for an ardent emotion, which is not fufceptible of increafe, cannot have a long courfe. But their short duration is occafioned chiefly by that of their causes: we are foon reconciled to an object, however unexpected; and novelty foon degenerates into familiarity.

Whether these emotions be pleasant or painful, is not a clear point. It may appear ftrange, that our own feelings and their capital qualities, fhould af ford any matter for a doubt: but when we are engroffed by any emotion, there is no place for fpeculation; and when fufficiently calm for fpeculation, it is not eafy to recal the emotion with accuracy. New objects are fometimes terrible, fometimes delightful The terror which a tyger infpires is greateft at first, and wears off gradually by familiarity: on the other hand, even women will acknowledge that it is novelty which pleases the most in a new fashion. It would be rafh however to conclude, that wonder is in itself neither pleasant nor painful, but that it affumes either quality according to circumftances. An object it is true, that hath a threatening appearance, adds to our terror by its novelty but from that experiment it doth not follow, that novelty is in itself disagreeable; for it is perfectly confiftent, that we be delighted with an object in one view, and terrified with it in another: a river in flood fwelling over its banks, is a grand and delightful object; and yet it may produce no fmall degree of fear when we attempt to cross it: courage and magnanimity are agreeable; and yet, when we view thefe qualities in an enemy, they ferve to increase our terror. In the fame manner, novelty may produce two effects clearly distinguishable from each other: it may, di. rectly and in itself, be agreeable; and it may have an oppofite effect indirectly, which is, to infpire terror;

for

for when a new object appears in any degree dangerous, our ignorance of its powers and qualities, affords ample scope for the imagination to drefs it in the most frightful colours.* The first fight of a lion, for example, may at the fame inftant produce two oppofite feelings, the pleasant emotion of wonder, and the painful paffion of terror: the novelty of the object produces the former directly, and contributes to the latter indirectly. Thus, when the fubject is analysed, we find, that the power which novelty hath indirectly to inflame terror, is perfectly confiftent with its being in every circumstance agreeable. The matter may be put in the cleareft light, by adding the following circumftances. If a lion be firft feen froma place of fafety, the fpectacle is altogether agreeable without the leaft mixture of terror. If, again, the first fight puts us within reach of that dangerous animal, our terror may be fo great as quite to exclude any fense of novelty. But this fact proves not that wonder is painful: it proves only, that wonder may be excluded by a more powerful paffion. Every man may be made certain from his own experience, that wonder raised by a new object which is inoffenfive, is always pleafant; and with refpect to offenfive objects, it appears from the foregoing deduction, that the fame must hold as long as the fpectator can attend to the novelty.

Whether furprise be in itself pleasant or painful, is a question no lefs intricate than the former. It is certain that surprise inflames our joy, when unexpect edly we meet with an old friend, and our terror when we ftumble upon any thing noxious. To clear that question, the first thing to be remarked is, that in

fome

*Effays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, part s. self. 6.

fome inftances an unexpected object overpowers the mind, fo as to produce a momentary ftupefaction: where the object is dangerous, or appears fo, the fudden alarm it gives, without preparation, is apt totally to unhinge the mind, and for a moment to fufpend all its faculties, even thought itself;* in which state a man is quite helpless; and if he move at all, is as like to run upon the danger as from it. Surprise carried to fuch a height, cannot be either pleafant or painful; because the mind, during fuch momentary ftupefaction, is in a good measure, if not totally, infenfible.

If we then inquire for the character of this emotion, it must be where the unexpected object or event produceth less violent effects. And while the mind remains fenfible of pleasure and pain, is it not natural to suppose, that surprise, like wonder, fhould have an invariable character? I am inclined however to think, that surprise has no invariable character, but af fumes that of the object which raifes it. Wonder being an emotion invariably raised by novelty, and being distinguishable from all other emotions, ought naturally to poffefs one conftant character. The unexpected appearance of an object, feems not equally entitled to produce an emotion diftinguishable from that which is produced by the object in its ordinary appearance the effect it ought naturally to have, is only to fwell that emotion, by making it more pleafant or more painful than it commonly is. And that conjecture is confirmed by experience, as well as by language, which is built upon experience: when a man meets a friend unexpectedly, he is faid to be agreeably furprised; and when he meets an enemy unexpectedly, he is faid to be difagreeably furprised.

* Hence the Latin names for furprife, torpor, animi, ftupor,

It

It appears, then, that the fole effect of furprife is to fwell the emotion raised by the object. And that effect can be clearly explained: a tide of connected perceptions glide gently into the mind, and produce no perturbation; but an object breaking in unex, pectedly, founds an alarm, roufes the mind out of its calm ftate, and directs its whole attention to the object, which, if agreeable becomes doubly fo. Several circumftances concur to produce that effect: on the one hand, the agitation of the mind, and its keen attention, prepare it in the moft effectual manner for receiving a deep impreffion: on the other hand, the object, by its fudden and unforeseen appearance, makes an impreffion, not gradually as expected objects do, but as at one ftroke with its whole force. The circumstances are precisely similar where the object is in itself disagreeable.*

The

* What the Marefchal Saxe terms le cœur humain is no other than fear occafioned by furprife. It is owing to that caufe that an ambush is generally fo deftructive: intelligence of it beforehand renders it harmlefs. The Marefchal gives from Cæfar's Commentaries two examples of what he calls le caur humain. At the fiege of Amiens by the Gauls, Cafar came up with his army, which did not exceed 7000 men, and be gan to intrench himfelf in fuch hurry, that the barbarians, judging him to be afraid, attacked his intrenchments with great fpirit. During the time they were filling up the ditch, he iffued out with his cohorts; and, by attacking them unexpectedly, ftruck a panic that made them fly with precipitation, not a fingle man offering to make a fland. At the fiege of Alefia, the Gauls, infinitely fuperior in number, attacked the Roman lines of circumvallation, in order to raise the fiege. Cæfar ordered a body of his men to march out filently, and to attack them on the one flank, while he with another body did the fame on the other flank. The furprife of being attacked when they expected a defence only, put the Gauls into diforder, and gave an easy victory to Cæfar.

A third may be added, no lefs memorable. In the year 846, an oh. inate battle was fought between Xamire King of Leon, and Abdoul rahman the Moorish King of Spain. After a very long conflict, the night only prevented the Arabians from obtaining a complete victory. The King of Leon, taking advantage of the darknefs, retreated to a meighbouring hill, leaving the Arabians mafters of the field of battle.

The pleasure of novelty is easily distinguished from that of variety: to produce the latter, a plurality of objects is neceffary; the former arifes from a circumftance found in a fingle object. Again, where objects, whether coexiftent or in fucceffion, are fufficiently diverfified, the pleasure of variety is complete, though every fingle object of the train be familiar: but the pleasure of novelty, directly oppofite to familiarity, requires no diverfification.

There are different degrees of novelty, and its ef fects are in proportion. The lowest degree is found in objects furveyed a fecond time after a long interval; and that in this cafe an object takes on fome appearance of novelty, is certain from experience: a large building of many parts variously adorned, or an extenfive field embellished with trees, lakes, temples, ftatues, and other ornaments, will appear new oftener than once the memory of an object fo complex is foon loft, of its parts at leaft, or of their ar rangement. But experience teaches, that even without any decay of remembrance, abfence alone will give an air of novelty to a once familiar object; which is not furprifing, because familiarity wears off gradually by abfence: thus a perfon with whom we have been intimate, returning after a long interval, appears like a new acquaintance: and diftance of place contributes to this appearance, no lefs than diftance of time: a friend, for example, after a fhort abfence in a remote country, has the fame air of Novelty

Next morning, perceiving that he could not maintain his place for want of provifions, nor be able to draw off his men in the face of a victorious army, he ranged his men in order of battle, and, without lofing a mɔment, marched to attack the enemy, refolving to conquer or die. The Arabians, aftonifhed to be attacked by thofe who were conquered the night before, loft all heart: fear fucceeded to aftonishment, the panic was univerfal, and they all turned their backs almost without drawing a fword.