from our own moral perceptions, so it is from the consideration of these, that the strongest proofs of his attributes arise.

295. The distinction between Right and Wrong, as was formerly observed, (§ 195.) is apprehended by the mind to be eternal and immutable, no less than the distinction between mathematical Truth and Falsehood. To argue, therefore, from our own moral judgments, to the administration of the Deity, cannot be justly censured as a rash extension, to the Divine nature, of suggestions resulting from the arbitrary constitution of our own minds.

296. The power we have of conceiving this distinction is one of the most remarkable of those which raise us above the brutes; and the sense of obligation which it involves, possesses a distinguished pre-eminence over all our other principles of action, (§ 214.) To act in conformity to our sense of rectitude is plainly the highest excellence which our nature is capable of attaining; nor can we avoid extending the same rule of estimation to all intelligent beings whatever.

297. Besides these conclusions, with respect to the Divine attributes, (which seem to be implied in our very perception of moral distinctions,) there are others perfectly agreeable to them, which continually force themselves on the mind, in the exercise of our moral judgments, both with respect to our own conduct and that of other men. The reverence, which we feel to be due to the admonitions of Conscience; the sense of merit and demerit, which accompanies our good and bad actions; the warm interest we take in the fortunes of the virtutuous; the indignation we feel at the occasional triumphs of successful villany;-all imply a secret conviction of the moral administration of the universe.

298. An examination of the ordinary course of human affairs adds to the force of these considerations; and furnishes a proof from the fact, that, notwithstanding the seemingly promiscuous distribution of happiness and misery in this life, the reward of virtue, and the punishment of vice, are the great objects of all the general laws by which the world is governed. The disorders,

in the mean time, which, in such a world as ours, cannot fail to arise in particular instances; when they are compared with our natural sense of good and of ill desert, afford a presumption, that in a future state the moral government, which we see begun here, will be carried into complete execution.

ARTICLE THIRD.

Of a Future State.

299. THE Consideration of the Divine attributes naturally leads our thoughts to the future prospects of man, and to the sequel of that plan of moral government, which we see plainly begun here; and which, our own moral constitution, joined to our conclusions concerning the perfections of God, afford us the strongest intimations, will be more completely unfolded in some subsequent stage of our being. The doctrine, indeed, of a future state seems to be, in a great measure, implied in every system of religious belief; for why were we rendered capable of elevating our thoughts to the Deity, if all our hopes are to terminate here; or why were we furnished with powers which range through the infinity of space and of time, if our lot is to be the same with that of the beasts which perish? But although the doctrine of a future state be implied in every scheme of religion; the truths of religion are not necessarily implied in the doctrine of a future state. Even absolute Atheism does not destroy all the arguments for the immortality of the soul. Whether it be owing to an over-ruling intelligence or not, it is a fact which no man can deny, that there are general laws which regulate the course of human affairs, and that, even in this world, we see manifest indications of a connexion between virtue and happiness. Why may not necessity continue that existence it at first gave birth to; and why may not the connexion between virtue and happiness subsist for ever?

I. Of the Argument for a Future State derived from the Nature of Mind.

300. In collecting the various evidences which the light of nature affords for a future state, too much stress has commonly been laid upon the soul's Immateriality. The proper use of that doctrine is not to demonstrate that the soul is physically and necessarily immortal; but to refute the objections which have been urged against the possibility of its existing, in a separate state from the body. Although our knowledge of the nature of Mind may not be sufficient to afford us any positive argument on the subject; yet, if it can be shown, that the dissolution of the body does not necessarily infer the extinction of the soul; and still more, if it can be shown, that the presumption is in favor of the contrary supposition, the moral proofs of a future retribution will meet with a more easy reception, when the doctrine is freed from the metaphysical difficulties which it has been apprehended to involve.

301. It was before remarked, (§ 12.) that our notions both of body and Mind are merely relative; that we know the one only by its sensible qualities, and the other by the operations of which we are conscious. To say, therefore, of Mind, that it is not material, is to affirm a proposition, the truth of which is involved in the only conceptions of Matter and of Mind that we are capable of forming.

302. The doubts that have been suggested, with respect to the essential distinction between Matter and Mind, derive all their plausibility from the habits of inattention we acquire in early infancy to our mental operations. It was plainly the intention of Nature, that our thoughts should be habitually directed to things external; and, accordingly, the bulk of mankind are not only disposed to overlook the intellectual phenomena, but are incapable of that degree of reflection which is necessary for their examination. Hence it is, that when we begin to study our own internal constitution, we find the facts it presents to us so very intimately associated in our conceptions with the qualities of Matter, that it is

impossible for us to draw distinctly and steadily the line between them. The tendency which all men have to refer the sensation of color to the objects by which it is excited, may serve to illustrate the manner in which the qualities of mind and body come to be blended in our apprehensions.

303. If these remarks be well founded, the prejudices which give support to the scheme of Materialism, are not likely to be cured by any metaphysical reasonings, how clear and conclusive soever, so long as the judgment continues to be warped by such obstinate associations as have just been mentioned. A habit of reflecting on the laws of thought, as they are to be collected from our own consciousness, together with a habit of resisting those illusions of the fancy, which lead superficial inquirers to substitute analogies for facts, will gradually enable us to make the phenomena of Matter and those of Mind distinct objects of attention; and, as soon as this happens, the absurdity of Materialism must appear intuitively obvious.

304. It is entirely owing to our early familiarity with material objects, and our early habits of inattention to what passes within us, that Materialism is apt to appear at first sight, to be less absurd than the opposite system, which represents Mind as the only existence in the universe. Of the two doctrines, that of Berkeley is at once the safest and the most philosophical; not only as it contradicts merely the suggestions of our perceptions, while the other contradicts the suggestions of our consciousness; but as various plausible arguments may be urged in its favor, from the phenomena of dreaming; whereas no instance can be mentioned, in which sensation and intelligence appear to result from any combination of the particles of Matter.

305. Besides the evidences for the existence of Mind, which our own consciousness affords, and those which are exhibited by other men, and by the lower animals, there are many presented to us by every part of the material world. We are so constituted, that every change in it we see suggests to us the notion of an efficient cause; and every combination of means conspir

ing to an end suggests to us the notion of intelligence. And accordingly, the various changes which take place in nature, and the order and beauty of the universe, have, in every age, been regarded as the effects of power and wisdom; that is, of the operation of Mind. In the material world, therefore, as well as in the case of animated nature, we are led to conceive body as a passive subject, and Mind as the moving and governing agent. And it deserves attention, that, in the former class of phenomena, Mind appears to move and arrange the parts of matter, without being united with it as in the case of animal life.

306. There are various circumstances which render it highly probable, that the union between soul and body, which takes place in our present state, so far from being essential to the exercise of our powers and faculties, was intended to limit the sphere of our information, and to prevent us from acquiring, in this early stage of our being, too clear a view of the constitution and government of the universe. Indeed, when we reflect on the difference between the operations of Mind and the qualities of Matter, it appears much more wonderful that the two substances should be so intimately united, as we find them actually to be, than to suppose that the former may exist in a conscious and intelligent state when separated from the latter.

307. The most plausible objections, nevertheless, to the doctrine of a future state, have been drawn from the intimacy of this union. From the effects of intoxication, madness, and other diseases, it appears that a certain condition of the body is necessary to the intellectual operations; and, in the case of old men, it is generally found that a decline of the faculties keeps pace with the decay of bodily health and vigor. The few exceptions that occur to the universality of this fact only prove, that there are some diseases fatal to life, which do not injure those parts of the body with which the intellectual operations are more immediately connected.

308. The reply which Cicero has made to these objections is equally ingenious and solid. "Suppose a person to have been educated, from his infancy, in a