chamber where he enjoyed no opportunity of seeing external objects, but through a small chink in the windowshutter; would he not be apt to consider this chink as essential to his vision; and would it not be difficult to persuade him that his prospects would be enlarged by demolishing the walls of his prison?" Admitting that this analogy is founded merely on fancy; yet if it be granted that there is no absurdity in the supposition, it furnishes a sufficient answer to all the reasonings which have been stated against the possibility of the soul's separate existence, from the consideration of its present union with the body.

309. In support of the foregoing conclusions, many strong arguments might be derived from an accurate examination and analysis of our ideas of Matter and its qualities. But such speculations could not be rendered intelligible, without a previous explanation of some principles too abstruse to be introduced here.

II. Of the Evidences for a Future State, arising from the Human Constitution, and from the Circumstances in which Man is placed.

310. The great extent of this subject necessarily confines the following remarks to an enumeration of the principal heads of the argument. These are stated without any illustration.

(1.) The natural desire of immortality; and the anticipations of futurity inspired by hope.

(2.) The natural apprehensions of the mind when under the influence of remorse.

(3.) The exact accommodation of the condition of the lower animals to their instincts and to their sensitive powers; contrasted with the unsuitableness of the present state of things to the intellectual faculties of man, to his capacities of enjoyment, and to the conceptions of happiness and of perfection, which he is able to form.

(4.) The foundation which is laid in the principles of our constitution for a progressive and an unlimited improvement.

(5.) The information we are rendered capable of acquiring, concerning the more distant parts of the universe; the unlimited range, which is opened to the human imagination through the immensity of space and of time; and the ideas, however imperfect, which philosophy affords us of the existence and attributes of an over-ruling Mind :-Acquisitions, for which an obvious final cause may be traced, on the supposition of a future state; but which, if that supposition be rejected, could have no other effect than to make the business of life appear unworthy of our regard.

(6.) The tendency of the infirmities of age and of the pains of disease, to strengthen and confirm our moral habits; and the difficulty of accounting, upon the hypothesis of annihilation, for those sufferings which commonly put a period to the existence of man.

(7.) The discordance between our moral judgments and feelings, and the course of human affairs.

(8.) The analogy of the material world; in some parts of which the most complete and the most systematical order may be traced; and of which our views always become the more satisfactory, the wider our knowledge extends. It is the supposition of a future state alone that can furnish a key to the present disorders of the moral world; and without it, many of the most striking phenomena of human life must remain for ever inexplicable.

311. Of the different considerations now mentioned, there is not one, perhaps, which, taken singly, would be sufficient to establish the truth they are brought to prove; but taken in conjunction, their force appears irresistible. They not only all terminate in the same conclusion, but they mutually reflect light on each other; and they have that sort of consistency and connexion among themselves, which could hardly be supposed to take place among a series of false propositions.

312. The same remark may be extended to the other principles of Natural Religion. They all hang together in such a manner, that, if one of them be granted, it facilitates the way for the reception of the rest.

313. Nor is it merely with each other that these prin

ciples are connected. They have a relation to all the other principles of Moral Philosophy ;-insomuch that a person who entertains just views of the one, never fails to entertain also just views of the other. Perhaps it would not be going too far to assert, that they have a relation to almost all the truths we know, in the moral, the intellectual, and the material worlds. One thing is certain, that, in proportion as our knowledge extends, our doubts and objections disappear; new light continually breaks in upon us from every quarter, and more of order and system appears in the universe.

314. It is a strong confirmation of these remarks, that the most important discoveries, both in moral and physical science, have been made by men friendly to the principles of natural religion; and that those writers, who have affected to be sceptical on this last subject, have in general been paradoxical and sophistical in their other inquiries. This consideration, while it illustrates the connexion which different classes of truths have with each other, proves, that it is to a mind well fitted for the discovery and reception of truth in general, that the evidences of Religion are the most satisfactory.

315. The influence which the belief of a future state has on the conduct and on the enjoyments of mankind, also tends to confirm its credibility. This is so remarkable, that it has led some to consider it merely as an invention of politicians, to preserve the good order of society, and to support the feeble mind under the sufferings of human life. But if it be allowed that it has really such a tendency, Can it be supposed that the Author of the universe should have left consequences so very momentous, to depend on the belief of a chimera, which was, in time, to vanish before the light of philosophy? Is it not more probable, that the enlargement of our knowledge, to which we are so powerfully prompted by the principle of curiosity, will tend to increase and not to diminish the virtue and the happiness of mankind; and, instead of spreading a gloom over creation, and extinguishing the hopes which nature inspires, will gradually unfold to us, in the moral world, the same order and beauty we admire in the material?

316. It was before observed in the beginning of this section (§ 225.) that our duties to God must be deduced from the relation in which we stand to him; and that this relation can only be determined by our notions of his nature and attributes. From the principles which have now been established on that subject, the duties of religion follow as self-evident consequences.

317. In the first place: If the Deity be possessed of infinite moral excellence, we must feel towards him, in an infinite degree, all those affections of love, gratitude, and confidence, which are excited by the imperfect worth we observe among our fellow-creatures; for it is by conceiving all that is benevolent and amiable in man, raised to the highest perfection, that we can alone form some faint notion of the Divine nature. To cultivate, therefore, an habitual love and reverence of the Supreme Being, may be justly considered as the first great branch of morality; nor is the virtue of that man complete, or even consistent with itself, in whose mind these sentiments of piety are wanting.

318. Secondly: Although Religion can, with no propriety, be considered as the sole foundation of morality, yet, when we are convinced that God is infinitely good, and that he is the friend and protector of virtue, this belief affords the most powerful inducements to the practice of every branch of our duty. It leads us to consider conscience as the vicegerent of God, and to attend to its suggestions, as to the commands of that Being from whom we have received our existence, and the great object of whose government is to promote the happiness and the perfection of his whole creation.

319. Thirdly: A regard to our own happiness in the future stages of our being (which will be afterwards shown to constitute a moral obligation) ought to conspire with the other motives already mentioned, în stimulating our virtuous exertions. The moral perceptions we have received from God, more particularly our sense of merit and demerit, may be considered as clear indications of future rewards and punishments, which in due time, he will not fail to distribute. Religion is therefore, a species of authoritative law, enforced by

the most awful sanctions, and extending not merely to our actions, but to our thoughts. In the case of the lower orders of men, who are incapable of abstract speculation, and whose moral feelings cannot be supposed to have received much cultivation; it is chiefly this view of Religion, which is addressed to their hopes and fears, that secures a faithful discharge of their social duties.

320. In the last place; a sense of Religion, where it is sincere, will necessarily be attended with a complete resignation of our own will to that of the Deity; as it teaches us to regard every event, even the most afflicting, as calculated to promote beneficent purposes which we are unable to comprehend; and to promote finally the perfection and happiness of our own nature.

SECTION II.

Of the Duties which respect our Fellow-creatures. 321. UNDER this title it is not proposed, to give a complete enumeration of our social duties, but only to point out some of the most important; chiefly with a view to show the imperfection of those systems of morals, which attempt to resolve the whole of virtue into one particular principle. Among these systems, that which resolves virtue into Benevolence is undoubtedly the most amiable; but even this system will appear, from the following remarks, to be not only inconsistent with truth, but to lead to dangerous consequences.

ARTICLE FIRST.

Of Benevolence.

322. It has been supposed by some moralists, that Benevolence is the only immediate object of moral approbation; and that the obligation of all our moral duties arises entirely from their apprehended tendency to promote the happiness of society.

323. Notwithstanding the various appearances in human nature, which seem at first view to favor this theo