perfect between the human mind and the works of na ture, is extremely remarkable. The oppofition between variety and uniformity is fo great, that one would not readily imagine they could both be relished by the fame palate; at least not in the fame object, nor at the fame time: it is however true, that the pleasures they afford, being happily adjufted to each other, and readily mixing in intimate union, are frequently produced by the fame individual object. Nay, further, in the objects that touch us the moft, uniformity and variety are con、 ftantly combined; witnefs natural objects, where this combination is always found in perfection. Hence it is, that natural objects readily form themfelves into groups, and are agreeable in whatever manner combined: a wood with its trees, fhrubs and herbs, is agreeable: the mufic of birds, the lowing of cattle, and the murmuring of a brook, are in con junction delightful; though they ftrike the ear without modulation or harmony. In fhort, nothing can be more happily accommodated to the inward conftitution of man, than that mixture of uniformity with variety, which the eye difcovers in natural objects; and, accordingly, the mind is never more highly gratified than in contemplating a natural landscape.

CHAP.

СНАР. Х.

Congruity and Propriety.

MAN is fuperior to the brute, not more by

his rational faculties, than by his fenfes. With respect to external fenfes, brutes probably yield not to men; and they may also have fome obfcure percep tion of beauty: but the more delicate fenfes of reg ularity, order, uniformity, and congruity, being connected with morality and religion, are referved to dignify the chief of the terreftrial creation. Upon that account, no difcipline is more fuitable to man, nor more congruous to the dignity of his nature, than that which refines his tafte, and leads him to distinguish, in every fubject, what is regular, what is orderly, what is fuitable, and what is fit and proper.*

It is clear from the very conception of the terms congruity and propriety, that they are not applicable to any fingle object: they imply a plurality, and obviously fignify a particular relation between different objects. Thus we fay currently, that a decent garb is fuitable or proper for a judge, modeft behaviour for a young woman, and a lofty style for an epic poem:

and,

*Nec vero illa parva vis naturæ eft rationifque, quod unum hoc animal fentit quid fit ordo, quid fit quod deceat in factis dictifque, qui modus. Itaque eorum ipforum, quæ afpectu fentiuntur, nullum aliud ani mal, pulchritudinem, venuftatem, convenientiam partium fentit. Quam fimilitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, conflantiam, ordinem, in conciliis factifque confervandum putat, cavetque ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat; tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinofe aut faciat aut ccgitet. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quærimus, hone tum. Cicero de Officiis, l. 1.

and, on the other hand, that it is unfuitable or incongruous to fee a little woman funk in an overgrown farthingale, a coat richly embroidered covering coarse and dirty linen, a mean fubject in an elevated ftyle, an elevated fubject in a mean ftyle, a firft minifter darning his wife's stocking, or a reverend prelate in lawn fleeves dancing a hornpipe.

The perception we have of this relation, which feems peculiar to man, cannot proceed from any other caufe, but from a fenfe of congruity or propriety; for, fuppofing us deftitute of that fenfe, the terms would be to us unintelligible.*

It is matter of experience, that congruity or propriety, wherever perceived, is agreeable; and that incongruity or impropriety, wherever perceived, is difagreeable. The only difficulty is, to afcertain what are the particular objects that in conjunction fuggeft thefe relations; for there are many objects that do not the fea, for example, viewed in conjunction with a picture, or a man viewed in conjunction with a mountain, fuggeft not either congruity or incongruity. It feems natural to infer, what will be found true by induction, that we never perceive con

gruity

From many things that pafs current in the world without being generally condemned, one at firft view would imagine, that the fenfe of congruity or propriety hath fearce any foundation in nature; and that it is rather an artificial refinement of those who affect to diftinguish themfelves from others. The fulfome panegyrics bestowed upon the great and opulent, in epifles dedicatory and other fuch compofitions, would incline us to think fo. Did there prevail in the world, it will be faid, or did nature fuggeft, a tafle of what is fuitable, decent, or proper, would any good writer deal in fuch compofitions, or any man of fenfe receive them without difguft? Can it be fuppofed that Lewis XIV. of France was endued by nature with any fenfe of propriety, when, in a dramatic performance purpofely compofed for his entertainment, he fuffered himself, publicly and in his prefence, to be flyled the greateft king ever the earth produced? Thefe, it is true, are ftrong facts; but luckily they do not prove the fenfe of propriety to be artificial: they only prove, that the fenfe of propriety is at times overpowered by pride and vanity; which is no fingular cafe, for that fometimes is the fate even of the fense of juftice.

gruity nor incongruity but among things that are connected by fome relation; fuch as a man and his actions, a principal and its acceffories, a subject and its òrnaments. We are indeed fo framed by nature, as, among things fo connected, to require a certain fuitablenefs or correfpondence, termed congruity or propriety; and to be displeased when we find the oppofite relation of incongruity or impropriety.

If things connected be the fubject of congruity, it is reafonable beforehand to expect a degree of congruity proportioned to the degree of the connection. And, upon examination we find our expectation to be 22 well founded: where the relation is intimate, as between a cause and its effect, a whole and its parts, we require the ftrictest congruity; but where the relation is flight, or accidental, as among things jumbled together, we require little or no congruity: the ftricteft propriety is required in behaviour and manner of living; because a man is connected with these by the relation of caufe and effect: the relation between an edifice and the ground it ftands upon is of the most intimate kind, and therefore the fituation of a great house ought to be lofty: its relation to neighbouring

In the chapter of beauty, qualities are diftinguifhed into primary and fecondary and to clear fome obfcurity that may appear in the text, it is proper to be obferved, that the fame diftinction is applicable to relations. Refemblance, equality, uniformity, proximity, are relations that depend not on us, but exift equally whether perceived or not; and upon thas account may juftly be termed primary relations. But there are other relations, that only appear fuch to us, and that have not any external exiftence like primary relations; which is the cafe of congruity, incongruity, propriety, impropriety thefe may be properly termed fecondary rela tions. Thus it appears from what is faid in the text, that the fecondary relations mentioned arife from objects connected by fome primary rela tion. Property is an example of a fecondary relation, as it exifts no where but in the mind. I purchase a field or a horse: the covenant makes the primary relation; and the fecondary relation built on it is property.

bouring hills, rivers, plains, being that of propinquity only, demands but a fmall share of congruity: among members of the fame club, the congruity ought to be confiderable, as well as among things placed for fhow in the fame niche: among paffengers in a stage-coach we require very little congruity; and lefs ftill at a public fpectacle.

Congruity is fo nearly allied to beauty, as commonly to be held a fpecies of it; and yet they differ fo effentially, as never to coincide: beauty, like colour, is placed upon a fingle fubject: congruity upon a plurality: further, a thing beautiful in itself, may, with relation to other things, produce the ftrongest sense of incongruity.

Congruity and propriety are commonly reckoned fynonimous terms; and hitherto in opening the fubject they have been ufed indifferently; but they are diftinguifhable; and the precife meaning of each muft be afcertained. Congruity is the genus, of which propriety is a fpecies; for we call nothing propriety, but that congruity or fuitablenefs, which ought to fubfift between fenfible beings and their thoughts, words, and actions.

In order to give a full view of these fecondary rela tions, I fhall. trace them through fome of the most confiderable primary relations. The relation of a part to the whole, being extremely intimate, demands the utmoft degree of congruity: even the flightest deviation is difguftful; witnefs the Lutrin, a bur lefque poem, which is clofed with a ferious and warm panegyric on Lamoignon, one of the King's judges: -Amphora coepit

Inftitui; currente rota, cur urceus exit ?

Examples of congruity and incongruity are furnished in plenty by the relation between a fubject and

its