136. As we have artificial appetites, so we have also artificial desires. Whatever conduces to the attainment of any object of natural desire, is itself desired on account of its subserviency to this end; and frequently comes, in process of time, to acquire, in our estimation, an intrinsic value. It is thus, that wealth becomes, with many, an ultimate object of pursuit ; although it is undoubtedly valued at first, merely as the means of attaining other objects. In like manner, men are led to desire dress, equipage, retinue, furniture, on account of the estimation in which they are supposed to be held by the public. Such desires have been called, by Dr. Hutcheson, Secondary Desires. Their origin is easily explicable on the principle of Association.

SECTION IV.

Of our Affections.

137. UNDER this title are comprehended all those active principles, whose direct and ultimate object is the communication either of enjoyment or of suffering, to any of our fellow-creatures. According to this definition, Resentment, Revenge, Hatred, belong to the class of our affections, as well as Gratitude or Pity. Hence a distinction of the affections into Benevolent and Malevolent.

I. Of the Benevolent Affections.

138. OUR Benevolent affections are various; and it would not, perhaps, be easy to enumerate them completely. The Parental and the Filial affections,-the affections of Kindred,-Love,-Friendship,-Patriotism, -Universal Benevolence,-Gratitude,-Pity to the distressed, are some of the most important. Besides these, there are peculiar benevolent affections, excited by those moral qualities in other men, which render them either amiable, or respectable, or objects of admi

ration.

139. In the foregoing enumeration, it is not to be un

derstood, that all the benevolent affections particularly specified, are stated as original principles, or ultimate facts in our constitution. On the contrary, there can be little doubt, that several of them may be analysed into the same general principle differently modified, according to the circumstances in which it operates. This, however, (notwithstanding the stress which has been sometimes laid upon it,) is chiefly a question of arrangement. Whether we suppose these principles to be all ultimate facts, or some of them to be resolvable into other facts more general; they are equally to be regarded as constituent parts of human nature; and, upon either supposition, we have equal reason to admire the wisdom with which that nature is adapted to the situation in which it is placed. The laws which regulate the acquired perceptions of Sight, are surely as much a part of our frame, as those which regulate any of our original perceptions; and, although they require, for their developement, a certain degree of experience and observation, in the individual; the uniformity of the result shows, that there is nothing arbitrary nor accidental in their origin.

140. The question, indeed, concerning the origin of our different affections, leads to some curious disquisitions; but is of very subordinate importance to those inquiries, which relate to their nature, and laws, and uses. In many philosophical systems, however, it seems to have been considered as the most interesting subject of discussion connected with this part of the human constitution.

141. To treat in detail, of the nature, laws, and uses of our benevolent affections, is obviously inconsistent with the brevity of a treatise, confined by its plan, to a statement of definitions and divisions, and of such remarks as are necessary for explaining the arrangement on which it proceeds. The enumeration already mentioned (§ 138,) suggests an order according to which this subject may be treated in a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy. What follows is equally applicable to all the various principles which come under the general description.

142. The exercise of all our kind affections is accompanied with an agreeable feeling or emotion. So much, indeed, of our happiness is derived from this source, that those authors, whose object is to furnish amusement to the mind, avail themselves of these affections as one of the chief vehicles of pleasure. Hence, the principal charm of tragedy, and of every other species of pathetic composition. How far it is of use, to separate, in this manner, "the luxury of pity" from the opportunities of active exertion, may perhaps be doubt

ed.

143. The pleasures of kind affection are not confined to the virtuous. They mingle also with our criminal indulgences; and often mislead the young and thoughtless, by the charms they impart to vice and to folly.

144. Even when these affections are disappointed in the attainment of their objects, there is a degree of pleasure mixed with the pain :-and sometimes the pleasure greatly predominates.

145. The final cause of the agreeable emotion connected with the exercise of Benevolence, in all its various modes, was evidently to induce us to cultivate, with peculiar care, a class of our active principles so immediately subservient to the happiness of human society.

146. Notwithstanding, however, the pleasure arising from the indulgence of the benevolent affections; these affections have nothing selfish in their origin :-as has been fully demonstrated by different writers. This conclusion, although contrary to the systems of many philosophers, both ancient and modern, is not only agreeable to the obvious appearance of the fact; but is strongly confirmed by the analogy of the other active powers already considered.

147. We have found that the preservation of the individual, and the continuation of the species, are not intrusted to Self-love and Reason alone; but that we are endowed with various appetites, which, without any reflexion on our part, impel us to their respective objects. We have also found, with respect to the acquisition of knowledge, (on which the perfection of the individual, and the improvement of the species, essentially depend;)

that it is not intrusted solely to Self-love and Benevolence; but that we are prompted to it by the implanted principle of Curiosity. It farther appeared, that, in addition to our sense of duty, another incentive to worthy conduct is provided in the desire of Esteem, which is not only one of our most powerful principles of action, but continues to operate, in full force, to the last moment of our being. Now, as men were plainly intended to live in society, and as the social union could not subsist, without a mutual interchange of good offices; would it not be reasonable to expect, agreeably to the analogy of our nature, that so important an end would not be intrusted solely to the slow deductions of Reason, or to the metaphysical refinements of Self-love; but that some provision would be made for it in a particular class of active principles, which might operate, like our appetites and desires, independently of our reflexion? To say this of Parental Affection or of Pity, is saying nothing more in their favor, than what was affirmed of Hunger and Thirst; that they prompt us to particular objects, without any reference to our own enjoyment.

II. Of the Malevolent Affections.

148. THE names which are given to these, in common discourse, are various; but it may be doubted, if there be any principle of this kind, implanted by nature, in the mind, excepting the principle of Resentment.

149. Resentment has been distinguished into Instinctive and Deliberate. The former operates, in man, exactly as in the lower animals; and was plainly intended to guard us against sudden violence, in cases where reason would come too late to our assistance. This species of Resentment subsides, as soon as we are satisfied, that no injury was intended.

150. Deliberate Resentment is excited only by intentional injury; and, therefore, implies a sense of justice, or of moral good and evil.

151. The Resentment excited by an injury offered to another person, is properly called Indignation. In both cases the principle of action seems to be fundamentally

the same; and to have for its object, not the communication of suffering to a sensitive being, but the punishment of injustice and cruelty.

152. As all the benevolent affections are accompanied with pleasant emotions; so all the malevolent affections are sources of pain and disquiet. This is true even of Resentment; how justly soever it may be roused by the injurious conduct of others.

153. In the foregoing review of our active powers, no mention has been made of our Passions. The truth is, that this word does not, in strict propriety, belong exclusively to any one class of these principles; but is applicable to all of them, when they are suffered to pass the bounds of moderation. In such cases, a sensible agitation or commotion of the body is produced; our reason is disturbed; we lose, in some measure, the power of self-command, and are hurried to action by an almost irresistible impulse. Ambition, the Desire of Fame, Avarice, Compassion, Love, Gratitude, Resentment, Indignation; may all, in certain circumstances, be entitled to this appellation. When we speak of passion in general, we commonly mean the passion of Resentment; probably, because this affection disturbs the reason more, and leaves us less the power of self-government, than any other active principle of our nature.

SECTION V.

Of Self-Love.

154. THE Constitution of man, if it were composed of the active principles hitherto mentioned, would be merely analogous to that of the brutes. His reason, however, renders his nature and condition, on the whole, essentially different from theirs.

155. They are incapable of looking forward to consequences, or of comparing together the different gratifications of which they are susceptible; and accordingly, as far as we are able to perceive, they yield to every pres