it, as diftinguished on the one hand from real prefence, and on the other from a fuperficial or reflective remembrance. In contradiftinction to real presence, ideal prefence may properly be termed a waking dream; becaufe, like a dream, it vanifheth the moment we reflect upon our prefent fituation: real prefence, on the contrary, vouched by eye-fight, commands our belief, not only during the direct perception, but in reflecting afterward on the object. To diftinguish ideal prefence from reflective remembrance, I give the following illuftration: "when I think of an event as paft, without forming any image, it is barely reflecting or remembering that I was an eye-witness: but when I recal the event fo diftinctly as to form a complete image of it, I perceive it as paffing in my prefence; and this perception is an act of intuition, into which reflection enters not, more than into an act of fight.

Though ideal prefence is thus diftinguished from real prefence on the one fide, and from reflective remembrance on the other, it is however variable without

F 3

any

1

any precife limits; rifing fometimes toward the former, and often finking toward the latter. In a vigorous exertion of memory, ideal prefence is extremely dif tinct; thus, when a man, entirely occupied with fome event that made a deep impreffion, forgets himself, he perceives every thing as paffing before him, and hath a confcioufnefs of prefence fimilar to that of a spectator; with no difference but that in the former the perception of prefence is lefs firm and clear than in the latter. But fuch vigorous exertion of memory is rare : ideal prefence is oftener faint, and the image fo obfcure as not to differ widely from reflective remembrance.

Hitherto of an idea of memory, I proceed to confider the idea of a thing I never faw, raised in me by fpeech, by writing or by painting. That idea with respect to the prefent fubject, is of the fame nature with an idea of memory, being either complete or incomplete. A lively and accurate defcription of an important event, raises in me ideas no lefs diftinct than if I had been originally an eye-witnefs: I am infenfibly transformed into a fpectator; and have an impreffion that every incident is paffing in my prefence. On the other hand, a flight or fuperficial narrative produceth but a faint and incomplete idea, of which ideal prefence makes no part. Paft time is a circumftance that enters into this idea, as it doth into an incomplete idea of memory; I believe that Scipio exifted about 2000 years ago, and that he overcame Hannibal in the famous battle of Zama. When I reflect fo flightly upon that memorable event, confider it as long paft; but let it be spread out in a lively and beautiful description, I am infenfibly transformed into a spectator :. I perceive thefe two heroes in act to engage: I perceive them brandifhing their fwords, and cheering their troops; and in that manner I attend them through

the