We have not however

cation where there is no defire. far to feek for a caufe: it is involved in the nature of man, that he cannot be indifferent to an event that concerns him or any of his connections; if it be fortunate, it gives him joy; if unfortunate, it gives him forrow.

In no fituation doth joy rife to a greater height than upon the removal of any violent diftrefs of mind or body; ́and in no fituation doth forrow rife to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes us happy. The fenfibility of our nature ferves in part to account for these effects. Other caufes concur. One is, that violent diftrefs always raises an anxious defire to be free from it; and therefore its removal is a high gratification: nor can we be poffeffed of any thing that makes us happy, without wishing its continuance; and therefore its removal, by croffing our wifhes, muft create forrow. The principle of contraft is another caufe: an emotion of joy arifing upon the removal of pain, is increafed by contrast when we reflect upon our former diftrefs: an emotion of forrow, upon being deprived of any good, is increafed by contraft when we reflect upon our former happiness :

Joffer. There's not a wretch that lives on common charity,
But's happier than me. For I have known
The lufcious fweets of plenty : every night
Have flept with foft content about my head,
And never wak'd but to a joyful morning.
Yet now muft fall like a fall ear of corn,

Whofe bloffom 'fcap'd, yet's withered in the ripening.

Venice Preferv'd, aa 1. fc. 1.

It hath always been reckoned difficult to account for the extreme pleasure that follows a ceffation of bodily pain; as when one is relieved from the rack, or from a violent fit of the ftone. What is faid explains this difficulty, in the easiest and simplest manner: ceflation of bodily pain is not of itself a pleasure, for a non ens or a negative can neither give pleasure nor pain; but a man is fo framed by nature as to rejoice when he is eafed of pain,

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as well as to be forrowful when deprived of any enjoyment. This branch of our constitution is chiefly the caufe of the pleasure. The gratification of defire comes in as te an acceffory caufe: and contraft joins its force, by increasing the sense of our present happiness. In the cafe of an acute pain, a peculiar circumstance contributes its part: the brisk circulation of the animal spirits occafioned by acute pain, continues after the pain is gone, and produceth a very pleafant emotion. Sickness hath not that effect, because it is always attended with a depreffion of fpirits.

Hence it is, that the gradual diminution of acute pain, occafions a mixt emotion, partly pleafant, partly painful the partial diminution produceth joy in proportion but the remaining pain balanceth the joy. This mixt emotion, however, hath no long endurance; for the joy that ariseth upon the diminution of pain, foon vanifheth, and leaveth in the undisturbed poffeffion, that degree of pain which remains.

What is above obferved about bodily pain, is equally applicable to the diftreffes of the mind; and accordingly it is a common artifice to prepare us for the reception of good news by alarming our fears.

SECT. IV.

Sympathetic Emotion of Virtue, and its caufe.

ONE feeling there is that merits a deliberate

view, for its fingularity as well as utility. Whether to call it an emotion or a paffion, feems uncertain: the former it can scarce be because it involves defire; the latter it can scarce be because it has no object. But this feeling, and its nature, will be beft understood from examples. A fignal act of gratitude produceth in the spectator or reader, not only love or esteem for the author,

but

but also a separate feeling, being a vague feeling of gratitude without an object; a feeling, however, that disposes the fpectator or reader to acts of gratitude, more than upon an ordinary occafion. This feeling is overlooked by writers upon ethics; but a man may be convinced of its reality, by attentively watching his own heart when he thinks warmly of any fignal act of gratitude; he will be confcious of the feeling, as diftinct from the esteem or admiration he has for the grateful perfon. The feeling is fingular in the following refpect, that it is accompanied with a defire to perform acts of gratitude, without having any object; though in that ftate, the mind, wonderfully bent on an object, neglects no opportunity to vent itfelf: any act of kindnefs or good-will that would pafs unregarded upon another occafion, is greedily feized; and the vague feeling is converted into a real paffion of gratitude: in fuch a ftatę, favours are returned double.

In like manner, a courageous action produceth in a fpectator the paffion of admiration directed to the author and befide this well known paflion, a separate feeling is raised in the spectator; which may be called an emotion of courage; becaufe, while under its influence, he is confcicus of a boldnefs and intrepidity beyond what is ufual, and longs for proper objects upon which to exert this emotion:

Spumantemque dari, pecora inter inertia, votis
Optat aprum, aut fulvum defcendere monte leonem.

Aneid. iy. 158

Non altramente il tauro, oue l'irriti
Gelofo amor con ftimoli pungenti,
Horribilmente mugge, e co'muggiti
Gli fpirti in fe rifueglia, e l'ire ardenti:
E'l corno aguzza a i tronchi, e par ch'inuiti
Con vani colpi a'la battaglia i venti.

Taffo, canto 7. ft. 55.

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So full of valour that they fmote the air
For breathing in their faces.

Tempest, at 4. fc. 4.

The emotions raifed by mufic independent of words, must be all of this nature: courage roufed by martial mufic performed upon inftruments without a voice, cannot be directed to any object; nor can grief or pity raised by melancholy mufic of the fame kind have an object.

For another example, let us figure fome grand and heroic action, highly agreeable to the fpectator: befide veneration for the author, the fpectator feels in himself an unusual dignity of character, which difpofeth him to great and noble actions: and herein chiefly confifts the extreme delight every one hath in the hiftories of conquerors and heroes.

This fingular feeling, which may be termed the fynpathetic emotion of virtue, refembles, in one refpect, the well known appetites that lead to the propagation and prefervation of the fpecies. The appetites of hunger, thirft, and animal love, arife in the mind before they are directed to any object; and in no cafe whatever is the mind more folicitous for a proper object, than when under the influence of any of thefe appetites.

The feeling I have endeavoured to unfold, may well be termed the fympathetic emotion of virtue; for it is raifed in a fpectator, or in a reader, by virtuous actions of every kind, and by no other fort. When we contemplate a virtuous action, which fails not to prompt our love for the author, our propenfity at the fame time to fuch actions is fo much enlivened, as to become for a time an actual emotion. But no man hath a propenfity to vice as fuch: on the contrary, a wicked deed difgufts him, and makes him abhor the author; and this abhorrence is a strong antidote against vice, as long as any impreffion remains of the wicked action,

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In a rough road, a halt to view a fine country is refreshing; and here a delightful prospect opens upon us. It is indeed wonderful to obferve what incitements there are to virtue in the human frame: juftice is perceived to be our duty; and it is guarded by natural punishments, from which the guilty never efcape: to perform noble and generous actions, a warm fenfe of their dignity and fuperior excellence is a moft efficacious incitement.* And to leave virtue in no quarter unfupported, here is unfolded an admirable contrivance, by which good example commands the heart, and adds to virtue the force of habit. We We approve every virtuous action, and bestow our affection on the author; but if virtuous actions produced no other effect upon us, good example would not have great influence: the fympathetic emotion under confideration bestows upon good example the utmost influence, by prompting us to imitate what we admire. This fingular emotion will readily find an object to exert itself upon and at any rate, it never exifts without producing fome effect; because virtuous emotions of that fort, are in fome degree an exercise of virtue; they are a mental exercife at leaft, if they appear not externally. And every exercife of virtue, internal and external, leads to habit; for a difpofition or propenfity of the mind, like a limb of the body, becomes ftronger by exercife. Proper means at the fame time, being ever at hand to raise this fympathetic emotion, its frequent reiteration may, in a good measure, fupply the want of a more complete exercise. Thus, by proper difcipline, every perfon may acquire a fettled habit of virtue: intercourse with men of worth, hiftories of generous and difinterested actions, and frequent meditation upon them, keep the fympathetic emotion in conftant exercife, which by degrees introduceth

* See Effays on morality and natural religion, part 1, eff. 2. ch. 4.