cipal fubject, which is requifite between a whole and its conftituent parts: it demands, however, a degree of union, fuch as ought to fubfift between a principal and acceffory; and therefore will not be graceful if it be loofely connected with the principal fubject, I give for an example the defcent of Æneas into hell, which employs the fixth book of the Æneid the reader is not prepared for that important event; no caufe is affigned that can make it appear neceffary, or even natural, to fufpend for fo long a time the principal action in its most interesting period: the poet can find no pretext for an adventure fo extraordinary, but the hero's longing to vifit the ghoft of his father recently dead: in the mean time the story is interrupted, and the reader lofes his ardour. Pity it is that an episode fo extremely beautiful were not more happily introduced. I must ob

serve at the fame time, that full juftice is done to this incident, by confidering it to be an epifode; for if it be a conftituent part of the principal action, the connection ought to be ftill more intimate. The fame objection lies against that elaborate defcription of Fame in the Eneid any other book of that heroic poem, or of any heroic poem, has as good a title to that defcription as the book where it is placed.

*

In a natural landscape we every day perceive a multitude of objects connected by contiguity folely; which is not unpleafant, because objects of fight make an impreffion fo lively, as that a relation even of the flightest kind is relished. This however ought not to be imitated in defcription: words are fo far fhort of the eye in liveliness of impreffion, that in a defcription, connection ought to be carefully ftudied; for new objects introduced in defcription, are made more or less welcome in proportion to the degree of their connection with the principal fubject. In the following paffage different things are brought together without the flighteft connection,

Lib.lin, 173.

nection, if it be not what may be called verbal, i. e. taking the fame word in different meanings,

Surgamus: folet effe gravis cantantibus umbra,
Juniperi gravis umbra: nocent et frugibus umbræ,
Ite domum faturæ, venit Hefperus, ite capellæ.

Virg. Buc. x. 75.

The introduction of an object metaphorically or figuratively, will not juftify the introduction of it in its natural appearance: a relation fo flight can never be relished

Diftruft in lovers is too warm a fun;

But yet 'tis night in love when that is gone.
And in thofe climes which moft his fcorching know,
He makes the noblest fruits and metals grow.

Part 2. Conqueft of Granada, a& 3.

The relations among objects have a confiderable in fluence in the gratification of our paffions, and even in their production. But that fubject is referved to be treated in the chapter of emotions and paffions*.

There is not perhaps another inftance of a building fo great erected upon a foundation fo flight in appearance, as the relations of objects and their arrangement. Relations make no capital figure in the mind, the bulk of them being tranfitory, and fome extremely trivial: they are, however, the links that, by uniting our perceptions into one connected chain, produce connection of action, because perception and action have an intimate corref pondence. But it is not fufficient for the conduct of life, that our actions be linked together, however intimately: it is befide neceffary that they proceed in a certain order; and this alfo is provided for by an original propenfity. Thus order and connection, while they admit fufficient variety, introduce a method in the management of affairs without them our conduct would be fluctuating and defultory; and we fhould be hurried from thought to thought, and from action to action, entirely at the mercy of chance.

Chap. 2. part I. fca. 1.

CHAP.

CHA P. II.

Emotions and Paffions.

Of all the feelings raifed in us by external ob

jects, thofe only of the eye and the ear are honoured with the name of paffion or emotion: the moft pleafing feelings of tafte, or touch, or fmell, afpire not to that honour. From this obfervation appears the connection of emotions and paffions with the fine arts, which, as obferved in the introduction, are all of them calculated to give pleasure to the eye or the ear; never once condefcending to gratify any of the inferior fenfes. The defign accordingly of this chapter is to delineate that connection, with the view chiefly to ascertain what power the fine arts have to raise emotions and paffions. To thofe who would excel in the fine arts, that branch of knowledge is indifpenfible; for without it the critic, as well as the undertaker, ignorant of any rule, have nothing left but to abandon themfelves to chance. Deftitute of that branch of knowledge, in vain will either pretend to foretel what effect his work will have upon the heart.

The principles of the fine arts, appear in this view to open a direct avenue to the heart of man. The inquif itive mind beginning with criticism, the most agreeable of all amusements, and finding no obftruction in its progrefs, advances far into the fenfitive part of our nature; and gains imperceptibly a thorough knowledge of the human heart, of its defires, and of every motive to action; a fcience, which of all that can be reached by man, is to him of the greatest importance.

Upon a fubject fo comprehenfive, all that can be expected in this chapter, is a general or flight furvey: and to fhorten that furvey, I propofe to handle separately. fore emotions more peculiarly connected with the fine

arts.

arts. Even after that circumfcription, fo much matter comes under the prefent chapter, that, to avoid confufion, I find it neceffary to divide it into many parts: and though the first of thefe is confined to fuch caufes of emotion or paffion as are the most common and the most general; yet upon examination I find this fingle part fo extenfive, as to require a fubdivifion into feveral fections. Human nature is a complicate machine, and is unavoidably fo in order to answer its various purposes. The public indeed have been entertained with many fyftems of human nature that flatter the mind by their fimplicity: according to fome writers, man is entirely a felfish being; according to others, univerfal benevolence is his duty one founds morality upon fympathy folely, and one upon utility. If any of thefe fyftems were copied from nature, the prefent fubject might be foon difcuffed. But the variety of nature is not so easily reached: and for confuting fuch Utopian fyftems without the fatigue of reasoning, it appears the best method to take a furvey of human nature, and to fet before the eye, plainly and candidly, facts as they really exift.

PART I

Caufes unfolded of the Emotions and Paffions.

SECT. I.

Difference between Emotion and Paffion.-Causes that are the most common and the most general.-Paffion confidered as productive of Action.

THESE

HESE branches are fo interwoven, that they cannot be handled feparately. It is a fact univerfally admitted, that no emotion or paffion ever starts up in the mind without a caufe: if I love a perfon, it is for good

qualities

qualities or good offices: if I have refentment against a man, it must be for fome injury he has done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under no diftrefs of body nor of mind.

The circumstances now mentioned, if they raise an emotion or paffion, cannot be entirely indifferent; for if fo, they could not make any impreffion. And we find upon examination, that they are not indifferent: looking back upon the foregoing examples, the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are antecedently agreeable; if an injury did not give uneafiness, it would not occafion refentment against the author: nor would the paffion of pity be raised by an object in diftrefs, if that object did not give pain.

What is now faid about the production of emotion or paffion, refolves into a very fimple propofition, That we love what is agreeable, and hate what is difagreeable. And indeed it is evident, that a thing must be agreeable or difagrecable, before it can be the object either of love or of hatred.

This fhort hint about the causes of paffion and emotion, leads to a more extenfive view of the subject. Such is our nature, that upon perceiving certain external objects, we are inftantaneously conscious of pleasure or pain: a gently-flowing river, a smooth extended plain, a spreading oak, a towering hill, are objects of fight that raise pleasant emotions: a barren heath, a dirty marsh, a rotten carcafe, raise painful emotions. Of the emotions. thus produced we inquire for no other caufe but merely the prefence of the object.

The things now mentioned raife emotions by means of their properties and qualities: to the emotion raifed by a large river, its fize, its force, and its fluency, contributes each a fhare: the regularity, propriety, and convenience, of a fine building, contribute each to the emotion raised by the building.

If