Page images
PDF
EPUB

SECTION I.

Of the Duties which respect the Deity.

225. As our duties to God must be inferred from the relation in which we stand to him, and as our idea of this relation depends on our conceptions of his nature and attributes, an examination of the principles of Natural Religion forms a necessary introduction to this section.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION.

ARTICLE FIRST.

Of the Existence of the Deity.

226. On this subject two modes of reasoning have been employed, which are commonly distinguished by the titles of the Arguments a priori and a posteriori.

227. The argument a priori has been enforced with singular ingenuity by Dr. Clarke, whose particular manner of stating it is supposed to have been suggested to him by the following passage in Newton's Principia. "Eternus est et infinitus, omnipotens et omnisciens; id est, durat ab æterno in æternum, et adest ab infinito ad infinitum. Non est æternitas et infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique, et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium constituit." * Proceeding on the same principles, Dr. Clarke argues, that "space and time are only abstract conceptions of an immensity and eternity, which force themselves on our belief; and, as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal." "These," says Dr. Reid," are the speculations of men of superior genius; but whether they be as solid as they are sublime; or whether they be the wanderings of imagination in a region beyond the limits of human understanding, I am unable to determine."

* Newton Princ. Scholium generale.

228. Without calling in question the solidity of Clarke's demonstration, we may be allowed to say, that the argument a posteriori is more level to the comprehension of ordinary men, and more satisfactory to the philosopher himself. Indeed, in inquiries of this sort, the presumption is strongly in favor of that mode of reasoning which is the most simple and obvious. Quicquid nos vel meliores vel beatiores facturum est, aut in aperto, aut in proximo, posuit natura.”

229. The existence of a Deity, however, does not seem to be an intuitive truth. It requires the exercise of our reasoning powers to present it, in its full force, to the mind. But the process of reasoning consists only of a single step; and the premises belong to that class of first principles, which form an essential part of the human constitution, (§ 70. (3.) These premises are two in number. The one is, that every thing which begins to exist must have a cause. The other, that a combination of means conspiring to a particular end, implies intelligence.

I. Of the Foundations of our Reasoning from the Effect to the Cause, and of the Evidences of Active Power exhibited in the Universe.

230. It was before observed, (Introd. § 3.) that our knowledge of the course of nature is entirely the result of observation and experiment; and that there is no instance in which we perceive such a connexion between two successive events, as might enable us to infer the one from the other as a necessary consequence.

231. From this principle, which is now very generally admitted by philosophers, Mr. Hume has deduced an objection to the argument a posteriori for the existence of the Deity. After having proved that we cannot get the idea of necessary connexion, from examining the conjunction between any two events; he takes for granted, that we have no other idea of Cause and Effect, than of two successive events which are invariably conjoined; that we have therefore no reason to think, that any one event in nature is necessarily connected with another, or

to infer the operation of power from the changes which we observe in the universe.

232. To perceive the connexion between Mr. Hume's premises and his conclusion, it is necessary to recollect, that, according to his system, "all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions; or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any thing, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses." Having proved, therefore, that external objects, as they appear to our senses, give us no idea of power or of necessary connexion, and also that this idea cannot be copied from any internal impression, (that is, cannot be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds,) he thinks himself warranted to conclude, that we have no such idea. "One event," says he, "follows another, but we never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing, which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, That we have no idea of connexion or power at all; and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life."

233. Are we, therefore, to reject as perfectly unintelligible, a word which is to be found in all languages; merely because it expresses an idea, for the origin of which we cannot account upon a particular philosophical system? Would it not be more reasonable to suspect, that the system was not perfectly complete, than that all mankind should have agreed in employing a word which conveyed no meaning?

234. With respect to Mr. Hume's theory, concerning the origin of our ideas, it is the less necessary to enter into particular discussions, that it coincides, in the main, with the doctrine of Locke, to which some objections, which appear to be insurmountable, were formerly stated, (§ 194.) Upon neither theory is it possible to explain the origin of those simple notions, which are not received immediately by any external sense, nor derived immediately from our own consciousness; but which are necessarily formed by the mind, while we are ex

ercising our intellectual powers upon their proper objects.

235. These very slight hints are sufficient to show, that we are not entitled to dispute the reality of our idea of power, because we cannot trace it to any of our senses. The only question is, if it be certain, that we annex any idea to the word power, different from that of mere succession? The following considerations, among many others, prove, that the import of these two expressions is by no means the same.

(1.) If we had no idea of cause and effect different from that of mere succession, it would appear to us no less absurd to suppose two events disjoined, which we have constantly seen connected, than to suppose a change to take place without a cause. The former supposition, however, is easy in all cases whatever. The latter may be safely pronounced to be impossible.

(2.) Our experience of the established connexions of physical events is by far too narrow a foundation for our belief, that every change must have a cause. Mr. Hume himself has observed, that "the vulgar always include the idea of Contiguity in place in the idea of causation ;' or, in other words, that they conceive matter to produce its effects by impulse alone. If therefore every change which had fallen under our notice, had been preceded by apparent impulse, experience might have taught us to conclude, from observing a change, that a previous impulse had been given; or, according to Mr. Hume's notion of a cause, that a cause had operated to produce this effect. Of the changes, however, which we see, how small a number is produced by apparent impulse? And yet, in the case of every change, without exception, we have an irresistible conviction of the operation of some cause, How shall we explain, on Mr. Hume's principles, the foundation of this conviction, in cases in which impulse has apparently no share?

236. The question, however, still recurs; In what manner do we acquire the idea of Causation, Power, or Efficiency? But this question, if the foregoing observations be admitted, is comparatively of little consequence; as the doubts which may arise on the subject,

tend only, (without affecting the reality of the idea or notion) to expose the defects of particular philosophical systems.

237. The most probable account of the matter seems to be, that the idea of causation, or of power, necessarily accompanies the perception of change, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which sensation implies a being who feels, and thought, a being who thinks. A power of beginning motion, for example, is an attribute of mind, no less than sensation or thought; and wherever motion commences, we have evidence that mind has operated.

238. Are we therefore to conclude, that the divine power is constantly exerted to produce the phenomena of the material world, and to suppose that one and the same cause produces that infinite multiplicity of effects which are every moment taking place in the universe?

239. In order to avoid this conclusion, which has been thought, by many, too absurd to deserve a serious examination, various hypotheses have been proposed. The most important of these may be referred to the following heads.

(1.) That the phenomena of nature are the result of certain active powers essentially inherent in matter. This doctrine is commonly called Materialism.

(2.) That they result from certain active powers communicated to matter at its first formation.

(3.) That they take place in consequence of general laws established by the Deity.

(4.) That they are produced by "a vital and spiritual, but unintelligent and necessary agent, created by the Deity for the execution of his purposes."

[ocr errors]

(5.) That they are produced by minds connected with the particles of matter.

(6.) That the universe is a machine, formed and put in motion by the Deity; and that the multiplicity of effects which take place, may perhaps have all proceeded from one single act of his power.

240. These different hypotheses, (some of which

[blocks in formation]
« PreviousContinue »