are regarded as peculiar to men of more cultivated minds, we should seem to reproach them with faults which are scarcely to be excused in persons even of the lowest class.

The force of the prepositions, as Hermann has justly remarked,* does not depend upon the cases which they govern; but it is to be explained from the verbs on which the prepositions themselves depend. It follows from this, that a preposition, even if it retain the same signification as to the general notion of the thing expressed, may yet require a different case, provided the verb on which that preposition depends, changes in any way the mode of conceiving the relation of that thing. For if prepositions serve to indicate the relations of ideas, the cause is apparent, both why they govern cases at all, and why they govern only one case, or why they govern different cases, if the verb on which they depend changes the mode of conceiving that relation. Some govern but a single case, because the idea expressed by the verb on which they depend, necessarily demands that case; for the force of these prepositions is such, that if other cases were joined to them, the very idea of the verb would be contradicted. Others again govern more cases, because the idea contained in them is such, that it may be conceived of in various relations, though in a different manner; and hence they may be joined with verbs of different species, which govern different cases.

By verbs of different species, I mean those which indicate the different modes in which the relation of two things may be conceived. Thus siva and oxova are different species of verbs; for when we couple the notion of any two things by means of siva, we signify nothing more, than that these two notions are in some way connected; but ozoda properly indicates motion, by which the relation of place is changed. Now motion may be conceived of in a threefold view, as either in, or from, or to a place; and therefore the verb ozoda governs also three cases, and calls to its aid those prepositions, which serve to express those different relations. A person is, therefore, correctly said ὑπὸ ̓Ιλίου εἶναι, and ὑπὸ ̓Ιλίῳ, when he is under (at, near) Ilium; but if he is to be represented as coming to Ilium, so as to be under it, he is said vno "mov pedal. The reason therefore why Homer says: αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ"Ιλιον , is to be sought in the verb 9. Had he said vno ig

Hermann, "De emendenda ratione Graecae Grammat. p. 162.

0e, it would not have signified that he came to Ilium, but that being under Ilium, he had come to some particular place there. For the same reason we find Luke 7: 6 ïva vno tηv otéynv eloOns. In the following passages the reason of the construction is different: Mark 4: 32 ὑπὸ τὴν σκιὰν αὐτοῦ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατασκηνοῦν. John 1:49 ὄντα ὑπὸ τὴν συκήν. 1 Cor. 10: 1 ὑπὸ τὴν νεφέλην ἦσαν. In these instances the verbs καταoxyvov and elvai, seem to require not the accusative, but the genitive or dative; so that at first view one is tempted to suppose, that the writers have erred against the necessary laws of language. But there is either a probable reason why vnó should be joined with the accusative in a relation of this sort, or else the best writers have erred in like manner. So Xenophon, Anab. ΙΙΙ. 4 ὑφ ̓ ἣν ἡ κατάβασις ἦν εἰς τὸ πεδίον. Herodotus II. 137 οὔτε γὰρ ὕπεστι οἰκήματα ὑπὸ γῆν. In Homer also and other writers, vnó is very often construed with the accusative, when the verb from which it depends seems rather to require the dative. But if we carefully look at all the examples of this sort, it will easily be seen, that the accusative is used in order to make more conspicuous the fact, that a thing or person is so connected with another thing, that the latter is to be conceived of and regarded as an adjunct or accident of the former. The noun, therefore, which is put in the accusative, is such as denotes either the place in which any thing is or happens, or the time at which it happens; for time and place are necessary adjuncts in all things. So when it is said (1 Cor. 10: 1) that the fathers were all uno Tηv vegélny, we are to bear in mind, that while they were journeying, the cloud was always with them; but had it been vno vegéλns, it would have expressed nothing more, than that they had been once under a cloud; which was not the intention of the writer.

Should any one be disposed to regard this distinction as more subtle than true, let him reflect why all good Greek writers say ὑπὸ νύκτα, ὑφ ̓ ἡμέραν, and not ὑπὸ νυκτός, ὑφ ̓ ἡμέρας, when they wish to express that any thing was done by night or in the day time. Not unfrequently we are able to see why a thing ought to be said in a certain way, when we perceive that the same could not have been said in any other way.

The principle is also the same, in regard to the preposition dia. When did governs the genitive, it denotes the cause by or through which a thing is or exists, or the manner in which a thing is done or becomes such as we would represent it. With

the accusative, on the other hand, dia marks the cause on account of which a thing is done or conceived to be done. Thus in Heb. 9: 12 it is properly said: Xotoros dia rov idiov aïparos εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὰ ἅγια, for it is the mode in which he entered that is here spoken of. So also it is correctly said in Rev. 12: 11 ἐνίκησαν τὸν κατήγορον διὰ τὸ αἷμα τοῦ ἀρνίου καὶ διὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς μαρτυρίας αὐτῶν. Here we are to conceive of them as overcoming out of regard to τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸν λόγον, as if these were the cause on account of which they were impelled to conquer; for they did not regard their own lives, as is immediately subjoined: οὐκ ἠγάπησαν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν, ἄχρι θανάτου. And although the cause which impelled them to conquer, also gave them strength and power for the victory, yet the mode of conceiving of it in this first relation is different. Here therefore we are to think not only of the efficient cause, which enabled them to overcome, but also of the impelling cause, which induced them to undertake the contest. The case is similar in 1 John 2: 12 ὅτι αφέωνται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ. For if John had written did zou ovoμáros, we must have supposed to oroua avτou to be the efficient cause of the remission of sins; which however is not the meaning of the apostle; and we are to regard them as having obtained remission on account of, for the sake of, his name. And when it is said John 6: 57 xxy@ ζῶ διὰ τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὁ τρώγων με, κακεῖνος ζήσεται δι' ἐμέ, we cannot doubt that did denotes not so much the efficient cause, (certainly not that alone,) as the end or object in which the reason of living is to be sought; for as the reason why Christ lived on earth was in the Father who sent him, (since it was the object of his life to fulfil the commands of the Father,) so those live because of or on account of Christ, who yield obedience to his doctrines.

The same holds true also when did seems to denote the impulsive cause, as it is called : as διὰ φθόνον, διὰ σπλάγχνα ελέ ους θεοῦ; very similar to which is also John 10: 32 δια ποῖον ἔργον λιθάζετέ με. It is cbvious, if he had here said διὰ ποίου toyou, we must have thought, not on the deed on account of which, but on the manner in which, they wished to stone him; just as if one should say διὰ λίθων λιθάζειν. Here also, then, dia denotes not per, but propter; and is correctly joined with the accusative. On the other hand, in Acts 3: 16,ʼn πiotis ǹ di αὐτοῦ is not πίστις εἰς αὐτόν, but the πίστις of which he is the author and cause. In 2 Pet. 1:3 καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς διὰ δόξης καὶ ἀρετῆς, it is not he who calls us to δόξαν καὶ ἀρετήν, that is

meant ; but he who calls us through δόξαν καὶ ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ, ἵνα διὰ τούτων τῆς θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως γενώμεθα, ν. 4. comp. 1 Pet. 2: 9. For the highest δόξα καὶ ἀρετή of God are exhibited in this vocation. Had it been the purpose to direct our attention to the object or end to which they are called, it must have been written διὰ τὴν δόξαν καὶ ἀρετήν. But the meaning of the formula διὰ δόξης in 2 Cor. 3: 11, is the same as is found in many other instances, where did either denotes the mode in which a thing is done, as διὰ ὑπομονῆς Rom. 8: 23. Heb. 12: 1, and διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται Rom. 2: 12 ; or it indi cates the cause through or by which a thing is done, as διὰ τῆς σαρκός Rom. 5: 19. 8: 3, and δι ̓ οὗ καὶ τὴν προςαγωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν Rom. 5: 2. comp. v. 1, 11. Hence we understand why Peter could say correctly in 2 Pet. 3: 5, γῆ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ δι ̓ ὕδατος συνεστῶσα τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ. Here ἐξ ὕδατος signi fies that the earth arose out of the water, as if water were the material. This was done δι ̓ ὕδατος, through the efficacy of the water itself, in the omnipotent will of God. What is subjoined in ν. 6, δι' ὧν ὁ τότε κόσμος ὕδατι κατακλυσθεὶς ἀπώλετο, has been rightly interpreted by Markland (ad Lysiam p. 329 ed. Reisk.) in the same manner as a thing is said to be done διά τινος, i. e. during the existence of something else; as in the passage itself of Lysias, γνώριμος γενόμενος διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου δυναστείας, i. e. durante ejus potestate. So also in Rom. 2: 27 τὸν διὰ γράμ ματος καὶ περιτομῆς, and 4: 11 τῶν πιστευόντων δι' ἀκροβυστί ας. Lastly in the celebrated passage Rom. 3: 25, Paul has correctly said, that God constituted Christ έλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως, (for the ἱλασμός comes through faith, and has thereby manifested τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὑτοῦ, διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτη μάτων, i. e. on account of (propter) the pardon of sins ; plainly as in Rom. 4: 25 ὃς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν καὶ ἠγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν, on account of pardon and salvation, or that we might obtain pardon and salvation. As the apostle says in 1 Cor. 8: 2, διὰ τὰς πορνείας ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖ κα ἐχέτω, (i. e. on account of, or in order to avoid, fornication,) so also in the above passage he has correctly said : ὁ Θεὸς προέθετο αὐτὸν ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως, εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὑτοῦ διὰ τὴν παρέσιν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ; for this is the end of τῆς δικαιοσύνης, that we may obtain pardon.

These examples suffice to shew, that the sacred writers have observed at least the necessary laws of language, with more fidelity than is generally supposed. We pass therefore to the

other species of laws, or those peculiar to the Greek tongue. This topic is a very ample one, and covers, so to speak, the whole usus loquendi of that language; and it cannot therefore be expected, that we should here explain every thing in which the interpreters of the New Testament have found a departure from Greek usage. The subject of Greek idioms, for instance, has not yet been so clearly explained and settled, that every idiom may be at once referred to a certain rule; nor so that the causes can every where be assigned, in consequence of which usage has correctly introduced forms and modes of speaking, which are contrary to the grammatical laws. In general, the genius of the Greeks was so active and rapid, that their language abounds in forms and figures of this sort, more than any other; and as these do not rest on the authority of law, and seem often to depend on mere taste or caprice, they render this part of Greek grammar exceedingly difficult, and are regarded by the unskilful as faults. Hence, even the ancient grammarians have sometimes named those forms of speaking solecisms, which, when occurring in the best writers, they have called figures, onpara, of the Greek language. And since those who have formed their estimate of that language from the jejune precepts of these grammarians, have of course not understood the nature of these Tuara; they have often regarded the sacred penmen as writing incorrectly, when they have only used the same license which is found in the best Greek authors. The sacred writers duly observe the laws of grammar; but not always the laws of the grammarians. And it is truly said by Apollonius Alexandrinus, *De Constructione Orationis, III. 2, οὐ δή γε θαῤῥήσει τις αλό γους τὰς τοιαύτας συντάξεις φάναι, τῶν ἐλλογιμωτάτων ἀνδρῶν χρησαμένων, καὶ τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐμποδίζοντος· δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἡ κατὰ πολὺ γενομένη σύνταξις ἀπηνέγκατο τὴν ὀνομασίαν· ᾧ λόγῳ καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ πλέον ἐπεκράτησε. “No one indeed will undertake to call such constructions improper, since they are employed by the most approved writers, and are not contrary to reason. It is manifest, therefore, that the predominant construction has borne off the name, just as other things also prevail by numbers." Thus, for example, when it is said in the Apocalypse (1: 5,6) ἀπὸ ̓Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστὸς,—καὶ ὁ ἄρχων τῶν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς· τῷ ἀγαπήσαντι ἡμᾶς καὶ λούσαντι ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐποί ησεν ἡμᾶς βασιλεῖς αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα κ. τ. λ. there seems, at first view, to be almost as many solecisms as there are words. Sed