riches; but we fay the paffion of friendship, of love, of gratitude, of envy, of refentment. And there is a material difference between appetites and paffions, which makes it proper to diftinguish them by different names : the latter have no exiftence till a proper object be prefented; whereas the former exift firft, and then are di rected to an object: a paffion comes after its object; an appetite goes before it, which is obvious in the appetites of hunger, thirst, and animal love, and is the fame in the other appetites above mentioned.

By an object fo powerful as to make a deep impreffion, the mind is inflamed, and hurried to action with a ftrong impulfe. Where the object is lefs powerful, fo as not to inflame the mind, nothing is felt but defire without any fenfible perturbation. The principle of duty affords one instance: the defire generated by an object of duty, being commonly moderate, moves us to act calmly, without any violent impulfe; but if the mind happen to be inflamed with the importance of the object, in that cafe defire of doing our duty becomes a warm paffion.

The actions of brute creatures are generally directed by instinct, meaning blind impulfe or defire, without any view to confequences. Man is framed to be governed by reafon : he commonly acts with deliberation, in order to bring about fome defirable end; and in that cafe his actions are means employed to bring about the end defired: thus I give charity in order to relieve a perfon from want: I perform a grateful action as a duty incumbent on me and I fight for my country in order to repel its enemies. At the fame time, there are hu man actions that are not governed by reason, nor are done with any view to confequences. Infants, like brutes, are mostly governed by inftinct, without the leaft view to any end, good or ill. And even adult perfons act fometimes inftinctively thus one in extreme hunger fnatches at food, without the flightest confideration whether

id

C

whether it be falutary: avarice prompts to accumulate wealth, without the leaft view of ufe; and thereby abfurdly converts means into an end and animal love often hurries to fruition, without a thought even of gratification.

A paffion when it flames fo high as to impel us to act blindly without any view to confequences, good or ill, may in that state be termed instinctive; and when it is fo moderate as to admit reason, and to prompt actions with a view to an end, it may in that state be termed deliberative. With respect to actions exerted as means to an end, defire to bring about the end is what determines one to exert the action; and defire confidered in that view is termed a motive thus the fame mental act that is termed defire with refpect to an end in view, is termed a motive with refpect to its power of determining one to act. Inftinctive actions have a caufe, namely, the impulfe of the paffion; but they cannot be faid to have a motive, because they are not done with any view to confequences.

We learn from experience that the gratification of defire is pleasant; and the forefight of that pleasure becomes often an additional motive for acting. Thus a a child eats by the mere impulfe of hunger a young man thinks of the pleasure of gratification, which being a motive for him to eat, fortifies the original impulfe: and a man farther advanced in life, hath the additional motive, that it will contribute to his health.*

From these premises, it is eafy to determine with accuracy, what paffions and actions are felfifh, what focial. It is the end in view that afcertains the clafs to which they belong: where the end in view is my own good, they are selfish; where the end in view is the good of another, they are focial. Hence it follows, that inftinc

tive

* One exception there is, and that is remorfe, when it is fo violent as to make a man defire to punish himself. The gratification here is far from being pleasant. See p. 188. of this volume. But a fingle exception, ins ftead of overturning a general rule, is rather a confirmation of it.

tive actions, where we act blindly and merely by im pulfe, cannot be reckoned either focial or selfish: thus eating, when prompted by an impulfe merely of nature, is neither focial nor felfifh; but add a motive, that it will contribute to my pleasure or my health, and it becomes in a measure felfifh. On the other hand, when affection moves me to exert an action to the end folely of advancing my friend's happiness, without regard to my own gratification, the action is juftly denominated focial, and fo is also the affection that is its caufe; if another motive be added, that gratifying the affection will alfo contribute to my own happiness, the action becomes partly felfifh. If charity be given with the fingle view of relieving a perfon from diftress, the action is purely focial; but if it be partly in view to enjoy the pleafure of a virtuous act, the action is fo far felfifh.* Animal love when carried into action by natural impulfe fingly, is neither focial nor felfifh: when exerted with a view to gratification, it is felfish when the motive of giving pleafure to its object is fuperadded, it is partly focial, partly felfifh. A just action, when prompted by the principle of duty folely, is neither focial nor felfish. When I perform an act of justice with a view to the pleasure of gratification, the action is felfish: I pay a debt for my own fake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But fuppofe the money has been advanced by a friend without intereft, purely to oblige me in that cafe, together with the motive of gratification, there arifes a motive of gratitude, which refpects the creditor folely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good; and the action is partly focial, partly selfish. Suppofe again I meet with a furprising

and

A felfish motive proceeding from a focial principle, fuch as that mentioned, is the most respectable of all felfifh motives. To enjoy the pleasure of a virtuous action, one must be virtuous; and to enjoy the pleafure of a charitable action, one muft think charity laudable at leaf, if not a duty. It is otherwife where a man gives charit; merely for the fake of oflentation; for this he may do without having any pity or benevolence in his temper.

and unexpected act of generofity, that infpires me with love to my benefactor, and the utmoft gratitude: I burn to do him good: he is the fole object of my defire; and my own pleasure in gratifying the defire vanifheth out of fight in this case, the action I perform is purely focial. Thus it happens, that when a focial motive becomes ftrong, the action is exerted with a view fingly to the object of the paffion, and self never comes in view. The fame effect of ftifling selfish motives, is equally remarkable in other paffions that are in no view focial. An action' for example, done to gratify my ambitious views, is felfifh: but if my ambition become headstrong, and blindly impel me to action, the action is neither felfifh nor focial. A flight degree of refentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleasure arifing to myself from gratifying the paffion, is justly denominated selfish: where revenge flames fo high as to have no other aim but the deftruction of its object, it is no longer selfish; but, in oppofition to a focial paffion, may be termed diffocial.*

When this analysis of human nature is confidered, not one article of which can with truth be controverted, there is reafon to be furprised at the blindness of fome philofophers, who, by dark and confufed notions, are led to deny all motives to action but what arife from felf-love. Man, for aught appears, might poffibly have been fo framed, as to be fufceptible of no paffions but what have felf for their object: but man thus framed, would be ill fitted for fociety: his conftitution, partly felfish, partly focial, fits him much better for his prefent fituation.†

Of

This word, hitherto not in ufe, feems to fulfil all that is required by Demetrius Phalereus (Of elocution, &. 96.) in coining a new word: ficft, that it be perfpicuous; and next, that it be in the tone of the language; that we may not, fays our author, introduce among the Grecian vocables, words that found like thofe of Phrygia or Scythia.

As the benevolence of many human actions is beyond the poffibility of doubt, the argument commonly infilled on for reconciling fuch actions to the

D 4

Of felf, every one hath a direct perception; of other things we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes and hence it is, that of felf the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and, for the reafon now given, must be more agreeable than any other object. Is this fufficient to account for the prevalence of felf-love?

:

In the foregoing part of this chapter it is fuggefted, that fome circumftances make beings or things fit objects for defire, others not. This hint ought to be purfued. It is a truth afcertained by univerfal experience, that a thing which in our apprehenfion is beyond reach, never is the object of defire; no man, in his right fenfes, defires to walk on the clouds, or to defcend to the centre of the earth we may amufe ourselves in a reverie, with building caftles in the air, and wifhing for what can never happen; but fuch things never move defire. And indeed a defire to do what we are sensible is beyond our power, would be altogether abfurd. In the next place, though the difficulty of attainment with refpect to things within reach, often inflames defire; yet, where the profpect of attainment is faint, and the event extremely uncertain, the object, however agreeable, feldom raifeth any ftrong defire: thus beauty, or any other good quality, in a woman of rank, feldom raifes love in a man greatly her inferior. In the third place, different objects, equally within reach, raise emotions in different degrees; and when defire accompanies any of these emotions, its strength, as is natural, is proportioned to that of its caufe. Hence the remarkable difference among defires directed to beings inani,

mate,

felfish fyftem, is, that the only motive I can have to perform a benevolent action, or an action of any kind, is the pleasure that it affords me. So much then is vielded, that we are pleafed when we do good to others: which is a fair admiffion of the principle of benevolence; for without that principle, what pleafure could one have in doing good to others? And admitting a principle of benevolence, why may it not be a motive to action, as well a felfifhnefs is, or any other principle ?