struction it can possibly admit of. Such a temper, while it renders a man respectable and amiable in society, contributes, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to his private happiness.

339. Candor in Controversy implies a strong sense of justice, united to a sincere and disinterested love of truth. It is a disposition of mind so difficult to preserve, and so rarely to be met with, that the most useful rule, perhaps, to be given with respect to it, is to avoid the occasions of dispute and opposition.

340. A love of controversy indicates not only an overweening vanity, and a disregard for truth, but, in general, perhaps always, it indicates a mediocrity of genius; for it arises from those feelings of envy and jealousy which provoke little minds to depreciate the merit of useful discoveries. He who is conscious of his own inventive powers, and whose great object is to add to the stock of human knowledge, will reject unwillingly any plausible doctrine, till after the most severe examination; and will separate with patience and temper the truths it contains, from the errors that are blended with them. No opinion can be more groundless, than that a captious and disputatious temper is a mark of acuteness. On the contrary, a sound and manly understanding is, in no instance, more strongly displayed, than in a quick perception of important truth, when imperfectly stated, and blended with error;-a perception which may not be sufficient to satisfy the judgment completely at the time, or, at least, to enable it to obviate the difficulties of others; but which is sufficient to prevent it from a hasty rejection of the whole, from the obvious defects of some of the parts. Hence the important hints which an author of genius collects among the rubbish of his predecessors; and which, so far from detracting from his own originality, place it in the strongest possible light, by showing that an idea, which was already current in the world, and which had hitherto remained barren and useless, may, in the mind of a philosopher, become the germ of an extensive system.

341. The effects of controversy on the temper, although abundantly sensible, even in the solitude of the

closet, are more peculiarly adverse to the discovery of truth, in those disputes which occur in conversation; and which seldom answer any purpose, but to rivet the disputants more firmly in their errors. In consequence, indeed, of such disputes, the intellectual powers may be sharpened, and original hints may be suggested; but few instances are to be found, in which they do not mislead the disputants to a still greater distance from truth than before, and render their minds still more inaccessible to conviction.

II. Of Integrity or Honesty.

342. THESE Words are commonly employed to express that disposition of mind, which leads us to observe the rules of Justice, in cases where our interest interferes with the rights of other men; a branch of Justice so important, that it has, in a great measure, appropriated the name to itself. The observations made by Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith on the differences between Justice and the other virtues, apply only to this last branch of it; and it is this branch which properly forms the subject of that part of Ethics which is called Natural Jurisprudence. In the remaining paragraphs of this article, when the word justice occurs, it is to be understood in the limited sense now mentioned.

343. The circumstances which distinguish justice from the other virtues are chiefly two. In the first place, its rules may be laid down with a degree of accuracy, of which moral precepts do not, in any other instance, admit.* Secondly, Its rules may be enforced; inasmuch as every breach of them violates the rights of some other person, and entitles him to employ force for his defence. or security.

344. Another distinction between Justice and the other virtues is much insisted on by Mr. Hume. It is, according to him, an artificial and not a natural virtue ; and derives all its obligation from the political union, and from considerations of utility.

-345. The principal argument alleged in support of this proposition, is, That there is no implanted principle prompting us by a blind impulse to the exercise of Justice, similar to those affections which conspire with and strengthen our benevolent dispositions.

346. But granting the fact, upon which this argument proceeds, nothing can be inferred from it that makes an essential distinction between the obligations of Justice and of Beneficence; for, so far as we act merely from the blind impulse of an affection, our conduct cannot be considered as virtuous. Our affections were given us to arrest our attention to particular objects, whose happiness is connected with our exertions; and to excite and support the activity of the mind, when a sense of duty might be insufficient for the purpose: but the propriety or impropriety of our conduct depends, in no instance, on the strength or weakness of the affection, but on our obeying or disobeying the dictates of reason and of conscience. These inform us, in language which it is impossible to mistake, that it is sometimes a duty to check the most amiable and pleasing emotions of the heart ;-to withdraw, for example, from the sight of those distresses which stronger claims forbid us to relieve, and to deny ourselves that exquisite luxury which arises from the exercise of humanity. So far, therefore, as Benevolence is a virtue, it is precisely on the same footing with Justice; that is, we approve of it, not because it is agreeable to us, but because we feel it to be a duty.

347. It may be farther remarked, That although there is no implanted principle prompting us by a blind impulse to justice; there is a very strong implanted principle which serves as a check on Injustice; the principle, to wit, of Resentment, which is surely as much a part of the human constitution, as pity or parental affection. That deliberate Resentment implies a sense of Injustice, and consequently of Justice, was formerly observed, (§ 150.)

348. As the rules of Justice admit, in their statement, of a degree of accuracy peculiar to themselves, that part of Ethics which relates to them, has been formed,

in modern times, into a separate branch of the science, under the title of Natural Jurisprudence.

349. The manner in which this subject has been hitherto treated, has been much influenced by the professional habits of those who first turned their attention to it. Not only have its principles been delivered in the form of a system of law; but the technical language, and the arbitrary arrangements of the Roman code, have been servilely copied.

350. In consequence of this, an important branch of the law of nature has gradually assumed an artificial and scholastic appearance; and many capricious maxims have insensibly mingled themselves with the principles of universal jurisprudence. Hence, too, the frivolous discussions with respect to minute and imaginary questions, which so often occupy the place of those general and fundamental disquisitions that are suggested by the common nature, and the common circumstances of the human race.

351. A still more material inconvenience has resulted from the professional habits of the earliest writers on jurisprudence. Not contented with stating the rules of Justice in that form and language which was most familiar to their own minds, they have attempted to extend the same plan to all the other branches of Moral Philosophy; and, by the help of arbitrary definitions, to supersede the necessity of accommodating their modes of inquiry, to the various nature of their subject. Although Justice is the only branch of Virtue, in which there is always a Right on the one hand, corresponding to an Obligation on the other, they have contrived, by fictions of Imperfect and of External Rights, to treat indirectly of all our different duties, by pointing out the rights which are supposed to be their correlates. It is chiefly owing to this, that a study, which, in the writings of the ancients, is the most engaging and the most useful of any, has become, in so great a proportion of modern systems, as uninviting, and almost as useless, as the logic of the schoolmen.

352. Besides these defects in the modern system of jurisprudence, (defects produced by the accidental hab

its of those who first cultivated the study,) there is another essential one, arising from the inaccurate conceptions which have been formed of the object of the science. Although the obligations of Justice are by no means resolvable into considerations of Utility, yet, in every political association, they are so blended together in the institutions of men, that it is impossible for us to separate them completely in our reasonings: and accordingly (as Mr. Hume has remarked) the writers on jurisprudence, while they profess to confine themselves entirely to the former, are continually taking principles for granted, which have a reference to the latter. It seems therefore to be proper, instead of treating of jurisprudence merely as a system of natural justice, to unite it with politics; and to illustrate the general principles of Justice and of Expediency, as they are actually combined in the constitution of society. This view of the subject, (which, according to the arrangement formerly mentioned (§ 2.), belongs to the third part of Moral Philosophy,) will show, at the same time, how wonderfully these principles coincide in their applications; and how partial those conceptions of utility are, which have so often led politicians to depart from what they felt to be just, in quest of what their limited judgments apprehended to be expedient.

ARTICLE THIRD.

Of Veracity.

353. THIS duty consists of two branches; Veracity in testimony, and Fidelity to promises. The utility of the first of these is obvious, from the consequences that would result, if no foundation were laid for it in the constitution of our nature. The purposes of speech would be frustrated, and every man's opportunities of knowledge would be limited to his own personal expe

rience.

354. Considerations of utility, however, do not seem to be, in the first instance, the ground of the approbation we bestow on this disposition. Abstracting from all regard to consequences, there is something pleasing