Dr. W. Wright, now Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge, England.

They certainly must feel, in looking upon the completed work, that it is well adapted to the end which the author declares will be, by the favor of God, the coveted reward of his labor- the real aiding of the student to gain a good knowledge of the Old Testament scriptures in the original tongues.

ARTICLE X.

DR. HODGE'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.1

AN orator recently addressing the Massachusetts Medical Society remarked that "progress is the pride of the day; and the charm of antiquity is broken. In the early history of the country, medicine and theology were allied together, each having firm faith in the infinite and none in the infinitesimal; but now sugar is the staple article both in theological and medical dispensaries." In the system of theology which Dr. Hodge is giving to the public, there are signs of progress. It contains more of the saccharine element than is found in the older treatises emanating from his school. Still, it is in the main, allopathic rather than homoeopathic in its treatment of its patients. It is in this respect as it should be. It gives evidence of its author's sound mind and extensive learning. It is written in a vigorous and flexile style. It presents theology in a compact form. The spirit of it is candid and fair. It propounds various theories which we regard as untenable, and defends the real truth by some arguments which we regard as inconclusive. The excellences and the faults of the system the excellences being greater than the faults—appear in almost every chapter. Let us look, for example, at volume one, part one, chapter one, entitled "Origin of the Idea of God."

Dr. Hodge supposes that the existence of God can be proved, and also that it is self-evident. We have an "innate knowledge" of his being. Dr. Hodge defines innate knowledge to be "that which is due to our constitution as sentient, rational, and moral beings." "The soul is so constituted that it sees certain things to be true immediately in their own light. They need no proof. Men need not be told or taught that the things thus perceived are true." These immediate perceptions are called "intuitions," "primary truths," "laws of belief," "innate knowledge or ideas"

1 Systematic Theology. By Charles Hodge, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey Two Vols. pp. 648 and 732. New York: Charles Scribner and Company; London and Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons. 1872.

(I. 195). "All that is meant is that the mind is so constituted that it perceives certain things to be true without proof and without instruction” (I. 192). "What is seen inmediately without the intervention of proof to be true, is, according to the common mode of expression, said to be seen intuitively" (I. 193).

Among the truths of which we have an innate knowledge, Dr. Hodge specifies the following: "The part of a thing is less than the whole;” “A straight line is the shortest distance between two points;" "Nothing cannot be a cause;" "Every effect must have a cause; ' "Sin deserves pun

ishment," etc.

Dr. Hodge places the truth of God's existence in the same category with the axioms which we have now specified, and affirms that it is a "primary truth," one of which we have an "immediate perception," "intuition," " innate knowledge," "innate idea."

I. Let us inquire whether Dr. Hodge has shown that the perception of God's existence is so immediate as to prove the perception to be innate. Has he shown that we believe in God's existence as soon as the truth is presented to us, and without the intervention of any other truth? If there be the intervention of another truth, then this truth is perceived through a medium; and not being perceived immediately, it is not perceived intuitively. Dr. Hodge says: "All the faculties and feelings of our minds and bodies have their appropriate objects; and the possession of the faculties supposes the existence of those objects. The senses suppose the existence and reality of the objects of sense. The eye, in its very structure, supposes that there is such an element as light; the sense of hearing would be unaccountable and inconceivable without sound; and the sense of touch would be inconceivable were there no tangible objects. The same is true of our social affections; they necessitate the assumption that there are relations suited to their exercises. Our moral nature supposes that the distinction between right and wrong is not chimerical or imaginary. In like manner, our religious feelings, our sense of dependence, our consciousness of responsibility, our aspirations after fellowship with some Being higher than ourselves, and higher than anything which the world or nature contains, necessitates [necessitate] the belief in the existence of God” (I. 200). From the fact that a fish has an instinct for the water we may draw the inference that there is water in which the fish has the power to swim. Dr. Hodge will not doubt that this is an inference, and is not an independent belief. From the fact that a bird has an instinct for flying we may come to the conclusion that there is an atmosphere in which the bird has the power to fly; but Dr. Hodge will not say that this conclusion is a "primary perception." He may, indeed, say that we have a primary perception of an atmosphere, but not on the ground that there exists an instinct to fly in it, or an apparatus for breathing it. From the thirst of a young animal for milk we may derive an inference that milk is somewhere provided for it,

and is good for it; but this inference is not innate knowledge. "From the very structure of the eye" we may draw the conclusion that there is such an element as light; but will Dr. Hodge affirm that this conclusion is "a law of belief?" He may say that light is seen "in its own light," but is it not a self-contradiction to say that it is seen "intuitively," " primarily," in "the very structure of the eye?" If we learn that there is a being endued with a sense of hearing we infer that there will be sound which he can hear, but this belief in sound is not derived from sound itself, but from another object; it comes through a medium, and is not immediate. If we are informed of a being who has the sense of touch, we conclude that there will be objects which he can touch; but this conclusion is not" innate knowledge." Dr. Hodge says that the sense of hearing and of touch would be inconceivable without audible and tangible objects. (I. 200). He might as well say that audible and tangible objects would be inconceivable without the sense of hearing and touch. We cannot form an apprehension of the sense without forming an apprehension of its objects; nor can we form an apprehension of its objects without forming an apprehension of the sense; but a mind may think of visible, audible, and tangible objects, before it believes in the existence of any sense to recognize them, and it may think of a sense of sight, sound, and touch, before it believes in the existence of any visible, audible, or tangible objects to be recognized. If we are told of beings who have a constitutional love for parents and children, we reason in favor of the proposition that parents and children do or will exist. The idea of a parent involves the idea of a child, and vice versa; but the idea of a parent does not imply the actual existence of a child, and the idea of a child does not imply the actual existence of a parent. Our reasoning in favor of their actual existence is the opposite of an "innate knowledge" of it. "In like manner our religious feelings" constitute a premise from which we reason in favor of the existence of an object on which these feelings may rest; but the belief that there actually exists such an object forms the conclusion, and this conclusion is, of course, not a "fundamental law of belief." Dr. Hodge says that our sense of dependence "necessitates" our belief in the divine existence; so does our perception of the adaptation of means to ends throughout the material universe. First, we are conscious of a sense of dependence; secondly, we recognize the truth taught by observation that all our constitutional feelings have their appropriate objects; thirdly, we apply this truth in our argument proving that our constitutional sense of dependence has its appropriate object-God. Dr. Hodge says that our "consciousness of responsibility" necessitates our belief in the being of God. What is our consciousness of responsibility? It is a consciousness of accepting as true the statement that we are responsible. What is the accepting of this statement as true? It is the acceptance of the statement as true that we shall receive a reward for doing well, and a punishment for doing ill. So

far we have intuition. But so far we have no intuition of God's existence. Our accepting of the statement as true that we shall be rewarded for doing well or punished for doing ill may be a mere imagining, or apprehending, or surmising, or thinking, or supposing, or presuming, or hoping, or fearing, or expecting, or it may be a believing, that we shall be thus recompensed; but even this belief is not the "innate knowledge" of a God. It involves the premise of an argument. The argument is this: We shall be rewarded; therefore there will be a rewarder; we shall be punished; therefore there will be a punisher; moral agents have been and now are rewarded and punished; therefore there has been and is now a rewarder and punisher; there has occurred the event, the happiness, or the misery of a moral agent; this event has a cause, a moral governor; this moral governor is God.

Again, if it be true that our sense of accountability involves an “innate knowledge" of God, then it involves an "innate knowledge" of our future existence. The dying man has a hope of reward, or fear of punishment; this reward or punishment cannot be experienced in this life; therefore it will be experienced in a life to come. This is reasoning; but it is analogous to our reasoning in favor of the divine existence; if the latter reasoning be resolved into an innate belief, so may the former.

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II. Let us inquire whether Dr. Hodge has shown that the knowledge of God is so universal as to prove it to be innate. He admits that when he affirms this knowledge to be inborn he uses the word God “in a very wide sense"; only "in the general sense of a being on whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible" (I. 194, 195). But if our constitutional feeling of responsibility involves an innate belief in God, then it involves an innate belief in a holy God; also in a holy God who knows every secret act of virtue or sin which our own consciences approve or condemn. Can Dr. Hodge maintain that all men have this innate knowledge of a God who thus " searches the heart," and who will reward our most secret holiness, and punish our most hidden sin? He says that our belief in God's existence is necessitated by our aspirations after fellowship with some being higher than ourselves and higher than any thing which the world or nature contains" (I. 200). Is this merely a being on whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible? Will Dr. Hodge maintain that the fetich-worshippers have those lofty aspirations? Do the worshippers of an insect, who crush it when they are vexed with it, feel such a responsibility as involves a knowledge of "an invisible being, higher than self, and higher than man" (I. 197)? Is Dr. Hodge consistent with himself when at one time he represents this intuitively known being as so spiritual, so far exalted above nature; and at another time affirms that the being is merely one to whom we are accountable and on whom we are dependent? He teaches: "As we are born with the sense of touch and sight, and take cognizance of their

appropriate objects as soon as they are presented; so we are born with the intellectual faculty of perceiving these primary truths as soon as they are presented" (I. 193). Therefore, do all the heathen perceive the truth of God's existence as soon as it is presented to their minds? Dr. Hodge affirms not only that they do, but that the Bible teaches that they do. He writes: "The apostle tells us that those who have a written revelation shall be judged by that revelation; that those who have no externally revealed law, shall be judged by the law written on the heart. That the heathen have such a law he [Paul] proves first from the fact that they do by nature the things contained in the law,' i.e. they do under the control of their nature the things which the law prescribes, and, secondly, from the operations of conscience. When it condemns, it pronounces something done to be contrary to the moral law; and when it approves, it pronounces something to be conformed to that law (Rom. ii. 12-16). The recognition of God, therefore, that is, of a being to whom we are responsible, is involved in the very idea of accountability” (I. 196). On examining one written law we reason in favor of the fact that Solon existed; on examining another, we reason in favor of the fact that Draco existed; on examining a third, we reason in favor of the fact that Justinian existed. On examining a fourth, i.e. the law which is written on the heart of man, we reason in favor of the fact that God exists. Our belief that this fourth law has a cause is no more intuitive than is our belief that the three other laws have a cause. Dr. Hodge proceeds: "Hence every man carries in the very constitution of his being as a moral agent, the evidence of the existence of God" (I. 196). This is true. Every man has in his constitution a proof that there is a God. The evidence of God's existence is not in the statement of it, but in the constitution of the soul; the truth is not self-evident, but is learned from something lying under it. Dr. Hodge continues: "And as this sense of sin and responsibility is absolutely universal, so must also, according to the Bible, be the knowledge of God" (I. 196). On the same principle if, during the reign of king David or Solomon, a Jewish peasant had a knowledge that he had violated a Jewish law and had made himself liable to a civil punishment, he must have had an innate knowledge of the existence of David or Solomon. "The simple fact of scripture and experience is, that the moral law as written upon the heart is indelible; and the moral law in its nature implies a lawgiver, one from whom that law emanates, and by whom it will be enforced" (I. 198). The moral law implies a lawgiver, in the same sense in which a law in a certain French code implies a lawgiver; but the mind has not an "innate knowledge" that Napoleon was the author of that code. The thought of a substance is not separate from the thought of its qualities; and the thought of qualities is not separate from the thought of their substance; but the thought of a particular event is separate from the thought of its cause, and the thought of a cause is separate from the thought of a