SECTION III.

Of our Desires.

115. THESE are distinguished from our appetites by the following circumstances.

(1.) They do not take rise from the body.

(2.) They do not operate periodically, after certain intervals and they do not cease upon the attainment of a particular object.

116. The most remarkable active principles belonging to this class are;

(1.) The Desire of Knowledge, or the Principle of Curiosity.

(2.) The Desire of Society.

(3.) The Desire of Esteem.

(4.) The Desire of Power; or the Principle of Am

bition.

(5.) The Desire of Superiority; or the Principle of Emulation.

I. The Desire of Knowledge.

117. THE principle of Curiosity appears, in children, at a very early period, and is commonly proportioned to the degree of capacity they possess. The direction too which it takes, is regulated by nature, according to the order of our wants and necessities; being confined, in the first instance, exclusively to those properties of material objects, and those laws of the material world, an acquaintance with which is essential to the preservation of our animal existence. In more advanced years, it displays itself, in one way or another, in every individual; and gives rise to an infinite diversity in their pursuits. Whether this diversity be owing to natural predisposition, or to early education, it is of little consequence to determine; as upon either supposition, a preparation is made for it in the original constitution of the mind, combined with the circumstances of our external situation. Its final cause is also sufficiently obvious; as it is this which gives rise, in the case of individ

uals, to a limitation of attention and study; and lays the foundation of all the advantages, which society derives, from the division and subdivision of intellectual labor.

118. The desire of knowledge is not a selfish principle. As the object of hunger is not happiness, but food; so the object of curiosity is not happiness, but knowledge.

II. The Desire of Society.

119. ABSTRACTING from those affections which interest us in the happiness of others, and from all the advantages which we ourselves derive from the social union, we are led by a natural and instinctive desire, to associate with our own species. This principle is easily discernible in the minds of children; and it is common to man with many of the brutes.

120. After experiencing, indeed, the pleasures of social life; the influence of habit, and a knowledge of the comforts inseparable from society, contribute greatly to strengthen the instinctive desire: and hence some authors have been induced to display their ingenuity, by disputing its existence. Whatever opinion we form on this speculative question, the desire of society is equally entitled to be ranked among the natural and universal principles of our constitution.

121. How very powerfully this principle of action operates, appears from the effects of solitude upon the mind. We feel ourselves in an unnatural state; and, by making companions of the lower animals, or by attaching ourselves to inanimate objects, strive to fill up the void of which we are conscious.

122. The connexion between the Desire of Society and the Desire of Knowledge is very remarkable. The last of these principles is always accompanied with a wish to impart our information to others :-insomuch, that it has been doubted, if any man's curiosity would be sufficient to engage him in a course of persevering study, if he were entirely cut off from the prospect of social intercourse. In this manner, a beautiful provision is made for a mutual communication, among mankind, of their intellectual attainments.

III. The Desire of Esteem.

.

123. THIS principle discovers itself, at a very early period, in infants; who, long before they are able to reflect on the advantages resulting from the good opinion of others, and even before they acquire the use of speech, are sensibly mortified by any expression of neglect or contempt. It seems, therefore, to be an original principle of our nature; that is, it does not appear to be resolvable into reason and experience, or into any other principle more general than itself. An additional proof of this, is, the very powerful influence it has over the mind;—an influence more striking than that of any other active principle whatever. Even the love of life daily gives way to the desire of esteem; and of an esteem, which, as it is only to affect our memories, cannot be supposed to interest our self-love. In what manner, the association of ideas should manufacture, out of the other principles of our constitution, a new principle stronger than them all, it is difficult to conceive.

124. As our appetites of Hunger and Thirst, though not selfish principles, are yet immediately subservient to the preservation of the individual; so the desire of Esteem, though not a social or benevolent principle, is yet immediately subservient to the good of society.

IV. The Desire of Power.

125. WHENEVER we are led to consider ourselves as the authors of any effect, we feel a sensible pride or exultation, in the consciousness of Power; and the pleasure is, in general, proportioned to the greatness of the effect, compared to the smallness of our exertion.

126. The infant, while still on the breast, delights in exerting its little strength upon every object it meets with; and is mortified, when any accident convinces it of its own imbecility. The pastimes of the boy are, almost without exception, such as suggest to him the idea of his power and the same remark may be extended to the active sports and the athletic exercises, of youth and of manhood.

127. As we advance in years, and as our animal powers lose their activity and vigor, we gradually aim at extending our influence over others, by the superiority of fortune and of situation, or by the still more flattering superiority of intellectual endowments :-by the force of our understanding; by the extent of our information; by the arts of persuasion, or the accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power pleases the orator, in the consciousness of his eloquence; when he silences the reason of others by superior ingenuity; bends to his purposes their desires and passions; and, without the aid of force, or the splendor of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations?

128. The idea of power is, partly at least, the foundation of our attachment to property. It is not enough for us to have the use of an object. We desire to have it completely at our own disposal; without being responsible to any person whatever.

129. The love of liberty proceeds, in part, from the same source; from a desire of being able to do whatever is agreeable to our own inclination. Slavery mortifies us, because it limits our power.

130. Even the love of tranquillity and retirement has been resolved by Cicero into the same principle. "Multi autem et sunt, et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, Tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint. His idem propositum fuit quod regibus; ut ne quâ re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur; cujus proprium est, sic vivere, ut velis. Quare, cum hoc commune sit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis; alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant; alteri, si contenti sint et suo, et parvo."

131. The idea of power is also, in some degree, the foundation of the pleasure of Virtue. We love to be at liberty to follow our own inclinations, without being subjected to the control of a superior: but this alone is not sufficient to our happiness. When we are led, by vicious habits or by the force of passion, to do what reason disapproves, we are sensible of a mortfying subjection to the inferior principles of our nature, and feel

our own littleness and weakness. A sense of freedom and independence, elevation of mind, and the pride of virtue, are the natural sentiments of the man, who is conscious of being able, at all times, to calm the tumults of passion, and to obey the cool suggestions of duty and honor.

V. The Desire of Superiority.

132. EMULATION has been sometimes classed with the Affections: but it seems more properly to fall under the definition of our Desires. It is, indeed, frequently accompanied with ill-will towards our rivals: but it is the desire of superiority which is the active principle; and the malevolent affection is only a concomitant cir

cumstance.

133. A malevolent affection is not even a necessary concomitant of the desire of superiority. It is possible, surely, to conceive, (although the case may happen but rarely) that Emulation may take place between men, who are united by the most cordial friendship; and without a single sentiment of ill-will disturbing their harmony.

134. When Emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection, it assumes the name of Envy. The distinction between these two principles of action is accurately stated by Dr. Butler. "Emulation is merely the desire of superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. To desire the attainment of this superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down below our own level, is the distinct notion of Envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end, which the natural passion, Emulation, and which the unlawful one, Envy, aims at, is exactly the same; and consequently, that to do mischief is not the end of Envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end."

135. Some faint symptoms of Emulation may be remarked among the lower animals; but the effects it produces among them are perfectly insignificant. In our own race, it operates in an infinite variety of directions, and is one of the principal springs of human improvement.