ure the time by the number that is recollected. This doctrine shall be illustrated by examples. After finishing a journey through a populous country, the frequency of agreeable objects diftinctly recollected by the traveller, makes the time spent in the journey appear to him longer than it was in reality; which is chiefly remarkable in the first journey, when every object is new, and makes a strong impreffion. On the other hand, after finishing a journey through a barren country thinly peopled, the time appears fhort, being measured by the number of objects, which were few, and far from interefting. Here in both instances a computation is made, directly oppofite to that made during the journey. And this, by the way, ferves to account for what may appear fingular, that, in a barren country, a computed mile is always longer, than near the capital, where the country is rich and populous: the traveller has no natural measure of the miles he has travelled, other than the time bestowed upon the journey; nor any natural meafure of the time, other than the number of his perceptions: now thefe, being few from the paucity of objects in a waste country, lead him to compute that the time has been fhort, and confequently that the miles have been few : by the fame method of computation, the great number of perceptions, from the quantity of objects in a populous country, make the traveller conjecture that the time has been long, and the miles many. The laft step of the computation is obvious: in eftimating the distance of one place from another, if the miles be reckoned few in number, each mile must of course be long; if many in number, each must be fhort.

Again, the travelling with an agreeable companion, produceth a fhort computation both of the road and of time; especially if there be few objects that demand attention, or if the objects be familiar: and the cafe

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cafe is the fame of young people at a ball, or of a joyous company over a bottle: the ideas with which they have been entertained, being transitory, escape the memory: after the journey and the entertainment are over, they reflect that they have been much di verted, but scarce can fay about what.

When one is totally occupied with any agreeable work that admits not many objects, time runs on without obfervation: and upon a fubfequent recollecfion, muft appear fhort, in proportion to the paucity of objects. This is ftill more remarkable in clofe contemplation and in deep thinking, where the train, compofed wholly of ideas, proceeds with an extreme flow pace: not only are the ideas few in number, but are apt to escape an after reckoning. The like falfe reckoning of time may proceed from an oppofite state of mind in a reverie, where ideas float at random without making any impreffion, time goes on unheeded, and the reckoning is loft. A reverie may be fo profound as to prevent the recollection of any one idea: that the mind was bufied in a train of thinking, may in general be remembered: but what was the subject, has quite escaped the memory. In fuch a cafe, we are altogether at a loss about the time, having no data for making a computation. No caufe produceth fo falfe a reckoning of time, as immoderate grief: the mind, in that ftate, is violently attached to a fingle object, and admits not a different thought: any other object breaking in, is inftantly banifhed, fo as fcarce to give an appearance of fucceffion. In a reverie, we are uncertain of the time that is paft; but, in the example now given, there is an appearance of certainty, that the time must have been short, when the perceptions are fo few in number.

The natural measure of space, appears more obfcure than that of time. I venture, however, to men

tion it, leaving it to be further profecuted, if it be thought of any importance.

The space marked out for a house appears confiderably larger after it is divided into its proper parts. A piece of ground appears larger after it is furrounded with a fence and ftill larger when it is made a garden and divided into different compartments.

On the contrary, a large plain looks lefs after it is divided into parts. The fea must be excepted, which looks lefs from that very circumftance of not being divided into parts.

A room of a moderate fize appears larger when properly furnished. But, when a very large room is furnished, I doubt whether it be not leffened in appearance.

A room of a moderate fize looks lefs by having a ceiling lower than in proportion. The fame low ceiling makes a very large room look larger than it is in reality.

These experiments are by far too fmall a ftock for a general theory: but they are all that occur at pref ent; and, instead of a regular fystem, I have nothing for the reader's inftruction but a few conjectures.

The largest angle of vision seems to be the natural measure of space: the eye is the only judge; and in examining with it the size of any plain, or the length of any line, the most accurate method that can be taken is, to run over the object in parts: the largest part that can be feen with one ftedfaft look, determines the largest angle of vifion; and, when that angle is given, one may inftitute a calculation, by trying with the eye how many of these parts are in

the whole.

Whether this angle be the fame in all men, I know not the smallest angle of vifion is afcertained; and to ascertain the largest would not be lefs curious.

But fuppofing it known, it would be a very imperfect measure; perhaps more fo than the natural measure of time: for it requires great fteadiness of eye to measure a line with any accuracy, by apply. ing to it the largest angle of distinct vision. And supposing that steadiness to be acquired by practice, the measure will be imperfect from other circumftances. The fpace comprehended under this angle will be different according to the diftance, and alfo according to the fituation of the object of a perpendicular this angle will comprehend the smalleft fpace; the space will be larger in looking upon an inclined plain; and will be larger or lefs in proportion to the degree of inclination.

This measure of fpace, like the measure of time, is liable to feveral errors, from certain operations of the mind, which will account for fome of the erroneous judgments above mentioned. The space marked out for a dwelling-house, where the eye is at any reafonable distance, is feldom greater than can be seen at once, without moving the head: divide that space into two or three equal parts, and none of thefe parts will appear much lefs than what can be comprehended at one diftinct look; confequently each of them will appear equal, or nearly equal, to what the whole did before the divifion. If, on the other hand, the whole be very fmall, fo as fcarce to fill the eye at one look, its divifion into parts will, I conjecture, make it appear still less: the minutenefs of the parts is, by an eafy tranfition of ideas, transferred to the whole; and we pafs the fame judgment on the latter that we do on the former.

The space marked out for a fmall garden is furveyed almoft at one view; and requires a motion of the eye fo flight, as to pafs for an object that can be comprehended under the largeft angle of diftinct vifion: if

not

not divided into too many parts, we are apt to form the fame judgment of each part, and confequently to magnify the garden in proportion to the number of its parts.

A very large plain without protuberances is an object no lefs rare than beautiful; and in thofe who fee it for the first time, it must produce an emotion of wonder. That emotion, however flight, impofes, on the mind, and makes it judge that the plain is larger than it is in reality. Divide the plain into parts, and our wonder ceafes: it is no longer confidered as one great plain, but as fo many different fields or inclosures.

The first time one beholds the fea, it appears to be large beyond all bounds. When it becomes familiar, and ceases to raise our wonder, it appears less than it is in reality. In a ftorm it appears large, being diftinguishable by the rolling waves into a number of great parts. Iflands fcattered at confiderable distances, add in appearance to its fize: each intercepted part looks extremely large, and we infenfibly apply arithmetic to increase the appearance of the whole. Many iflands fcattered at hand, give a diminutive appearance to the fea, by its connection with its diminutive parts: the Lomond lake would undoubtedly look larger without its iflands.

Furniture increaseth in appearance the fize of a fmall room, for the fame reafon that divifions increase in appearance the fize of a garden. The emotion of wonder, which is raised by a very large room without furniture makes it look larger than it is in reality: if completely furnished, we view it in parts, and our wonder is not raised.

A low ceiling hath a diminutive appearance, which by an easy tranfition of ideas, is communicated to the length and breadth, provided they bear any pro portion

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