of her greatest danger; and never will the same Spirit cease to direct and govern her in future; but will preserve her, though surrounded with imminent perils, until the final consummation of all human things.

It is however the duty of all, especially in these our days, to watch and see how the influence and power of the divine Spirit may be preserved and augmented among Christians. It is incumbent particularly on those who have consecrated their lives to learning, to beware, lest through their fault this light of human life should be obscured or extinguished. This may hap

it is to be feared, chiefly through the neglect of those, by whose erudition and zeal the word of God, that instrument through which the Holy Spirit operates, ought to be daily more thoroughly understood and made to illuminate more and more strongly the life of man; that thus the Gospel may be preserved in its purity in the church forever. For if the Spirit of God operates through the power which is inherent in the word of God, it is obvious, that this divine gift can neither be preserved, nor the church remain secure, unless the sacred Scriptures correctly interpreted by men of real learning, are open and accessible to all Christians; so that they may draw from this pure fountain the precepts and principles that are necessary, in order to the right discharge of all their duties towards God and man.

This subject of the interpretation of the New Testament, however, although exceedingly ample, has yet been so often treated of by learned writers, that there seems scarcely a remaining topic, on which to make suggestions relative to the true method of interpretation. Inasmuch however as the most useful precepts can avail nothing, unless the interpreter possess that disposition and those qualities which enable him rightly to employ them; we therefore do not fear that we shall lose our labour, should we dwell for a few moments on some of those qualities of which an interpreter must not be destitute; and thus attempt either to excite the learned or instruct the ignorant. Other writers, and especially Ernesti, have spoken of the manner in which the judgment of the interpreter is to be exercised and formed. But in regard to the general qualities, character, and disposition of mind, which are required for the proper interpretation of the New Testament, there seems yet to be room for other remarks; especially on that simplicity which all recommend in interpreting the New Testament, but which very few understand, and to which still fewer have attained. This topic, therefore, we will now briefly discuss.

It will first be necessary to define and determine in what simplicity in the interpretation of the New Testament consists. It differs from that facility, which when conjoined with simplicity, Ernesti does not hesitate to call the chief excellence of an interpreter.* This facility, which requires an interpretation to be such as to present itself spontaneously to the mind, has indeed thus much in common with simplicity, viz. that the interpretation must not be sought with art and subtilty, but must as it were voluntarily offer itself to the mind. It is however possible, that an interpretation which is difficult to be made out, may at the same time be extremely simple; while others, less simple, may put on the appearance of facility. Indeed an interpretation in itself simple, often requires great skill and study in order to arrive at it. The facility of an interpretation moreover consists not only in the circumstance, that it may seem to be found without labour; but also therein, that it presents a facile sense, i. e. a sense which connects itself easily with the views, object, and character of the writer. In this view also simplicity is connected with facility; and both are opposed to every thing that is subtile and forced. Indeed the term simple implies that which is perfect and consistent in all its parts; just as we speak of simplicity of character in a person, in whom the different virtues are exhibited in completeness and harmony. The Greeks, who were much more exact in marking the distinctions of ideas than the Romans, appear to have designated that quality of simplicity which thus consists in completeness, by the term τὸ ὁλοκληρές, and the other by τὸ ἀφελές, evenness, and metaphorically, that which gives no occasion for censure. And simplicity may properly be called aqua, in so far as there is nothing plain and certain, which does not accord with that from which it arose or to which it is to be referred, i. e. with its source or with its object; just as we call men uncertain and insincere, whose words and actions do not correspond with their views and purposes, but are often inconsistent one with another, and repugnant to those very things on account of which they appear to have been spoken and done.

But since nothing is or can be entire and consistent in all its parts, which comes from any improper source; it follows that

* Institut. Interp. N. T. P. II. c. I. § 22. ed. Ammon. [Omitted in the English Translation.]

See the next following article.

simplicity is to be sought in the circumstance, that every thing springs from the source from which it ought to be derived, while nothing is engrafted as it were from any other quarter, which is not in itself inherent in the nature of the person or thing in question. A necessary adjunct also is, and this is a principal mark of simplicity, that nothing be found present, except what could not possibly be absent. Art and subtilty, on the other hand, are easily detected, when any thing is introduced, the necessity of which is not apparent. It is thus that simplicity is so pleasing in the fine arts; when we see each and every part essential to the completeness of the whole, and find nothing which is superfluous, or that could be spared. So also we applaud the simple elegance of a poem or other work, when it exhibits nothing which does not seem to belong to it. In the same manner, then, must we form a judgment respecting the simplicity of an interpretation. For that interpretation only can be called simple, which gives to the words of a writer such a sense as seems to be the necessary one; so that when this sense is presented to us, we are immediately conscious, that the author could not have meant any thing else.

It will perhaps be said, that such an interpretation is to be called necessary rather than simple. Indeed the simplicity lies in the very circumstance, that nothing extraneous is intermixed, but all is necessarily consistent and accordant with the nature of the thing itself; and therefore just as we term the words of a person simple, when they are the necessary signs of that which he has in his mind, so also may we properly call that a simple interpretation, which derives from the words of a writer that sense which appears to be the necessary one.

This necessity, however, requires some further illustration. When we say that simplicity of interpretation is manifested in the circumstance, that it proposes no other sense than what seems to be the necessary one, it may be thought that our definition is more obscure than the thing itself which is to be explained; inasmuch as this necessity would seem to be something ambiguous and uncertain in all writings, and especially in the New Testament. The whole subject is indeed much embarrassed, and requires very great caution, as we shall afterwards see; but still it may be easily disentangled and developed in a twofold method; of which those who either do not know, or do not well weigh the nature and importance of the duties of a grammarian, appear not to be at all aware.

In the first place, if words be the signs of ideas, and that not arbitrarily, but have become fixed through the usus loquendi and by a sort of necessity, it is obvious that we can have no doubt in regard to that which is necessarily signified, or that of which the necessary signs are exhibited to us; provided we are acquainted with the usus loquendi, (the extent and influence of which is much greater than is usually apprehended,) and with that necessity which, inasmuch as it depends on and consists in reason, the inventress of all languages, may be properly termed the logical necessity. There are however not a few interpreters, who after having read a few books, and got by rote the common rules of the grammarians, and turned over the lexicons, which in this respect are for the most part miserably written, suppose themselves to have imbibed treasures of philological learning; and being accustomed without consideration to regard all languages, both ancient and modern and especially the former, as the result of chance, they pay of course no regard to that necessity which lies in the essential and universal laws of language, such as every where necessarily regulate the manner of expressing ideas by words. Such persons therefore pronounce that to be the simplest interpretation, which is most easily confirmed by the meagre authority of the lexicons. To us however those persons, above all others, seem to be ignorant of the true character of language, who are accustomed to refer every thing, of which they cannot explain the cause, to the mere will or custom of the people among whom this or that language was vernacular. And although we can scarcely hope, ever to be able to perceive fully the logical grounds and causes of all languages; still we ought to make it the object of zealous and unremitted exertion, that these causes, so far as they are necessary and essential, and have sprung up not by accident, but from the laws of human reason itself, should be detected and developed.

In the second place, it is an instinctive quality of the human mind, always to employ the means nearest at hand, and to seek for nothing at a greater distance than is necessary. This indeed is the surest mark of simplicity and integrity even of personal character. We are naturally impelled, not to art, but to seek and to communicate the truth by the shortest and simplest means possible; and the use of art may be said to arise rather from some obliquity of life or perverseness of mind. Hence, inasmuch as the same law prevails in the use of lan

guage, and we express our thoughts and feelings by those signs which make known our meaning in the shortest and surest manner, it is therefore an essential characteristic of simplicity (i. e. of completeness and necessity) in interpretation, that we attribute to the words of a writer that sense, of which these words seem to be the nearest and most direct, or the shortest and most certain, signs. And here all who undertake to interpret the New Testament are to be admonished and exhorted, to prescribe to themselves as a rule this quality of simplicity; and not to recede, except for grave reasons, from that sense which seems to be the nearest and most direct. For although all the writers of the New Testament were not destitute of a certain degree of learning and subtilty of talent; yet they all were exceedingly remote from those arts by which language, that gift of God, is misused in order to conceal depravity of mind or purpose, and to deceive others by words of double meaning. Indeed no one will interpret the writings of these sacred authors with more felicity, than he who is best able to estimate correctly their simplicity.

It seems proper here to dwell more particularly, for a moment, on this quality of simplicity in an interpreter himself; a subject which has commonly been passed over in silence, even by those who have written with most acuteness upon the qualities and disposition necessary to a good interpreter. There is doubtless a certain simplicity of mind, which is amiable in all men, and which is particulary desirable in an interpreter of the New Testament. It is manifested especially in that integrity and rectitude of mind, which perceives clearly and at a glance every thing that is appropriate and necessary to a particular person or thing. It differs from the disposition of those who, by the employment of art, or in consequence of a mode of life not conformed to right reason, have lost this natural power of perception; and who are therefore no longer affected by that simplicity in which the highest beauty is said to consist, nor are able to perceive any thing in its true light or without doubt and ambiguity. But in that simple character of a mind which seeks no subterfuge or ambiguity, but is apt and prompt to comprehend all that is appropriate and necessary, we see an ornament of human life, and have the surest pledge and safeguard of a love of truth. Hence it may be regarded as essential to every interpreter, and especially to the interpreter of the New Testament. For whoever is destitute of this quality, and cannot comNo. JII.

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