By every production that shows art and contrivance, our curiofity is excited upon two points; first, how it was made; and next, to what end. Of the two, the latter is the more important inquiry, because the means are ever fubordinate to the end; and, in fact, our curiofity is always more inflamed by the final than by the efficient caufe. This preference is no where more visible, than in contemplating the works of nature: if in the efficient cause wisdom and power be difplayed, wifdom is no lefs confpicuous in the final caufe; and from it only can we infer benev olence, which of all the divine attributes is to man the most important. Having endeavoured to affign the efficient caufe of dignity and meannefs, by unfolding the principle on which they are founded, we proceed to explain the final caufe of the dignity or meannefs beftowed upon the feveral particulars above mentioned, beginning with corporeal pleasures. Thefe, as far as useful, are, like juftice, fenced with fufficient fanctions to prevent their being neglected: hunger and thirft are painful fenfations; and we are incited to animal love by a vigorous propenfity: were coporeal pleasures dignified over and above with a place in a high clafs, they would infallibly disturb the balance of the mind, by outweighing the focial affections. This is a fatisfactory final caufe for refufing to these pleasures any degree of dignity; and the final caufe is no lefs evident of their meannefs, when they are indulged to excess. The more refined pleafures of external fenfe, conveyed by the eye and the ear from natural objects and from the fine arts, deferve a high place in our esteem, because of their fingular and extenfive utility: in fome cafes they rife to a confiderable dignity; and the very lowest pleasures of the kind are never efteemed mean or groveling. The pleasure arifing from wit, humour, ! $ humour, ridicule, or from what is fimply ludicrous, is ufeful, by relaxing the mind after the fatigue of more manly occupation: but the mind, when it furrenders itself to pleasure of that kind, loses its vigour, and finks gradually into floth.* The place this pleafure occupies in point of dignity, is adjufted to these views: to make it useful as a relaxation, it is not branded with meannefs; to prevent its ufurpation, it is removed from that place but a fingle degree: no man values himself for that pleasure, even during gratification; and if it have engroffed more of his time than is requifite for relaxation, he looks back with fome degree of fhame. In point of dignity, the focial emotions rife above the felfifh, and much above thofe of the eye and ear: man is by his nature a focial being; and to qualify him for fociety, it is wifely contrived, that he should value himself more for being focial than felfish.† The excellency of man is chiefly difcernible in the great improvements he is fufceptible of in fociety: thefe, by perfeverance, may be carried on progreffively above any affignable limits; and, even abstracting from revelation, there is great probability, that the progrefs begun here will be completed in fome future ftate. Now, as all valuable improve ments proceed from the exercife of our rational faculties, the author of our nature, in order to excite us Neque enim ita generati à natura fumus, ut ad ludum et jocum facti elle videamur, fed ad feveritatem potius et ad quaedam ftudia graviora atque majora. Ludo autem et joco, ui illis quidem licet, fed ficut fomne et quietibus caeteris, tum cum gravibus feriifque rebus fatisfecerimus. Cicero de c. lib. 1. For the fame reafon, the felfish emotions that are founded upon a focial principle, rife higher in our elleem than thofe that are founded up on a felfifh principle. As to which fee above, p. 46. note. to a due use of these faculties, hath affigned a high rank to the pleasures of the understanding: their utility, with respect to this life as well as a future, entitles them to that rank. But as action is the aim of all our improvements, virtuous actions juftly poffefs the highest of all the ranks. These, we find, are by nature diftributed into different claffes, and the firft in point of dignity affigned to actions that appear not the firft in point of ufe generofity for example, in the fenfe of mankind is more refpected than justice, though the latter is undoubtedly more effential to fociety; and magnanimity, heroism, undaunted courage, rise still higher in our esteem. One would readily think, that the moral virtues fhould be efteemed according to their importance. Nature has here deviated from her ordinary path, and great wifdom is fhown in the deviation: the efficient caufe is explained above, and the final caufe is explained in the Effays of morality and natural religion.* We proceed to analyse grace, which being in a good measure an uncultivated field, requires more than ordinary labour : Graceful is an attribute: grace and gracefulness exprefs that attribute in the form of a noun. That this attribute is agreeable, no one doubts. As grace is difplayed externally, it must be an object of one or other of our five fenfes. That it is an object of fight, every person of taste can bear witness; and that it is confined to that fenfe, appears from induction; for it is not an object of fmell, nor of taste, nor of touch. Is it an object of hearing? Some mufic indeed is termed graceful; but that expreffion is metaphorical, as when we fay of other mufic that it is beautiful the latter metaphor, at the fame time is Part 1. effay 2. chap. 4. more more sweet and eafy; which fhows how little applicable to mufic or to found the former is, when taken in its proper fenfe. That it is an attribute of man, is beyond difpute. But of what other beings is it also an attribute? We perceive at first fight that nothing inanimate is entitled to that epithet. What animal then, beside man, is entitled? Surely, not an elephant, nor even a lion. A horfe may have a delicate fhape with a lofty mein, and all his motions may be exquifite; but he is never faid to be graceful. Beauty and grandeur are common to man with fome other beings but dignity is not applied to any being inferior to man; and upon the ftricteft examination, the fame appears to hold in grace. Confining then grace to man, the next inquiry is, whether, like beauty, it makes a conftant appearance, or in fome circumftances only. Does a perfon difplay this attribute at reft as well as in motion, afleep as when awake? It is undoubtedly connected with motion; for when the most graceful perfon is at rest, neither moving nor fpeaking, we lofe fight of that quality as much as of colour in the dark. Grace then is an agreeable attribute, infeparable from motion as opposed to reft, and as comprehending fpeech, looks, geftures, and loco-motion. As fome motions are homely, the oppofite to graceful, the next inquiry is, with what motions is this attribute connected? No man appears graceful in a mask; and, therefore, laying afide the expreffions of the countenance, the other motions may be genteel, may be elegant, but of themfelves never are graceful. A motion adjusted in the most perfect manner to answer its end, is elegant; but fill fomewhat more more is required to complete our idea of grace, or gracefulness. What this unknown more may be, is the nice point. One thing is clear from what is faid, that this more muft arife from the expreffion of the countenance and from what expreffions fo naturally as from those which indicate mental qualities, fuch as sweetness, benevolence, elevation, dignity? This promises to be a fair analyfis; because of all objects mental qualties affect us the moft; and the impreffion made by graceful appearance upon every spectator of tafte, is too deep for any caufe purely corporeal, The next step is, to examine what are the mental qualities, that, in conjunction with elegance of motion, produce a graceful appearance. Sweetnefs, cheerfulness, affability, are not feparately fufficient, nor even in conjunction. As it appears to me, dignity alone with elegant motion may produce a graceful appearance; but ftill more graceful, with the aid of other qualities, thofe especially that are the most exalted. But this is not all. The moft exalted virtues may be the lot of a person whofe countenance has little expreffion: fuch a perfon cannot be graceful. Therefore, to produce this appearance, we muft add another circumftance, namely, an expreffive countenance, difplaying to every fpectator of tafte, with life and energy, every thing that paffes in the mind. Collecting thefe circumftances together, grace may be defined, that agreeable appearance which arifes from elegance of motion, and from a countenance expreffive of dignity. Expreffions of other mental qualities are not effential to that appearance, but they heighten it greatly. Of all external objects, a graceful perfon is the most agreeable. Dancing |