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XI.

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Dignity and Grace.

HE terms dignity and meanness are ap plied to man in point of character, fentiment, and behaviour: we fay, for example, of one man, that he hath natural dignity in his air and manner; of another, that he makes a mean figure; we perceive dignity in every action and fentiment of fome perfons; meannefs and valgarity in the actions and fentiments of others. With refpect to the fine arts, fome performances are faid to be manly, and suitable to the dignity of human nature; others are termed low, mean, trivial. Such expreffions are common, though they have not always a precife meaning. With refpect to the art of criticism, it must be a real acquifition to afcertain what these terms truly import; which poffibly may enable us to rank every performance in the fine arts according to its dignity.

Inquiring firft to what fubjects the terms dignity and meanness are appropriated, we foon difcover, that. they are not applicable to any thing inanimate: the moft magnificent palace that ever was built, may be lofty, may be grand, but it has no relation to dignity: the most diminutive fhrub may be little, but it is not mean. These terms must belong to. fenfitive beings, probably to man only; which will be evident when we advance in the inquiry.

Human actions appear in many different lights: in themselves they appear grand or little; with respect to the author, they appear proper or improper; with respect to those affected by them, just or unjust;.

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and I now add, that they are alfo diftinguished by dignity and meannefs. If any one incline to think, that, with respect to human actions, dignity coincides with grandeur, and meanness with littleness, the dif 'ference will be evident upon reflecting, that an action may be grand without being virtuous, and little without being faulty; but that we never attribute dignity to any action but what is virtuous, nor meannefs to any but what is faulty. Every action of dignity creates refpect and esteem for the author; and a mean action draws upon him contempt. A man is admired for a grand action, but frequently is neither loved nor efteemed for it: neither is a man always contemned for a low or little action. The action of Cæfar paffing the Rubicon was grand; but there was no dignity in it, confidering that his purpose was to enflave his country: Cæfar, in a march, taking opportunity of a rivulet to quench his thirst, did a low action, but the action was not mean.

As it appears to me, dignity and meannefs are founded on a natural principle not hitherto mentioned. Man is endowed with a SENSE of the worth and excellence of his nature: he deems it more perfect than that of the other beings around him; and he perceives, that the perfection of his nature confifts in virtue, particularly in virtues of the highest rank. To exprefs that fenfe, the term dignity is appropriated. Further, to behave with dignity, and to refrain from all mean actions, is felt to be, not a virtue only, but a duty it is a duty every man owes to himself. By acting in that manner, he attracts love and efteem: by acting meanly, or below himself, he is difapproved and contemned.

According to the description here given of dignity and meannefs, they appear to be a fpecies of propriety and impropriety. Many actions may be proper or improper, to which dignity or meannefs cannot be applied :

applied to eat when one is hungry, is proper, but there is no dignity in that action; revenge fairly taken, if againft law, is improper, but not mean. But every actionof dignity is alfo proper, and every mean action is also improper.

This fenfe of the dignity of human nature, reaches even our pleasures and amusements: if they enlarge the mind by raising grand or elevated emotions, or if they humanize the mind by exercifing our fympathy, they are approved as fuited to the dignity of our nature: if they contract the mind by fixing it on trivial objects, they are contemned as not fuited to the dignity of our nature. Hence, in general, every occupation, whether of use or amusement, that corresponds to the dignity of man, is termed manly; and every occupation below his nature, is termed childish.

To those who study human nature, there is a point which has always appeared intricate: How comes it that generofity and courage are more efteemed, and bestow more dignity, than good-nature, or even juftice; though the latter contribute more than the former to private as well as to public happiness? This question, bluntly propofed, might puzzle a cunning philofopher: but, by means of the following obfervations, will eafily be folved. Human virtues, like other objects, obtain a rank in our estimation, not from their utility, which is a fubject of reflection, but from the direct impreffion they make on us. Juftice and good-nature are a fort of negative virtues, that scarce make any impreffion but when they are trangreffed courage and generofity, on the contrary, producing elevated emotions, enliven greatly the fense of a man's dignity, both in himself and in others; and for that reafon, courage and generofity are in higher regard than the other virtues mentioned:

ed: we defcribe them as grand and elevated, as of greater dignity, and more praise-worthy.

This leads us to examine more directly emotions and paffions with refpect to the present subject; and it will not be difficult to form a scale of them, beginning with the meaneft, and afcending gradually to those of the highest rank and dignity. Pleasure felt as at the organ of sense, named corporeal pleafure, is perceived to be low; and when indulged to excefs, is perceived alfo to be mean: for that reafon, perfons of any delicacy diffemble the pleasure they take in eating and drinking. The pleafures of the eye and ear, having no organic feeling,* and being free from any fenfe of meannefs, are indulged without any shame: they even rise to a certain degree of dignity when their objects are grand or elevated. The fame is the case of the fympathetic paffions: a virtuous perfon behaving with fortitude and dignity under cruel misfortunes, makes a capital figure; and the fympathifing spectator feels in himself the fame dignity. Sympathetic distress at the fame time never is mean: on the contrary, it is agreeable to the nature of a focial being, and has general approbation. The rank that love poffeffes in the fcale, depends in a great measure on its object it poffeffes a low place when founded on external properties, merely; and is mean when beflowed on a perfon of inferior rank without any extraordinary qualification: but when founded on the more elevated internal properties, it affumes a confiderable degree of dignity. The fame is the cafe of friendfhip. When gratitude is warm, it animates the mind; but it fcarce rifes to dignity. Joy bestows dignity when it proceeds from an elevated caufe.

If I can depend upon induction, dignity is not a property of any difagreeable paffion: one is flight, another

* See the Introduction.

another fevere; one depreffes the mind, another ani mates it; but there is no elevation, far lefs dignity, in any of them. Revenge, in particular, though it inflame and fwell the mind, is not accompanied with dignity, nor even with elevation: it is not, however, felt as mean or groveling, unless when it takes indi ⚫rect measures for gratification. Shame and remorse, though they fink the spirits, are not mean. Pride, a difagreeable paffion, bestows no dignity in the eye of a fpectator. Vanity always appears mean; and extremely so where founded, as commonly happens, on trivial qualifications.

I proceed to the pleasures of the understanding, which poffefs à high rank in point of dignity. Of this every one will be fenfible, when he confiders the important truths that have been laid open by science; fuch as general theorems, and the general laws that govern the material and moral worlds. The pleafures of the understanding are fuited to man as a ra◄ tional and contemplative being; and they tend not a little to ennoble his nature; even to the Deity he ftretcheth his contemplations, which, in the discovery of infinite power, wifdom, and benevolence, afford delight of the most exalted kind. Hence it appears, that the fine arts ftudied as a rational science, afford entertainment of great dignity; fuperior far to what they afford as a subject of taste merely.

But contemplation, however in itself valuable, is chiefly refpected as fubfervient to action; for man is intended to be more an active than a contemplative being. He accordingly fhows more dignity in action than in contemplation: generofity, magnanimity, heroism, raise his character to the highest pitch: these best exprefs the dignity of his nature, and advance him nearer to divinity than any other of his attributes. By