and amiable in sincerity, openness, and truth; something disagreeable and disgusting in duplicity, equivocation, and falsehood. Dr. Hutcheson himself, the great patron of that theory which resolves all our moral qualities into Benevolence, confesses this; for he speaks of a sense which leads us to approve of Veracity, distinct from the sense which approves of qualities useful to mankind. As this, however, is, at best, but a vague. way of speaking, it may be worth while to analyze more particularly this part of our moral constitution.

*

355. The love of truth is unquestionably an originab and a powerful principle of the mind. It is indeed but another name for the principle of Curiosity, which was formerly illustrated, (§ 117.)

356. As a very great proportion of the knowledge of every individual is derived from social intercourse, it was necessary to adapt the original laws of our belief, to this source of our information. A disposition to repose faith in testimony is, accordingly, coeval with the use of language. It seems to be at first, unlimited, in children; and to be afterwards checked and moderated, in consequence of the experience of falsehood. It bears a striking analogy, both in its origin, and in its final cause, to our instinctive expectation of the continuance of the laws of nature (§ 70. (3.) Without this disposition, the education of children would be impracticable.†

357. Corresponding to the instinctive principle of Credulity, there is in man an instinctive principle of Veracity. Truth is always the genuine and native expression of the mind; whereas Falsehood implies a certain violence done to our nature, in consequence of the influence of some indirect motive.

358. In children, this principle is not so conspicuous as the other; and it sometimes happens, that a good deal of care is necessary to cherish it. But in such cases, it will always be found, that there is some indirect motive combined with the desire of social communica

* Phil. Moral. Instit. compend.

See Reid's Inquiry, chap. vi. sect. 34; and Smith's Theory, &c. last edition, vol. i. p. 382.

tion; such as Fear, or Vanity, or Mischief, or Sensuality. The same part of our constitution, which prompts to social intercourse, and to the use of speech, prompts also to Veracity: Nor is it probable, that there is such a thing as Falsehood uttered merely for its own sake.

359. If this remark be just, it suggests an important practical rule in the business of education ;-not to attempt the cure of Deceit, by general precepts concerning the duty of Veracity, or by punishments inflicted upon every single violation of it; but by studying to discover, and to remove, the radical evil from which it originates.

360. Fidelity to promises is perhaps more properly a branch of Justice than of Veracity; but this is merely a question of arrangement, and of little consequence to our present purpose.

361. If a person give his promise, intending to perform, but fails in the execution; his fault is, strictly speaking, a breach of Justice. a breach of Justice. As there is a natural faith in testimony, so there is a natural expectation excited by a promise. When I excite this expectation, and lead other men to act accordingly, I convey a right to the performance of my promise, and I act unjustly if I fail in performing it.

362. If a person promises,-not intending to perform; he is guilty of a complication of injustice and falsehood: for although a declaration of present intention does not amount to a promise, every promise involves a declaration of present intention.

363. The duties which have been mentioned in this article, are all independent of any particular relation between us and other men. But there is a great variety of other duties resulting from such relations: The duties of Gratitude, of Friendship, of Patriotism; besides those relative duties which moralists have distinguished by the titles Economical and Political. To attempt an enumeration of these, would lead into the details of practical morality.

SECTION III.

Of the Duties which respect Ourselves.

ARTICLE FIRST.

General Remarks on this Class of our Duties.

364. PRUDENCE, Temperance, and Fortitude, are no less requisite for enabling us to discharge our social duties, than for securing our own private happiness: but as they do not necessarily imply any reference to our fellow creatures, they seem to belong most properly to this third branch of Virtue.

365. An illustration of the nature and tendency of these qualities, and of the means by which they are to be improved and confirmed, although a most important article of Ethics, does not lead to any discussions of so abstract a kind, as to require particular attention in a work, of which brevity is a principal object.

366. It is sufficient here to remark, that independently of all considerations of utility, either to ourselves, or to others, these qualities are approved of, as right and becoming. Their utility, at he same time, or rather necessity, for securing the discharge of our other duties, adds greatly to the respect they command; and is certainly the chief ground of the obligation we lie under, to cultivate the habits by which they are formed.

367. A steady regard, in the conduct of life, to the happiness and perfection of our own nature, and a diligent study of the means by which these ends may be attained, is another duty belonging to this branch of virtue. It is a duty so important and comprehensive, that it leads to the practice of all the rest; and is therefore entitled to a very full and particular examination, in a system of Moral Philosophy. Such an examination, while it leads our thoughts to "the end and aim of our being," will again bring under our review, the various duties already considered; and, by showing how they all conspire in recommending the same dispositions, will illustrate the unity of design in the human constitution, and the benevolent wisdom displayed in its formation.

Other subordinate duties, besides, which it would be tedious to enumerate under separate titles, may thus be placed in a light more interesting and agreeable.

ARTICLE SECOND.

Of the Duty of employing the Means we possess to promote our own Happiness.

368. ACCORDING to Dr. Hutcheson, our conduct, so far as it is influenced by self-love, is never the object of moral approbation. Even a regard to the pleasures of a good conscience he considered as detracting from the merit of those actions which it encourages us to perform.

369. That the principle of Self-love, (or in other words, the desire of happiness) is neither an object of approbation nor of blame, is sufficiently obvious. It is inseparable from the nature of man, as a rational and a sensitive being, (§ 161.)

370. It is however no less obvious, on the other hand, that this desire, considered as a principle of action, has by no means an uniform influence on the conduct. Our animal appetites, our affections, and the other inferior principles of our nature, interfere as often with Self-love as with Benevolence; and mislead us from our own happiness as much as from the duties we owe to others.

371. In these cases, every spectator pronounces, that we deserve to suffer for our folly and indiscretion; and we ourselves, as soon as the tumult of passion is over, feel in the same manner. Nor is this remorse merely a sentiment of regret for having missed that happiness which we might have enjoyed. We are dissatisfied, not with our condition merely, but with our conduct;—with our having forfeited, by our own imprudence, what we might have attained.*

372. It is true that we do not feel so warm an indignation against the neglect of private good, as against perfidy, cruelty, and injustice; The reason probably is, that imprudence commonly carries its own punishment along with it; and our resentment is disarmed by pity.

* See Butler's Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue.

Indeed; as that habitual regard to his own happiness, which every man feels, except when under the influence of some violent appetite, is a powerful check on imprudence; it was less necessary to provide an additional punishment for this vice, in the indignation of the world.

373. From the principles now stated, it follows, that in a person who believes in a future state, the criminality of every bad action is aggravated by the imprudence with which it is accompanied.

374. It follows also, that the punishments annexed by the civil magistrate, to particular actions, render the commission of them more criminal, than it would otherwise be insomuch, that if an action, in itself perfectly indifferent, were prohibited by some arbitrary law, under a severe penalty; the commission of that action, (unless we were called to it by some urgent consideration of duty) would be criminal; not merely on account of the obedience which a subject owes to established authority, but on account of the regard which every man ought to feel for his life and reputation.

ARTICLE THIRD.

Of Happiness.

375. THE most superficial observation of life is sufficient to convince us, that Happiness is not to be attained, by giving every appetite and desire the gratification they demand; and that it is necessary for us, to form to ourselves some plan or system of conduct, in subordination to which all other objects are to be pursued.

376. To ascertain what this system ought to be, is a problem which has, in all ages, employed the speculations of philosophers. Among the ancients, it was the principal subject of controversy which divided the schools; and it was treated in such a manner, as to involve almost every other question of Ethics. The opinions maintained with respect to it by some of their sects, comprehend many of the most important truths to which the inquiry leads; and leave little to be added, but a few corrections and limitations of their conclusions.