stances, so as to be able to make payment conveniently. These deserve the most grateful acknowledgments. And indeed it was in their favour, and perhaps for their sakes, in favour of all other British creditors, that the law of Pennsylvania, though since much exclaimed against, was made, restraining the recovery of old debts during a certain time: for this restraint was general, respecting domestic as well as British debts; it being thought unfair, in cases where there was not sufficient for all, that the inhabitants, taking advantage of their nearer situation, should swallow the whole, excluding foreign creditors from any share. And in cases where the favourable part of the foreign creditors were disposed to give time, with the views abovementioned, if others less humane and considerate were allowed to bring immediate suits, and ruin the debtor, those views would be defeated. When this law expired in Sept. 1784, a new one was made, continuing for some time longer the restraint with respect to domestic debts, but expressly taking it away where the debt was due from citizens of the state to any of the subjects of Great Britain ;*

* Extract from an Act of General Assembly of Pennsylvania, intituled, " An Act for directing the mode of recovering debts contracted before the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven."

Exception in favour of British Creditors.

"Sect. 7. And provided also, and be it farther enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that this Act, nor any thing therein contained, shall not extend, or be construed to extend, to any debt or debts which were due before the fourth day of

which shows clearly the disposition of the assembly, and that the fair intentions above ascribed to them in making the former act, are not merely the ima gination of the writer. Indeed, the clamour has been much augmented by numbers joining it who really had no claim on our country. Every debtor in Britain, engaged in whatever trade, when he had no better excuse to give for delay of payment, ac cused the want of returns from America; and the indignation thus excited against us, now appears so general among the English, that one would imagine their nation, which is so exact in expecting punctual payment from all the rest of the world, must be at home the model of justice, the very pattern of punctuality. Yet if one were disposed to recriminate, it would not be difficult to find sufficient matter in several parts of their conduct. But this I forbear the two separate nations are now at peace, and there can be no use in mutual provocations to fresh enmity. If I have shown clearly that the present inability of many American merchants to discharge their debts contracted before the war, is not so much their fault, as the fault of the crediting nation, who, by making an unjust war on them, obstructing their commerce, plundering and devastating their country, were the cause of that inability, I have answered the purpose of writing this paper. How far the refusal of the British court to execute the treaty, in delivering up the frontier posts, may,

July, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-six, by any of the citizens of the state to any of the subjects of Great 'Britain."

on account of that deficiency of payment, be justifiable, is cheerfully submitted to the world's impartial judgment.

SPEECH IN THE CONVENTION ON THE SUBJECT OF SALARIES.

SIR,

IT is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honourable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading, I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine. I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them; but, on the contrary, great advantages.

Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence in the affairs of men: these are am bition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money. Separately, each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men a post of honour, that shall at the same time be a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places

it is that renders the British government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true source of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the nation, distracting its councils, hurrying it sometimes into fruitless wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonourable terms of peace.

And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of cha·racters? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust it will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions, and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your government, and be your rulers; and these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation; for their vanquished competitors, of the same spirit, and from the same motive, will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people.

Besides these evils, though we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations, and there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them: hence, as all history informs us, there has been, in every state and kingdom, a constant kind of warfare between the governing and the governed; the one striving to obtain more for

its support, and the other to pay less; and this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the princes or enslaving of the people. Generally, indeed, the ruling power carries its point; and we see the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes, the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partisans, and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred, who would not if he could, follow the example of Pharaoh; get first all the people's money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants for ever. It will be said, that we do not propose to establish kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to kingly government. It sometimes relieves them from aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among citizens; and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the government of these states may in future times end in a monarchy: but this catastrophe, I think, may be long delayed, if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult, by making our posts of honour places of profit. If we do, I fear that though we employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside; it will only nourish the fœtus of a king, (as the ho nourable gentleman from Virginia very aptly ex