and attachment of our fellow-creatures; and we know, with the evidence of a perception, that we enjoy the approbation of the invisible witness of our conduct. Hence it is, that we have not only a sense of merit, but an anticipation of reward, and look forwards to the future with increased confidence and hope.

207. The feelings of remorse which accompany the consciousness of guilt, involve, in like manner, a sense of ill-desert, and an anticipation of future punishment.

208. Although, however, our sense of Merit and Demerit must convince the philosopher of the connexion which the Deity has established between virtue and happiness, he does not proceed on the supposition, that, on particular occasions, miraculous interpositions are to be made in his favor. That virtue is, even in this world, the most direct road to happiness, he sees to be a fact; but he knows that the Deity governs by general laws; and when he feels himself disappointed in the attainment of his wishes, he acquiesces in his lot, and consoles himself with the prospect of futurity. It is an error of the vulgar to expect, that good or bad fortune are always to be connected, in particular instances, with good or bad actions ;—a prejudice which is a source of much disappointment in human life, but of which the prevalence in all ages and countries, affords a striking illustration of the natural connexion between the ideas of virtue and of merit.

SECTION VI.

Of the Moral Faculty.

ARTICLE THIRD.

Of Moral Obligation.

209. ACCORDING to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief, that virtue is enjoined by the command of God. But how, it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given. Either, that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author

and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational self-love should induce us, out of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition, we reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion; and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

210. The other system which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently show that it is erroneous.. Among others, it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest :-2. That a being independently and completely happy, cannot have any moral perceptions, or any moral attributes.

211. But farther; the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it; but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

212. In the last place; if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest argument for such a state is deduced from our natural notions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit; and from a comparison between these and the general course of human affairs.

213. It is absurd, therefore, to ask, why we are bound to practise virtue? The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. Every being, who is conscious of the distinction between Right and Wrong, carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe; notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future "What renders obnoxious to punishment, is not the foreknowledge of it, but merely the violating a known obligation."

state.

214. From what has been stated, it follows, that the moral faculty, considered as an active power of the mind, differs essentially from all the others hitherto enumerated. The least violation of its authority fills us with remorse. On the contrary, the greater the sacrifices we make, in obedience to its suggestions, the greater are our satisfaction and triumph.

215. The supreme authority of conscience, although beautifully described by many of the ancient moralists, was not sufficiently attended to by modern writers, as a fundamental principle in the science of Ethics, till the time of Dr. Butler. Too little stress is laid on it by Lord Shaftesbury; and the omission is the chief defect of his philosophy.

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216. If this distinction between the moral faculty and our other active powers, be acknowledged, it is of the less consequence what particular theory we adopt concerning the origin of our moral ideas and accordingly Mr. Smith, though he resolves moral approbation ultimately into a feeling of the mind, represents the supremacy of conscience as a principle which is equally essential to all the different systems that have been proposed on the subject. Upon whatever we suppose our moral faculties to be founded, whether upon a certain modification of reason, upon an original instinct, called a moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it cannot be doubted that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of this authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions, to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites, and to judge how far each of them was either to be indulged or restrained. It is the peculiar office of these faculties to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other principles of our nature."

SECTION VII.

Of Man's Free Agency.

217. ALL the foregoing inquiries concerning the moral constitution of man, proceed on the supposition, that he has a freedom of choice between good and evil; and that when he deliberately performs an action which he knows to be wrong, he renders himself justly obnoxious to punishment. That this supposition is agreeable to the common apprehensions of mankind, will not be disputed.

218. From very early ages, indeed, the truth of the supposition has been called in question by a few speculative men, who have contended, that the actions we perform are the necessary result of the constitutions of our minds, operated on by the circumstances of our external situation; and that what we commonly call moral delinquencies are as much a part of our destiny, as the corporeal or intellectual qualities we have received from nature. The argument in support of this doctrine has been proposed in various forms, and has been frequently urged with the confidence of demonstration.

219. Among those, however, who hold the language of Necessitarians, an important distinction must be made; as some of them not only admit the reality of moral distinctions, but insist, that it is on their hypothesis alone, that these distinctions are conceivable. With such men, the scheme of necessity may be a harmless opinion : and there is even ground for suspecting, that it might be found to differ from that of their antagonists, more in appearance than in reality, if due pains were taken to fix the meaning of the indefinite and ambiguous terms, which have been employed on both sides of the argu

ment.

220. By other philosophers, the consequences which are generally supposed to be connected with this system, have been admitted in all their extent; or rather, the system has been inculcated, with a view to establish these consequences. When proposed in this form, it

furnishes the most interesting subject of discussion, which can employ human ingenuity; and upon which our speculative opinions can hardly fail to affect very materially both our conduct and our happiness.

221. Dr. Cudworth, who wrote towards the end of the last century, observes, that "the scepticism which flourished in his time, grew up from the doctrine of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, as from its proper root." The same remark will be found to apply to the sceptical philosophy of the present age.

222. It is sufficient, in these Outlines, to mark the place which the question seems naturally to occupy in the order of study. Detached hints would throw but little additional light on a controversy, which has been industriously darkened by all the powers of sophistry.

CHAPTER SECOND.

OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF OUR DUTY.

223. THE different theories which have been proposed concerning the nature of Virtue, have arisen chiefly from attempts to trace all the branches of our duty to one principle of action; such as a rational Self-love, Benevolence, Justice, or a disposition to obey the will of God.

224. In order to avoid those partial views of the subject, which naturally take their rise from an excessive love of simplicity, the following inquiries proceed upon an arrangement, which has, in all ages, recommended itself to the common sense of mankind. This arrangement is founded on the different objects to which our duties relate. 1. The Deity. 2. Our Fellow-creatures. And, 3. Ourselves.