SECTION IV.

Of the General Definition of Virtue.

422. THE various duties which have now been considered, all agree with each other in one common quality, that of being obligatory on rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same authority; the authority of conscience. These duties, therefore, are but different articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word virtue.

423. When this word is applied to the character of an individual, it denotes a Habit of Mind, as distinguished from occasional acts of duty. It was formerly said (§ 156.) that the characters of men receive their denominations of Covetous, Voluptuous, Ambitious, &c. from the particular active principle which prevailingly influences the conduct. A man, accordingly, whose ruling or habitual principle of action is a sense of Duty, or a regard to what is Right, may be properly denominated Virtuous. Agreeably to this view of the subject, the ancient Pythagoreans defined Virtue to be, is tov SEOVTOS ;-the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and the most unexceptionable, perhaps, which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy.

424. These observations lead to an explanation of what has at first sight the appearance of paradox in the Ethical doctrines of Aristotle; That where there is Self-denial there is no Virtue.* That the merit of particular actions is increased by the self-denial with which they are accompanied, cannot be disputed but it is only when we are learning the practice of our duties, that this self-denial is exercised, (for the practice of morality, as well as of every thing else, is facilitated by repeated acts;) and, therefore, if the word virtue be employed to express that habit of mind, which it is the great object of a good man to confirm; it will follow, that in

* Ancient Metaphysics, vol. iii. p. 12. of the preface.

proportion as he approaches to it, his efforts of self-denial must diminish; and that all occasion for them would cease, if his end were completely attained.

SECTION V.

Of an Ambiguity in the words Right and Wrong, Virtue and Vice.

425. THE epithets Right and Wrong, Virtuous and Vicious, are applied sometimes to external actions, and sometimes to the intentions of the agent. A similar ambiguity may be remarked in the corresponding words in other languages.

426. The distinction made by some moralists, between Absolute and Relative Rectitude, was introduced, in order to obviate the confusion of ideas, which this ambiguity has a tendency to produce; and it is a distinction of so great importance, as to merit a particular illustration in a system of Ethics.

427. An action may be said to be absolutely right, when it is in every respect suitable to the circumstances in which the agent is placed or in other words, when it is such, as with perfectly good intentions, under the guidance of an enlightened and well-informed understanding, he would have performed.

428. An action may be said to be relatively right, when the intentions of the agent are sincerely good ;— whether his conduct be suitable to his circumstances or not.

429. According to these definitions, an action may be right, in one sense; and wrong in another :-An ambiguity in language, which how obvious soever, has not always been attended to by the writers on morals.

430. It is the relative rectitude of an action which determines the moral desert of the agent: but it is its absolute rectitude which determines its utility to his worldly interests, and to the welfare of society. And it is only so far as relative and absolute rectitude coincide, that utility can be affirmed to be a quality of virtue.

431. A strong sense of duty will indeed induce us to

avail ourselves of all the talents we possess, and of all the information within our reach, to act agreeably to the rules of absolute rectitude. And, if we fail in doing so, our negligence is criminal. But still, in every particular instance, our duty consists in doing what appears to us to be right at the time; and if, while we follow this rule, we should incur any blame, our demerit does not arise from acting according to an erroneous judgment, but from our previous misemployment of the means we possessed, for correcting the errors to which our judgment is liable.

432. A distinction similar to that now made between absolute and relative rectitude, was expressed among the Greeks by the words καθῆκον and κατόρθωμα; among the Romans by the phrases Officium medium and Officium perfectum; and among the Schoolmen by those of Material and Formal Virtue.

433. From these principles it follows, That actions, although materially right, are not meritorious with respect to the agent, unless performed from a sense of duty. This sense necessarily accompanies every action which is an object of moral approbation.

SECTION VI.

Of the Office and Use of Reason in the Practice of Morality.

434. It was observed (§ 431.) that a strong sense of duty, while it leads us to cultivate with care our good dispositions, will induce us to avail ourselves of all the means in our power for the wise regulation of our external conduct. The occasions on which it is necessary for us to employ our reason in this way, are chiefly the three following.

(1.) When we have ground for suspecting, that our moral judgments and feelings may have been warped and perverted by the prejudices of education.

(2.) When there appears to be an interference between different duties, so as to render it doubtful in what the exact propriety of conduct consists. To this head may be referred those cases in which the rights of different parties are concerned.

(3.) When the ends at which our duty prompts us to aim, are to be accomplished by means which require choice and deliberation.

435. It is owing to the last of these considerations, that the study of happiness, both private and public, becomes an important part of the science of Ethics. Indeed without this study, the best dispositions of the heart, whether relating to ourselves or to others, may be in a great measure useless.

436. The subject of happiness, so far as relates to the Individual, has been already considered. The great extent and difficulty of those inquiries, which have for their object to ascertain what constitutes the happiness of a Community, and by what means it may be most effectually promoted, make it necessary to separate them from the other questions of Ethics, and to form them into a distinct branch of the science.

437. It is not, however, in this respect alone, that Politics is connected with the other branches of Moral Philosophy. The provisions which nature has made for the intellectual and moral progress of the species, all suppose the existence of the political union: And the particular form, which this union happens, in the case of any community, to assume, determines many of the most important circumstances in the character of the people, and many of those opinions and habits which affect the happiness of private life.