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fome matters fufceptible of great refinement, time is perhaps the only infallible touchstone of tafte to that he appeals, and to that he cheerfully fubmits.

N. B. THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, meaning the whole, is a title too affuming for this work. "A number of thefe elements or principles are here unfolded: but, as the, author is far from imagining that he has completed the lift, a more humble title is proper, fuch as may express any number of parts lefs than the whole. This he thinks is fignified by the title he has chofen, viz. ELEMENTS OF CRIT

ICISM.

i.

ELEMENTS

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ELEMENTS

CRITICIS M.

CHAPTER I.

Perceptions and Ideas in a Train.

A MAN, while awake, is confcious of a con

tinued train of perceptions and ideas paffing in his mind. It requires no activity on his part to carry on the train : nor can he at will add any idea to the train*. At the fame time, we learn from daily experience, that the train of our thoughts is not regulated by chance: and if it depend not upon will, nor upon chance, by what law is it governed? The question is of importance in the science of human nature; and I promise beforehand, that it will be found of great importance in the fine arts.

It appears, that the relations by which things are linked together, have a great influence in directing the train of thought. Taking a view of external objects, their inherent

*For how fhould this be done ? what idea is it that we are to add ? If we can fpecify the idea, that idea is already in the mind, and there is no occafion for any act of the will. If we cannot fpecify any idea, I next demand, how can a perfon will, or to what purpofe, if there be nothing in view? We can not form a conception of fuch a thing. If this argument need confirmation, I urge experience: whoever makes a trial will find, that ideas are linked together in the mind, forming a connected chain; and that we have not the com, mand of any idea independent of the chain.

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herent properties are not more remarkable than the various relations that connect them together: Cause and effect, contiguity in time or in place, high and low, prior and pofterior, refemblance, contraft, and a thoufand other relations, connect things together without end. Not a fingle thing appears folitary and altogether devoid of connection; the only difference is, that fome are intimately connected, fome more flightly; fome near, fome at a distance.

Experience will fatisfy us of what reafon makes probable, that the train of our thoughts is in a great meafure regulated by the foregoing relations: an external object is no fooner prefented to us in idea, than it fuggefts to the mind other objects to which it is related; and in that manner is a train of thoughts compofed. Such is the law of fucceffion; which must be natural, because it governs all human beings. The law, however, feems not to be inviolable: it fometimes happens that an idea arifes in the mind without any perceived connection; as, for example, after a profound fleep.

But, though we cannot add to the train an unconnected idea, yet in a measure we can attend to fome ideas, and difmifs others. There are few things but what are connected with many others; and, when a thing thus connected becomes a fubject of thought, it commonly fuggefts many of its connections: among thefe a choice. is afforded; we can infift upon one, rejecting others; and fometimes we infift on what is commonly held the flighter connection. Where ideas are left to their natural course, they are continued through the ftrictest connections: the mind extends its view to a fon more readily than to a fervant; and more readily to a neighbour than to one living at a distance. This order, as obferved, may be varied by will, but fill within the limits of related objects; for though we can vary the order of a natural train, we cannot diffolve the train altogether, by carrying on our thoughts in a loofe manner without

any

any connection. So far doth our power extend; and that power is fufficient for all useful purpofes: to have more power, would probably be hurtful inftead of being falutary.

Will is not the only caufe that prevents a train of thought from being continued through the ftricteft connections: much depends on the prefent tone of mind: for a fubject that accords with that tone is always wel come. Thus, in good fpirits, a cheerful fubject will be introduced by the flightest connection; and one that is melancholy, no lefs readily in low fpirits: an interesting subject is recalled, from time to time, by any connection indifferently, ftrong or weak; which is finely touched by Shakespear, with relation to a rich cargo at fea.

My wind, cooling my broth,

Would blow me to an ague, when I thought
What harm a wind too great might do at sea.
I fhould not fee the fandy hour-glafs run,
But I fhould think of fhallows and of flats;
And fee my wealthy Andrew dock'd in fand,
Vailing her high top lower than her ribs,
To kifs her burial. Should I go to church,
And fee the holy edifice of ftone,

And not bethink me ftrait of dangerous rocks?
- Which touching but my gentle vessel's fide,
Would scatter all the fpices on the stream,
Enrobe the roaring waters with my filks;
And, in a word, but now worth this,
And now worth nothing.

Merchant of Venice, at 1. fc. 1.

Another caufe clearly diftinguishable from that now mentioned, hath alfo a confiderable influence to vary the natural train of ideas; which is, that, in the minds of fome perfons, thoughts and circumftances crowd upon each other by the flightest connections. I afcribe this to a bluntnefs in the difcerning faculty; for a perfon who cannot accurately diftinguish between a flight connection and one that is more intimate, is equally affected

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by.

by each fuch a perfon muft neceffarily have a great flow of ideas, becaufe they are introduced by any relation indifferently; and the flighter relations, being without number, furnish ideas without end. This doctrine is, in a lively manner, illuftrated by Shakespear.

Falftuff. What is the grofs fum that I owe thee?

Hoftefs. Marry, if thou wert an honeft man, thy felf and thy money too. Thou didft fwear to me on a parcel-gilt-goblet, fitting in my Dolphinchamber, at the round table, by a fea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitfun-week, when the Prince broke thy head for likening him to a finging man of Windfor, thou didft fwear to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my Lady thy wife. Canft thou deny it? Did not Goodwife Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Goffip Quickly? coming in to borrow a mess of vinegar; telling us fhe had a good difh of prawns; whereby thou didst defire to eat fome; whereby I told thee they were ill for a green wound. And didft not thou, when the was gone down ftairs, defire me to be no more fo familiar with fuch poor people, faying, that ere long they fhould call me Madam? And didft thou not kifs me, and bid me fetch thee thirty fhillings? I put thee now to thy book-oath, deny it if thou canft? Second Part, Henry IV. ad 2. fc. 2.

On the other hand, a man of accurate judgment cannot have a great flow of ideas; because the flighter relations, making no figure in his mind, have no power to introduce ideas. And hence it is, that accurate judgment is not friendly to declamation or copious eloquence. This reafoning is confirmed by experience; for it is a noted obfervation, That a great or comprehenfive memory is feldom connected with a good judgment.

As an additional confirmation, I appeal to another noted obfervation, That wit and judgment are seldom united. Wit confifts chiefly in joining things by diftant and fanciful relations, which furprise because they are unexpected fuch relations, being of the flighteft kind, readily occur tothofe only who make every relation equally welcome. Wit, upon that account, is in a good meas ure incompatible with folid judgment; which, negle&ting trivial relations, adheres to what are fubftantial and permanent.

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