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permanent. Thus memory and wit are often conjoined: folid judgment feldom with either.

Every man who attends to his own ideas, will difcover order as well as connection in their fucceffion. There is implanted in the breast of every man a principle of order, which governs the arrangement of his perceptions, of his ideas, and of his actions. With regard to perceptions, I obferve that, in things of equal rank, fuch as fheep in a fold, or trees in a wood, it must be indifferent in what order they be furveyed. But, in things of unequal rank, our tendency is, to view the principal fubject before we defcend to its acceffories or ornaments, and the fuperior before the inferior or dependent; we are equally averfe to enter into a minute confideration of conftituent parts, till the thing be first furveyed as a whole. It need fcarce be added, that our ideas are governed by the fame principle; and that, in thinking or reflecting upon a number of objects, we naturally follow the fame order as when we actually furvey them.

The principle of order is confpicuous with respect to natural operations; for it always directs our ideas in the order of nature: thinking upon a body in motion, we follow its natural courfe; the mind falls with a heavy body, defcends with a river, and afcends with flame and fmoke in tracing out a family, we incline to begin at the founder, and to defcend gradually to his latest pofterity; on the contrary, mufing on a lofty oak, we begin at the trunk, and mount from it to the branches: as to historical facts, we love to proceed in the order of time; or, which comes to the fame, to proceed along the chain of caufes and effects.

But though, in following out an hiftorical chain, our bent is to proceed orderly from caufes to their effects, we find not the fame bent in matters of fcience: there we seem rather difpofed to proceed from effects to their caufes, and from particular propofitions to thofe which

are more general. Why this difference in matters that appear to nearly related? I answer, The cafes are fimilar in appearance only, not in reality. In an hiftorical

chain every event is particular, the effect of fome former event, and the cause of others that follow: in fuch a chain there is nothing to bias the mind from the order of nature. Widely different is fcience, when we endeavour to trace out caufes and their effects: many experiments are commonly reduced under one caufe; and again, many of these caufes under one still more general and comprehenfive: in our progrefs from particular effects to general caufes, and from particular propofitions to the more comprehenfive, we feel a gradual dilatation or expanfion of mind, like what is felt in an ascending series, which is extremely pleafing the pleasure here exceeds what arifes from following the courfe of nature; and it is that pleafure which regulates our train of thought in the cafe now mentioned, and in others that are fimilar. Thefe obfervations, by the way, furnish materials for inftituting a comparison between the fynthetic and analytic methods of reafoning: the fynthetic method, defcending regularly from principles to their confequences, is more agreeable to the ftrictnefs of order; but in following the oppofite courfe in the analytic method, we have a fenfible pleasure like mounting upward, which is not felt in the other: the analytic method is more agreeable to the imagination; the other method will be preferred by thofe only who with rigidity adhere to order, and give no indulgence to natural emotions*.

It now appears that we are framed by nature to relish order and connection. When an object is introduced by à proper connection, we are confcious of a certain pleafure arifing from that circumstance. Among objects of equal rank, the pleasure is proportioned to the degree of connection: but among unequal objects, where

we

A train of perceptions or ideas, with refpeâ to its uniformity and vari ety, is handled afterwards, chap. 9.

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we require a certain order, the pleasure arifes chiefly from an orderly arrangement; of which one is fenfible, in tracing objects contrary to the course of nature, or contrary to our fenfe of order: the mind proceeds with alacrity down a flowing river, and with the fame alacrity from a whole to its parts, or from a principal to its acceffories; but in the contrary direction, it is fenfible of a fort of retrogade motion, which is unpleasant. And here may be remarked the great influence of order upon the mind of man: grandeur, which makes a deep impreffion, inclines us, in running over any feries, to proceed from fmall to great, rather than from great to small; but order prevails over that tendency, and affords pleasure as well as facility in paffing from a whole to its parts, and from a fubject to its ornaments, which are not felt in the oppofite course. Elevation touches the mind no less than grandeur doth; and in raifing the mind to elevated objects, there is a fenfible pleasure the courfe of nature, however, hath ftill a greater influence than elevation; and therefore, the pleasure of falling with rain, and defcending gradually with a river, prevails over that of mounting upward. But where the courfe of nature is joined with elevation, the effect must be delightful: and hence the fingular beauty of fmoke afcending in a calm morning.

I am extremely fenfible of the difguft men generally have to abftract fpeculation; and I would avoid it altogether, if it could be done in a work that profeffes to draw the rules of criticifm from human nature, their true fource. We have but a fingle choice, which is, to continue a little longer in the fame train, or to abandon the undertaking altogether. Candour obliges me to notify this to my readers, that fuch of them as have an invincible averfion to abstract speculation, may ftop fhort here; for till principles be unfolded, I can promife no entertainment to thofe who fhus thinking. But I flatter myself with a different bent in the generality of readers:

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fome

fome few, I imagine, will relifh the abstract part for its own fake; and many for the useful purposes to which it may be applied. For encouraging the latter to proceed with alacrity, I affure them beforehand, that the foregoing fpeculation leads to many important rules of criticifin, which fhall be unfolded in the course of this work. In the mean time, for inftant fatisfaction in part, they will be pleased to accept the following fpecimen.

Évery work of art, that is conformable to the natural courfe of our ideas, is fo far agreeable; and every work of art that reverses that course, is fo far difagreeable, Hence it is required in every fuch work, that, like an or ganic fyftem, its parts be orderly arranged and mutually connected, bearing each of them a relation to the whole, fome more intimate, fome lefs, according to their deftin ation when due regard is had to thefe particulars, we have a fenfe of juft compofition, and fo far are pleased with the performance. Homer is defective in order and connection; and Pindar more remarkably. Regularity, order, and connection, are painful restraints on a bold and fertile imagination; and are not patiently fubmitted to, but after much culture and difcipline. În Horace there is no fault more eminent than want of connection: inftances are without number. In the first fourteen lines of ode 7. lib. 1. he mentions feveral towns and diftricts, more to the taste of fome than of others: in the remainder of the ode, Plancus is exhorted to drown his cares in wine. Having narrowly escaped death by the fall of a tree, this poet✶ takes occafion to observe justly, that while we guard against fome dangers, we are expofed to others we cannot forefee: he ends with dif playing the power of mufic. The parts of ode 16. lib. 2. are fo loosely connected as to disfigure a poem otherwife extremely beautiful. The 1ft, 2d, 3d, 4th, 11th, 24th, 27th odes of the 3d book, lie open all of them to the fame cenfure. The firft fatire, book 1. is

* Lib. 2. ode 13.

fo

fo deformed by want of connection, as upon the whole to be scarce agreeable: it commences with an important queftion, How it happens, that people, though much fatisfied with themfelves, are feldom fo with their rank or condition. After illuftrating the observation in a fprightly manner by several examples, the author, forgetting his fubject, enters upon a declamation against avarice, which he purfues till the line 108. there he makes an apology for wandering, and promises to return to his fubject; but avarice having got poffeffion of his mind, he follows out that theme to the end, and never returns to the question propofed in the beginning.

Of Virgil's Georgics, though efteemed the most complete work of that author, the parts are ill connected, and the tranfitions far from being fweet and easy. In the first book he deviates from his fubject to give a defcription of the five zones: the want of connection. here, as well as in the defcription of the prodigies that accompanied the death of Cæfar, are fcarce pardonable. A digreffion on the praises of Italy in the fecond book,† is not more happily introduced: and in the midst of a declamation upon the pleafures of husbandry, which makes part of the fame book, the author introduces himself into the poem without the flighteft connection. In the Lutrin the Goddefs of Difcord is introduced without any connection: fhe is of no confequence in the poem; and acts no part except that of lavishing praise upon Lewis the Fourteenth. The two prefaces of Salluft look as if by fome blunder they had been prefixed to his two hiftories; they will fuit any other history as well, or any fubject as well as history. Even the members of these prefaces are but loosely connected: they look more like a number of maxims or observations than a connected difcourfe.

An episode in a narrative poem, being in effect an acceffory, demands not that ftrict union with the prin cipal

* Lin. 231.

↑ Lin. 186,

+ Lin. 475.

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