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unbecoming actions, too rifible for anger, and too ferious for derifion, the fpectator feels a fort of mixt emotion, partaking both of derifion and of anger : which accounts for an expreffion, common with refpect to the impropriety of fome actions. That we know not whether to laugh or be angry.

. It cannot fail to be observed, that in the cafe of a rifible impropriety, which is always flight, the contempt we have for the offender is extremely faint, though derifion, its gratification, is extremely pleaf

This difproportion between a paffion and its gratification, may feem not conformable to the analogy of nature. In looking about for a folution, I reflect upon what is laid down above, that an improper action, not only moves our contempt for the author, but alfo, by means of contraft, fwells the good opinion we have of ourselves. This contributes, more than any other particular, to the pleasure we have in ridiculing follies and abfurdities: and accordingly, it is well known, that thofe who have the greateft fhare of vanity; are the most prone to laugh at others. Vanity, which is a vivid paffion, pleasant in itself, and not less so in its gratification, would fingly be fufficient to account for the pleasure of ridicule, without borrowing any aid from contempt. Hence appears the reafon of a noted obfervation,. That we are the most difpofed to ridicule the blunders and abfurdities of others, when we are in high fpirits; for in high fpirits, felf-conceit difplays itself with more than ordinary vigour.

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Having with wary fteps traced an intricate road, not without danger of wandering; what remains to complete our journey, is to account for the final cause of congruity and propriety, which make fo great a figure in the human conftitution. One final caufe, regarding congruity, is pretty obvious, that the fenfe

of

of congruity, as one principle of the fine arts, contributes in a remarkable degree to our entertainment; which is the final caufe affigned above for our fense of proportion, and need not be enlarged upon here. Congruity, indeed, with refpect to quantity, coincides with proportion: when the parts of a building are nicely adjusted to each other, it may be faid indifferently, that it is agreeable, by the congruity of its parts, or by the proportion of its parts. But propriety, which regards voluntary agents only, can never be the fame with proportion: a very long nofe is difproportioned, but cannot be termed improper. In fome inftances, it is true, impropriety coincides with difproportion in the fame fubject, but never in the fame refpect. I give for an example a very little man buckled to a long toledo: confidering the man and the fword with respect to fize, we perceive a difproportion: confidering the fword as the choice of the man, we perceive an impropriety.

The fenfe of impropriety with refpect to mistakes, blunders, and abfurdities, is evidently calculated for the good of mankind. In the fpectators it is productive of mirth and laughter, excellent recreation in an interval from bufinefs. But this is a trifle compared to what follows. It is painful to be the fubject of ridicule; and to punish with ridicule the man who is guilty of an abfurdity, tends to put him more on his guard in time coming. It is well ordered, that even the most innocent blunder is not committed with impunity because, were errors licensed where they do no hurt, inattention would grow into habit, and be the occafion of much hurt.

The final caufe of propriety, as to moral duties, is ofall the most illustrious. To have a juft notion of it, the moral

* See chap. 3.

moral duties that refpect others must be distinguished from those that refpect ourselves. Fidelity, gratitude, and abftinence from injury, are examples of the first fort; temperance, modefty, firmness of mind, are examples of the other: the former are made duties by the fenfe of justice; the latter, by the fenfe of propriety. Here is a final caufe of the fenfe of propriety that will roufe our attention. It is undoubtedly the intereft of every man to fuit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the station alloted him by Providence; for fuch rational conduct contributes in every respect to happiness, by preferving health, by procuring plenty, by gaining the esteem of others, and, which of all is the greatest bleffing, by gaining a juftly founded felf-esteem. But in a matter fo effential to our well-being, even felf-intereft is not relied on : the powerful authority of duty is fuperadded to the motive of interest. The God of nature, in all things effential to our happiness, hath obferved one uni form method: to keep us fteady in our conduct, he hath fortified us with natural laws and principles, preventive of many aberrations, which would daily happen were we totally furrendered to fo fallible a guide as is human reafon. Propriety cannot rightly be confidered in another light, than as the natural law that regulates our conduct with respect to ourfelves; as juftice is the natural law that regulates our conduct with refpect to others. I call propriety a law, no less than justice; because both are equally rules of conduct that ought to be obeyed: propriety includes that obligation; for to fay an action is proper, is in other words to fay, that it ought to be performed; and to say it is improper, is in other words to fay, that it ought to be forborne. It is that very character of ought and fhould which makes justice a law to us; and the fame character is applicable to pro

priety,

priety, though perhaps more faintly than to justice: but the difference is in degree only, not in kind; and we ought, without hesitation or reluctance, to fubmit equally to the government of both.

But I have more to urge upon that head. To the fense of propriety as well as of justice, are annexed the fanctions of rewards and punishments; which evidently prove the one to be a law as well as the other. The fatisfaction a man hath in doing his duty, joined to the esteem and good-will of others, is the reward that belongs to both equally. The pun ifhments alfo, though not the fame, are nearly allied; and differ in degree more than in quality. Difobedience to the law of justice is punished with remorfe; difobedience to the law of propriety, with fhame, which is remorfe in a lower degree. Every tranfgreffion of the law of juftice raises indignation in the beholder; and fo doth every flagrant tranfgreffion of the law of propriety. Slighter improprieties receive a milder punishment: they are always rebuked with fome degree of contempt, and frequently with derifion. In general, it is true, that the rewards and punishments annexed to the sense of propriety are flighter in degree than those annexed to the fenfe of justice: which is wifely ordered, because duty to others is ftill more effential to fociety than duty to ourselves: fociety, indeed, could not fubfift a moment, were individuals not protected from the headstrong and turbulent paffions of their neighbours.

The final caufe now unfolded of the fenfe of propriety, muft, to every difcerning eye, appear delightful and yet this is but a partial view; for that fenfe reaches another illuftrious end, which is, in conjunction with the fenfe of juftice, to enforce the performance of focial duties. In fact, the fanctions vifibly contrived to compel a man to be just to himself,

are

are equally ferviceable to compel him to be just to others; which will be evident from a fingle reflection, That an action, by being unjuft, ceases not to be improper: an action never appears more eminently improper, than when it is unjuft: it is obvioufly becoming, and fuitable to human nature, that each man do his duty to others; and, accordingly, every tranfgreffion of duty to others, is at the fame time a tranfgreffion of duty to one's felf. This is a plain truth without exaggeration; and it opens a new and enchanting view in the moral landscape, the profpect being greatly enriched by the multiplication of agreeable objects. It appears now, that nothing is overlooked, nothing left undone, that can poffibly contribute to the enforcing focial duty; for to all the fanctions that belong to it fingly, are fuperadded the fanctions of felf-duty. A familiar example fhall fuffice for illuftration. An act of ingratitude, confidered in itself, is to the author difagreeable, as well as to every fpectator: confidered by the author with relation to himself, it raifes felf-contempt confidered by him with relation to the world, it makes him afhamed confidered by others, it raises their contempt and indignation against the author. These feelings are all of them occafioned by the impropriety of the action. When the action is confidered as unjuft, it occafions another fet of feelings in the author it produces remorfe, and a dread of merited punishment; and in others, the benefactor chiefly, indignation and hatred directed to the ungrateful perfon. Thus fhame and remorfe united in the ungrateful perfon, and indignation united with hatred in the hearts of others, are the punishments provided by nature for injuftice. Stupid and infenfible muft he be, who, in a contrivance fo exquifite, perceives not the benevolent hand of our Creator. CHAP.

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