trine concerning the radical distinction between Intuition. and Reasoning, it may be doubted, if the one of these powers be not implied in the other. If it be true, that a perfect demonstration is constituted by a chain of reasoning, in which all the links are connected by intuitive evidence; it will follow, that the power of reasoning presupposes the power of intuition. On the other hand, are not the powers of intuition and of memory sufficient, to account for those processes of thought, which conduct the mind by a series of consequences, from premises to a conclusion?

73. "When the mind," says Locke, "perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other, its knowledge may be called intuitive. When it cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and as it were, juxtaposition, or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other ideas, (one, or more, as it happens,) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches; and this is what we call Reasoning." According to these definitions; supposing the equality of two lines A and B to be perceived immediately in consequence of their coincidence; the judgment of the mind is intuitive. Supposing A to coincide with B, and B with C; the relation between A and C is perceived by Reasoning.

74. This is certainly not agreeable to common language. The truth of mathematical axioms has always been supposed to be intuitively obvious; and the first of these, according to Euclid's enumeration, affirms; that if A be equal to B, and B to C; A and C are equal.

75. Admitting, however, Locke's definition to be just, it might be easily shown, that the faculty which perceives the relation between A and C, is the same with the faculty which perceives the relation between A and B ; and between B and C. When the relation of equality between A and B has once been perceived, A and B become different names for the same thing.

76. That the power of reasoning (or, as it has been sometimes called, the Discursive Faculty,) is implied in

the powers of intuition and memory, appears also from an examination of the structure of syllogisms. It is impossible to conceive an understanding so formed, as to perceive the truth of the major and minor propositions, and not to perceive the truth of the conclusion. Indeed, as in this mode of stating an argument, the mind is led from universals to particulars, the truth of the conclusion must have been known before the major proposition was formed.

77. Deductive evidence is of two kinds, Demonstrative and Probable. The former relates to necessary, the latter to contingent truths. An accurate examination and comparison of these, are of great consequence to all who engage in moral inquiries. But the subject is too extensive to be introduced here.

78. The process of the mind, in discovering media of proof for establishing the truth of doubtful propositions ; and also the process by which we bring new truths to light, is properly called Invention. In this power, remarkable inequalities are observable among different individuals. In a capacity of understanding the reasonings of others, all men seem to be nearly on a level.

79. The word Logic is used by modern writers in two very different senses: 1. To express the scholastic art of syllogizing, which is commonly referred to Aristotle for its inventor. 2. To express that branch of the philosophy of the human mind, which has for its object, to guard us against the various errors, to which we are liable in the exercise of our reasoning powers; and to assist and direct the inventive faculty in the investigation of truth. The general aim of these two sorts of logic is the same; and they differ only in the justness of the principles on which they proceed. The inutility of the former is now pretty generally acknowledged; and it deserves our attention, chiefly, as a curious article in the history of science. The other is still in its infancy; but many important views have already been opened into the subject by Lord Bacon and others.

SECTION X.

Of Intellectual Powers or Capacities, formed by particular Habits of Study or of Business.

80. THE varieties of intellectual character among men, result from the various possible combinations and modifications of faculties, which, in greater or less degrees, are common to the whole species. Supposing these faculties to be originally the same in every individual; infinite diversities of genius would necessarily arise, from the different situations into which men are thrown by the accidents of human life.

81. The intellectual habits that are formed by the pursuits of science or of literature, are widely different from those which are produced by the active engagements of business. There are other peculiarities of a more delicate nature, which originate from particular studies; and which distinguish the different classes of literary men from each other. The metaphysician, the mathematician, the antiquary, the poet, the critic, strengthen, by their respective pursuits, particular faculties and principles; while they suffer others to remain without due cultivation.

82. An examination of the effects produced on the understanding, by different sciences, and by different active professions, would suggest many important rules for the improvement and enlargement of the mind, and for preserving all its various powers in that just proportion to each other, which constitutes the perfection of our intellectual nature.

83. Nearly connected with these last speculations, are those philosophical inquiries which have for their object, to analyse, into their constituent principles the different kinds of intellectual ability. Such inquiries not only open a curious and interesting field of disquisition, but have an obvious tendency to lessen that blind admiration of original genius, which is one of the chief obstacles to the improvement of the arts, and to the progress of knowledge.

84. Among the intellectual powers, gradually formed by a particular application of our original faculties, the power of Taste is one of the most important. It was formerly treated by metaphysicians as a simple and uncompounded principle of our constitution; but has been considered in a juster light by some late writers. A successful analysis of it could scarcely fail to suggest useful hints for its culture:-And there are few branches of education which deserve more serious attention; not only as it has a tendency to enlarge the sphere of innocent enjoyment, but as it seldom fails, when properly conducted, to form a temper, gentle, benevolent, and amiable.

SECTION XI.

Of certain auxiliary Faculties and Principles, essential to our intellectual Improvement, or intimately connected with it.

85. THE form and posture of the human body, and its various organs of perception, have an obvious reference to man's rational nature; and are beautifully fitted to encourage and facilitate his intellectual improvement. A similar remark may be extended to many other parts of our constitution, both external and internal: but there are two, which more particularly claim our attention; the power of expressing our thoughts by Language; and the principle of Imitation.

I. Of Language.

86. THE Connexion of this subject with that of the foregoing sections is sufficiently obvious. It is to the use of artificial signs, (§ 48.) that we are indebted for all our general conclusions: and without it, our knowledge would have been entirely limited to individuals. It is also to the use of artificial signs, that we are indebted for all that part of our information, which is not the immediate result of our own personal experience; and for that transmission of intellectual acquisitions from

one race to another, which lays the foundation of the progressive improvement of the species.

87. The formation of an artificial language, (as Dr. Reid has remarked) presupposes the use of natural signs. These consist in certain expressions of the countenance, certain gestures of the body, and certain tones of the voice.

88. There seems to be, in man, a power of interpreting instinctively some of these expressions. This, indeed, has been disputed of late; but various considerations might be mentioned, which justify the common opinion upon the subject.

89. As ideas multiply, the imperfections of natural language are felt; and men find it necessary to invent artificial signs, of which the meaning is fixed by mutual agreement. In proportion as artificial language improves, the language of nature declines: insomuch, that in such a state of society as ours, it requires a great deal of reflection and study to recover the use of it. This study is in a considerable degree the foundation of the arts, both of the actor and of the orator.

90. Artificial signs may be divided, into those which are addressed to the eye, and those which are addressed to the ear. The latter have formed, among all nations, the ordinary medium of intellectual communication.

91. As we have no record of the steps, by which any of the languages spoken among men have arisen; some writers have employed their ingenuity, in tracing, from the faculties of the mind, the origin of the different parts of speech; and, in illustrating the gradual progress of language, resulting from the general progress of society. Such conjectural speculations concerning the natural advances of the Species, in any particular line of improvement, may be distinguished by the title of Theoretical Histories.

92. The imperfections of those languages which have originated from popular use, have suggested, to some philosophers, the idea of a language expressly calculated for the purposes of science. The failure of the attempts hitherto made on this subject, are not decisive against the practicability of such a project.