The prefent fubject gives birth to feveral other ob fervations, for which I could not find room above, without relaxing more from the ftrictnefs of order and connection, than with fafety could be indulged in difcourfing upon an intricate fubject. Thefe obfervations I fhall throw out loosely as they occur.

No action, right nor wrong, is indifferent even to a mere fpectator: if right, it infpires efteem; difgust, if wrong. But it is remarkable, that thefe emotions feldom are accompanied with defire: the abilities of man are limited, and he finds fufficient employment, in relieving the diftreffed, in requiting his benefactors, and in punishing those who wrong him, without moving out of his fphere, for the benefit or chaftifement of thofe with whom he has no connection.

ers.

If the good qualities of others raise my esteem, the fame qualities in myfelf muft produce a fimilar effect in a fuperior degree, upon account of the natural partiality every man hath for himself and this increafes felf-love. If thefe qualities be of a high rank, they produce a conviction of fuperiority, which excites me to affume fome fort of government over othMean qualities, on the other hand, produce in me a conviction of inferiority, which makes me fubmit to others. Thefe convictions, diftributed among individuals by meafure and proportion, may juftly be efteemed the folid bafis of government; becaufe upon them depend the natural fubmiffion of the many to the few, without which even the mildeft government would be in a violent ftate, and have a conftant tendency to diffolution.

No other branch of the human conftitution fhows more vifibly our deftination for fociety, nor tends more to our improvement, than appetite for fame or efteem for as the whole conveniencies of life are de rived from mutual aid and support in fociety, it ought

to

to be a capital aim to fecure thefe conveniencies, by gaining the esteem and affection of others. Reafon, indeed, dictates that leffon: but reafon alone is not fufficient in a matter of fuch importance; and the appetite mentioned is a motive more powerful than reason, to be active in gaining efteem and affection. That appetite, at the fame time, is finely adjusted to the moral branch of our conftitution, by promoting all the moral virtues: for what means are there to attract love and esteem so effectual as a virtuous courfe of life? If a man be juft and beneficent, if he be temperate, modeft, and prudent, he will infallibly gain the esteem and love of all who know him.

Communication of paffion to related objects, is an illuftrious inftance of the care of Providence to extend focial connections as far as the limited nature of man can admit. That communication is fo far hurtful, as to spread the malevolent paffions beyond their natural, bounds but let it be remarked, that this unhappy effect regards favages only, who give way to malevolent paffions; for under the difcipline of fociety, these paflions being fubdued, are in a good measure eradicated; and in their place fucceed the kindly affections, which, meeting with all encouragement, take poffeffion of the mind, and govern all our actions. In that condition, the progrefs of paffion along related objects, by fpreading the kindly affections through a multitude of individuals, hath a glorious effect.

Nothing can be more entertaining to a rational mind, than the economy of the human paffions, of which I have attempted to give fome faint notion. It muft however be acknowledged, that our paffions, when they happen to fwell beyond proper limits, take on a lefs regular appearance: reafon may proclaim

L 2

our

our duty, but the will, influenced by paffion, makes gratification always welcome. Hence the power of paffion, which, when in excefs, cannot be refifted but by the utmost fortitude of mind; it is bent upon gratification; and where proper objects are wanting, it clings to any object at hand without diftinction. Thus joy infpired by a fortunate event, is diffufed upon every perfon around by acts of benevolence; and refentment for an atrocious injury done by one out of reach, feizes the first object that occurs to vent itfelf upon. Thofe who believe in prophecies, even with the accomplishment; and a weak mind is difpofed voluntarily to fulfil a prophecy, in order to gratify its wifh. Shakefpear, whom no particle of human nature hath escaped, however remote from common obfervation, defcribes that weakness:

K. Henry. Doth any name particular belong Unto that lodging where I firft did fwoon?

Warwick. Tis call'd Jerufalem, my Noble Lord. K. Henry. Laud be to God! ev'n there my life muft end, It hath been prophefy'd to me many years,

I fhould not die but in Jerufalem,

Which vainly I fuppos'd the holy land.
But bear me to that chamber, there I'll lie
In that Jerufalem fhall Henry die.

Second part, Henry IV. act 4. fc. laft. I could not deny myself the amufement of the foregoing obfervation, though it doth not properly come under my plan. The irregularities of paffion proceeding from peculiar weakneffes and biaffes, I do not undertake to justify; and of thefe we have had many examples.* It is fufficient that paffions common to all, are made fubfervient to beneficent purpofes. I fhall only obferve, that, in a polished fociety, inftances of irregular paffions are rare, and that their mischief doth not extend far.

Part 5. of the prefent chapter.

СНАР,

I

CHA P. MIL

Beauty.

HAVING difcourfed in general of emotions

and paffions, I proceed to a more narrow infpection
of fuch of them as ferve to unfold the principles of
the fine arts. It is the province of a writer upon eth-
ics, to give a full enumeration of all the paffions;
and of each separately to affign the nature, the cause,
the gratification, and the effects. But a treatife of
ethics is not my province; I carry 'my view no farther
than to the elements of criticifm, in order to fhow,
that the fine arts are a fubject of reasoning as well as
of taste. An extensive work would ill fuit a defign
fo limited; and to confine this work within mode-
rate bounds, the following plan may contribute. The
observation made above, that things are the causes of
emotions, by means of their properties and attributes,*
furnisheth a hint for diftribution. Inftead of a pain-
ful and tedious examination of the feveral paflions
and emotions, I purpofe to confine my inquiries to
fuch attributes, relations, and circumftances, as in
the fine arts are chiefly employed to raise agreeable
emotions. Attributes of fingle objects, as the most
fimple, shall take the lead; to be followed with par-
ticulars, which, depending on relations, are not
found in fingle objects. Difpatching next fome co-
incident matters, I proceed to my chief aim; which
is, to establish practical rules for the fine arts, derived
from principles previously eftablifhed. This is a gen-
eral view of the intended method: referving however
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a privilege

* Chap. 2, part 1. fect. 1. first note.

a privilege to vary it in particular inftances, where a deviation may be more commodious. I begin with beauty, the most noted of all the qualities that belong to fingle objects.

The term beauty, in its native fignification, is appropriated to objects of fight: objects of the other fenfes may be agreeable, fuch as the founds of mufical inftruments, the fmoothnefs and foftnefs of fome furfaces but the agreeablenefs denominated beauty belongs to objects of fight.

Of all the objects of external fenfe, an object of fight is the most complex: in the very fimpleft, colour is perceived, figure, and length, breadth, and thicknefs. A tree is compofed of a trunk, branches, and leaves; it has colour, figure, fize, and fometimes motion by means of each of thefe particulars, feparately considered, it appears beautiful; how much more fo, when they are all united together? The beauty of the human figure is extraordinary, being a compofition of numberlefs beauties arifing from the parts and qualities of the object, various colours, various motions, figures, fize, &c. all united in one complex object, and ftriking the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality fo remarkable in vifible objects, lends its name to exprefs every thing that is eminently agreeable: thus, by a figure of fpeech, we fay a beautiful found, a beautiful thought or expreflion, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful difcovery in art or science. But, as figurative expreffion is the fubject of a following chapter, this chapter is confined to beauty in its proper fignification.

It is natural to fuppofe, that a perception fo various as that of beauty, comprehending fometimes many particulars, fometimes few, fhould occafion emotions equally various and yet all the various emotions

of