ent impulse. But man is able to take a comprehensive survey of his various principles of action; and to form a plan of conduct for the attainment of his favorite objects. Every such plan implies a power of refusing occasionally to particular active principles, the gratification which they demand.

156. According to the particular active principle which influences habitually a man's conduct, his character receives its denomination of Covetous, Ambitious, Studious, or Voluptuous; and his conduct is more or less systematical, as he adheres to his general plan with steadiness or inconstancy.

157. A systematical steadiness in the pursuit of a particular end, while it is necessary for the complete gratification of our ruling passion, is far more favorable to the general improvement of the mind, than the dissipation of attention resulting from an undecided choice, among the various pursuits which human life presents to us. Even the systematical voluptuary is able to command a much greater variety of sensual indulgences, and to continue them to a much more advanced age, than the thoughtless profligate; and, how low soever the objects may be which occupy his thoughts, they seldom fail, by engaging them habitually in one direction, to give a certain degree of cultivation to his intellectual faculties.

158. The only exception, perhaps, which can be mentioned to the last remark, is in the case of those men whose leading principle of action is Vanity; and who, as their rule of conduct is borrowed from without, must, in consequence of this very circumstance, be perpetually wavering and inconsistent in their pursuits. Accordingly, it will be found, that such men, although they have frequently performed splendid actions, have seldom risen to eminence in any one particular career; unless, when, by a rare concurrence of accidental circumstances, this career has been steadily pointed out to them through the whole of their lives, by public opinion.

159. A systematical conduct in life, invariably directed to certain objects, is more favorable to happiness, than one which is influenced merely by occasional inclination and appetite. Even the man who is decidedly

and uniformly unprincipled, is free of much of the disquiet, which disturbs the tranquillity of those, whose characters are more mixed, and more inconsistent.

160. There is another, and very important respect, in which the nature of man differs from that of the brutes. He is able to avail himself of his past experience, in avoiding those enjoyments, which he knows will be succeeded by suffering; and in submitting to lesser evils, which he knows are to be instrumental in procuring him a greater accession of good. He is able, in a word, to form the general notion of Happiness, and to deliberate about the most effectual means of attaining it.

161. It is implied in the very idea of Happiness, that it is a desirable object; and therefore, Self-love is an active principle very different from those which have been hitherto considered. These, for aught we know, may be the effect of arbitrary appointment; and they have, accordingly, been called implanted principles. The desire of happiness may be called a rational principle of action; being peculiar to a rational nature, and inseparably connected with it.

162. In prefixing to this section the title of Self-love, the ordinary language of modern philosophy has been followed. The expression, however, is exceptionable; as it suggests an analogy (where there is none in fact) between that regard, which every rational being must necessarily have to his own happiness, and those benevolent affections which attach us to our fellow-creatures. The similarity, too, between the words, self-love and selfishness, has introduced much confusion into ethical disquisitions..

163. The word selfishness, is always used in an unfavorable sense; and hence, some authors have been led to suppose, that vice consists in an excessive regard to our own happiness. It is remarkable, however, that, although we apply the epithet selfish to avarice, and to low and private sensuality, we never apply it to the desire of knowledge, or to the pursuits of virtue, which are certainly sources of more exquisite pleasure than Riches or Sensuality can bestow.

164. The truth will probably be found, upon examin

ation, to be this; that the word selfishness, when applied to a pursuit, has no reference to the motive from which the pursuit proceeds, but to the effect it has on the conduct. Neither our animal appetites, nor avarice, nor curiosity, nor the desire of moral improvement, arise from Self-love but some of these active principles disconnect us with society more than others; and consequently, though they do not indicate a greater regard for our own happiness, they betray a greater unconcern for the happiness of our neighbours. The pursuits of the miser have no mixture whatever of the social affections: On the contrary, they continually lead him to state his own interest in opposition to that of other men. The enjoyments of the sensualist all expire within his own person: and, therefore, whoever is habitually occupied in the search of them, must of necessity neglect the duties which he owes to mankind. It is otherwise with the desire of knowledge, which is always accompanied with a strong desire of social communication; and with the love of moral excellence, which, in its practical tendency, coincides so remarkably with Benevolence, that many authors have attempted to resolve the one principle into the other.

165. That the word selfishness is by no means synonymous with a regard to our own happiness, appears farther from this, that the blame we bestow on those pursuits which are commonly called selfish, is founded, partly, on the sacrifice they imply of our true interest, to the inferior principles of our nature. When we see, for example, a man enslaved by his animal appetites; so far from considering him as under the influence of an excessive self-love, we pity and despise him for neglecting the higher enjoyments which are placed within his reach.

SECTION VI.

Of the Moral Faculty.

ARTICLE FIRST.

General Observations on this Part of our Constitution.

166. THE facts alluded to in the last paragraph of the foregoing section, have led some philosophers to conclude, that Virtue is merely a matter of prudence, and that a sense of duty is but another name for a rational self-love. This view of the subject was far from being unnatural; for we find, that these two principles, in general, lead to the same course of action; and we have every reason to believe, that if our knowledge of the universe were more extensive, they would be found to do so, in all instances whatever.

167. That we have, however, a sense of duty, which is not resolvable into a regard to our happiness, appears from various considerations.

(1.) There are, in all languages, words equivalent to Duty and to Interest, which men have constantly distinguished in their signification. They coincide, in general, in their applications; but they convey very different ideas.

(2.) The emotions arising from the contemplation of what is right or wrong in conduct, are different, both in degree and in kind, from those which are produced by a calm regard to our own happiness. This is particularly remarkable, in the emotions excited by the moral conduct of others; for such is the influence of self-deceit, that few men judge with perfect fairness of their own actions. The emotions excited by characters exhibited in histories and in novels, are sometimes still more powerful than what we experience from similar qualities displayed in the circle of our acquaintances; because the judgment is less apt to be warped by partiality or by prejudice. The representations of the stage, however, afford the most favorable of all opportunities for observing their effects. As every species of Enthusiasm operates most forcibly when men are col

lected in a crowd, our moral feelings are exhibited on a larger scale in the theatre than in the closet. And accordingly, the slightest hint, suggested by the poet, raises to transport the passions of the audience; and forces involuntary tears from men of the greatest reserve, and the most correct sense of propriety.

(3.) Although philosophers have shown, that a sense of duty, and an enlightened regard to our own happiness conspire, in most instances, to give the same direction to our conduct, so as to put it beyond a doubt, that, even in this world, a virtuous life is true wisdom, yet this is a truth by no means obvious to the common sense of mankind, but deduced from an extensive view of human affairs, and an accurate investigation of the remote consequences of our different actions. It is from experience and reflexion, therefore, that we learn the tendency of virtue to advance our worldly prosperity; and, consequently, the great lessons of morality, which are obvious to the capacity of all mankind, cannot have been suggested to them merely by a regard to their own inter

est.

(4.) The same conclusion is strongly confirmed by the early period of life at which our moral judgments make their appearance ;-long before children are able to form the general notion of happiness, and indeed in the very infancy of their reason.

168. In order to elude the force of some of the foregoing arguments, it has been supposed that the rules of morality were, in the first instance, brought to light by the sagacity of philosophers and politicians; and that it is only in consequence of the influence of education, that they appear to form an original part of the human constitution. The diversity of opinions among different nations, with respect to the morality of particular actions, has been considered as a strong confirmation of this doctrine.

169. But the power of education, although great, is confined within certain limits; for it is by co-operating with the natural principles of the mind, that it produces its effects. Nay, this very susceptibility of education, which is acknowledged to belong universally to the race,