our hopes. If no account could be given of the evils of life, but that they may possibly be good relatively to the whole universe;-still more, if it should appear, that the sufferings of life overbalance its enjoyments; it could hardly be expected, that any speculative reasoning would have much effect in banishing the melancholy suggestions of scepticism. We are therefore naturally led, in the first place, to inquire, whether some explanation may not be given of the origin of evil, from a consideration of the facts which fall under our notice? and, secondly, to compare together the happiness and the misery which the world exhibits.

269. The question concerning the origin of evil, has, from the earliest times, employed the ingenuity of speculative men; and various theories have been proposed to solve the difficulty. The most celebrated of these are the following.

(1.) The doctrine of Pre-existence.

(2.) The doctrine of the Manicheans. (3.) The doctrine of Optimism.

270. According to the first hypothesis, the evils we suffer at present are punishments and expiations of moral delinquencies, committed in a former stage of our being. This hypothesis, it is obvious (to mention no other objection,) only removes the difficulty a little out of sight, without affording any explanation of it.

271. The Manicheans account for the mixture of good and evil in the universe, by the opposite agencies of two co-eternal and independent principles. Their doctrine has been examined and refuted by many authors, by reasonings a priori; but the most satisfactory of all refutations, is its obvious inconsistency with that unity of design which is every where conspicuous in na

ture.

272. The fundamental principle of the Optimists is, that all events are ordered for the best; and that the evils which we suffer, are parts of a great system conducted by Almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness.

273. Under this general title, however, are comprehended two very different descriptions of philosophers;

those who admit, and those who deny, the freedom of human actions. The former only contend, that every thing is right, so far as it is the work of God; and endeavour to show, that the creation of beings endowed with free-will, and consequently liable to moral delinquency; and the government of the world by general laws, from which occasional evils must result, furnish no solid objection to the perfection of the universe. But they hold, at the same time, that although the permission of moral evil does not detract from the goodness of God, it is nevertheless imputable to man as a fault, and renders him justly obnoxious to punishment. This system (under a variety of different forms) has been, in all ages, maintained by the best and wisest philosophers; who, while they were anxious to vindicate the perfections of the Deity, saw the importance of stating their doctrine in a manner consistent with man's free will and moral agency.

274. By some modern authors, the scheme of Optimism has been proposed in a form inconsistent with these suppositions, and which leads to a justification of moral evil, even with respect to the delinquent.

275. It is of great importance, to attend to the distinction between these two systems; because it is customary among sceptical writers to confound them studiously together, in order to extend to both that ridicule. to which the latter is justly entitled. The scope of the argument, as stated in the former system, may be collected from the following hints.

276. All the different subjects of human complaint may be reduced to two classes; Moral and Physical evils. The former comprehends those which arise from the abuse of Free-will; the latter those which result from the established laws of nature, and which man cannot prevent by his own efforts.

277. According to the definition now given of moral evil, the question, with respect to its permission, is reduced to this; Why was man made a free agent? A question to which it seems to be a sufficient reply: That perhaps the object of the Deity, in the government of the world, is not merely to communicate happiness, but

to form his creatures to moral excellence ;-or that the enjoyment of high degrees of happiness may perhaps necessarily require the previous acquisition of virtuous habits.

278. The sufferings produced by vice are, on this supposition, instances of the goodness of God, no less than the happiness resulting from virtue.

279. These observations justify Providence, not only for the permission of moral evil, but for the permission of many things which we commonly complain of as physical evils. How great is the proportion of these, which are the obvious consequences of our vices and our prejudices; and which, so far from being a necessary part of the order of nature, seem intended to operate in the progress of human affairs, as a gradual remedy against the causes which produce them!

280. Some of our other complaints with respect to the lot of humanity will be found, on examination, to arise from partial views of the constitution of man, and from a want of attention to the circumstances which constitute his happiness, or promote his improvement.

281. Still, however, many evils remain, to which the foregoing principles do not apply. Such are those produced by what we commonly call the accidents of life; -accidents from which no state of society, how perfect soever, can possibly be exempted; and which, if they be subservient to any benevolent purposes, contribute to none within the sphere of our knowledge.

282. Of this class of physical evils, the explanation must be derived from the general laws by which the government of the Deity appears to be conducted. The tendency of these laws will be found, in every instance, favorable to order and to happiness; and it is one of the noblest employments of philosophy to investigate the beneficent purposes to which they are subservient. a world, however, which is thus governed, and where the inhabitants are free agents, occasional inconveniences and misfortunes must unavoidably be incurred.

In

283. In the mean time, from this influence of "Time and Chance," on human affairs, salutary effects arise. Virtue is rendered disinterested, and the characters of men are more completely displayed.

284. Many of our moral qualities, too, are the result of habits which imply the existence of physical evils. Patience, Fortitude, Humanity, all suppose a scene, in which sufferings are to be endured in our own case; or relieved in the case of others.

285. Thus it appears, not only that partial evils may be good with respect to the whole system; but that their tendency is beneficial on the whole, even to that small part of it which we see.

286. The argument for the goodness of God, which arises from the foregoing considerations, will be much strengthened, if it shall appear farther, that the sum of happiness in human life far exceeds the sum of misery.

287. In opposition to this conclusion, the prevalence of moral evil over moral good, in the characters of men, has been insisted on by many writers; and in proof of it an appeal has been made to the catalogue of crimes which sully the history of past ages.

288. Whatever opinion we may adopt, with respect to the state of the fact, in this particular instance; no objection can be drawn from it to the foregoing reasonings; for moral evil is alone imputable to the being by whom it is committed. There is, however, no necessity for having recourse to this evasion. Corrupted as mankind are, the proportion of human life which is spent in vice, is inconsiderable when compared with the whole of its extent. History itself is a proof of this; for the events it records are chiefly those which are calculated, by their singularity, to engage the curiosity and to interest the passions of the reader. In computing, besides, the moral demerit of mankind, from their external actions, a large allowance ought to be made for erroneous speculative opinions; for false conceptions of facts; for prejudices inspired by the influence of prevailing manners; and for habits contracted insensibly in early infancy.

289. With respect to the balance of physical evil and physical good, the argument is still clearer; if it be acknowledged (§ 282.) that the general laws of nature are beneficent in their tendency, and that the inconveniencies which arise from them are only occasional.

290. Of these occasional evils, too, no inconsiderable part may be traced to the obstacles, which human institutions oppose to the order of things recommended by nature. How chimerical soever the speculations of philosophers concerning the perfection of legislation may be, they are useful, at least, in illustrating the wisdom and goodness of the Divine government.

291. Nor is it only in those laws which regulate the more essential interests of mankind, that a beneficent intention may be traced. What a rich provision is made for our enjoyment, in the pleasures of the understanding, of the imagination, and of the heart; and how little do they depend on the caprice of fortune! The positive accommodation of our sensitive powers to the scene we occupy, is still more wonderful:-Of the organ of smell, for example, to the perfumes of the vegetable world; of the taste, to the endless profusion of luxuries which the earth, the air, and the waters afford; of the ear, to the melodies of the birds; of the eye, to all the beauties and glories of the visible creation.

292. Among these marks of beneficence in the frame of man, the constitution of his mind, with respect to Habits, must not be omitted. So great is their influence, that there is hardly any situation to which his wishes may not be gradually reconciled; nay, where he will not find himself, in time, more comfortable, than in those which are looked up to with envy by the bulk of mankind. By this power of accommodation to external circumstances, a remedy is, in part, provided for the occasional evils resulting from the operation of general laws.

293. In judging of the feelings of those who are placed in situations very different from our own, due allowances are seldom made for the effects of habit; and, of consequence, our estimates of the happiness of life fall short greatly of the truth.

II. Of the Evidences of the Moral Government of the Deity.

294. IT was before remarked, (§ 264.) that, as our first ideas of the moral attributes of God are derived