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ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF EMPIRE IN ASIA.

"Ir would be absurd to suggest," says Lord Ronaldshay, "that a journey of upwards of 10,000 miles by railway, steamboat, raft, wheeled conveyance of many kinds, and packpony, through such countries as Asiatic Turkey, Persia, Transcaspia, Siberia, and Manchuria, is by any means one which is productive of unalloyed pleasure and amusement. There is nothing even remotely amusing in long hours in the saddle at caravan pace across the desert steppe of Mesopotamia. On the contrary, there is a grim reality about the limitless and forbidding expanse of an Asian desert which inspires feelings of anything but merriment. The vastness of it fills you with awe, the silence and absence of life weigh heavily upon you, the hovering vulture and the staring white skeleton of pony or camel speak only of

death."

Nevertheless Lord Ronaldshay has the knack of writing very pleasantly about his travels. He tells us enough to gain a hearing, and does not weary his audience by dwelling too long on the difficulties and hardships of the road. He had an object in his wanderings. He has seen enough to enable him to understand the changes which are in progress in Asia, and how deeply they affect the British Empire. He knows also how ignorant the great majority of the English people are of the movements in the East and of their bearing upon the power and prosperity of this nation. To overcome the apathy which arises from this ignorance, and to draw public attention in this country

to the great game which is being played in the Middle as well as in the Far East, is the motive which has led him to make this great journey and to write a record of it. The mo

tive and the work are alike worthy of praise.

The ground which the author has covered, whether in his travels or in the political essays in which he records his impressions, is not new. Very competent observers, such as Lord Curzon, and more recently Mr H. J. Whigham and Mr Valentine Chirol, have covered much of it. It is probable, however, that some will read Lord Ronaldshay who will not study the more avowedly political treatises of Whigham and Chirol. They will take up a pleasant book of travel, and may be led insensibly into the really more fascinating exposition of the political problems.

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It is not possible in a brief review to follow the details of the author's journey. A toilsome march through "weary land" lying between Aleppo and the Euphrates, across the level sandy stretches of Mesopotamia to Mosul on the Tigris, and then down southward by the right bank of that river through dreary wastes, without adventure, but with the memories and ruins of the past to beguile the time, to Baghdad. Not, alas! the Baghdad of romance, but "a hopelessly

On the Outskirts of Empire in Asia. By the Earl of Ronaldshay, F.R.G.S. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London.

commonplace town," of narrow, gloomy, and dirty lanes. Then more monotonous marching across the mountains and steppes of Western Persia, until, sick of the saddle and the road, the sun and the dust, the traveller reaches Teheran -a sordid capital, without a single building of note, enclosed by insignificant walls of mud which are much too large for the city they are supposed to guard. It is, however, as "the headquarters of the incalculable intrigue which passes in Persia for diplomacy," that Lord Ronaldshay introduces to us the capital of the Shah. Next we are led across the Caspian to the oil-wells of Baku, and from Baku to Krasnovodsk, and there we step into the train.

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"Incongruous or not, the train is there, and you accept it as a matter of course, and are thankful. You may travel all over India by rail and think nothing of it," says the author. But here you have but a single long isolated arm stretching from the confines of Europe into the very heart of an ancient continent. Far more even than the plains of Asiatic Turkey or the plateau of Irán, the vast solitudes of Turkomania or the steppes of Turkestan seem a world apart. As you are borne rapidly along, you might indeed be travelling on some witch's broomstick in a fairy tale,”

or more appropriately, perhaps, on the enchanted horse of the 'Arabian Nights.'

"Merve, Queen of the World; Bokhara the Noble, Samarkand, the capital of Timur, pass before you in quick succession, overwhelming you with the magnitude of their associations. You gaze upon their sights and marvel at the strange stories which they tell, and you mix with their peoples for a while and then

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You look back upon

pass on. them as upon the figures of a dream. talked with them, but you are not of them. Their world is not your world, nor yours theirs."

You have mixed with them and

But before following the author farther on his road, we may be allowed to turn back to his chapters on the Baghdad Railway and the position of Great Britain in Persia. The two questions are inseparably connected with each other and with the defence of our Indian Empire. Lord Ronaldshay rightly insists on the fact that India is the pivot of British supremacy in the East. Ques tions dealing with the East should be looked at largely from an Indian point of view. When we see the ignorance which prevails in this country on all matters connected with India, and the failure to recognise the vital importance of her Indian possessions not only to the prosperity of Great Britain but to her very existence as a first-class Power, we are inclined to despair. The average

untravelled Englishman thinks of India as a very hot country, to which young men who cannot get a living at home go out, to ill-treat the natives and to ruin their livers with hot curries and strong drinks, and from which they return with yellow faces and intolerable tempers to bore their relatives and acquaintances. "Without India," wrote Lord Curzon, "the British Empire could not exist." The statement would probably be received with astonishment or incredulity by most political meetings in this country. Yet there is no fact more certain in

the whole range of facts connected with the British Empire. On this rests the significance of the discussions relating to the Baghdad Railway and our influence in Persia. It may be conceded, as Lord Ronaldshay thinks, that the Baghdad Railway will be made whether Great Britain co-operates or stands aloof. It is sufficient to look at the map of Europe and Asia to understand that so obvious a connection between the West and East is certain to be carried through. If the line were destined to end at Baghdad the political interests of this empire would not be so vitally touched. Indeed, in so far as the construction of such a line by German, or German and French, capitalists might prove an obstacle to the absorption of Asia Minor by Russia, it might be regarded by his Majesty's Government with complacence. But it is impossible, and it is not intended, that it should stop at Baghdad. It will assuredly be prolonged to the Persian Gulf. Now, the best authorities-including Lord Curzon, Captain Mahan, and others have declared the necessity of maintaining British supremacy in the Gulf. In the July number of this Magazine for 1903 we went fully into this matter, and the decision cannot be open to doubt. Lord Lansdowne has formally declared that Great Britain will not tolerate the establishment by any foreign Power of a fortified port or naval base in the Persian Gulf. But Ministries go out and Ministries come in. There is no safety unless the nation at

large, or at least the educated and thinking part of it, understands the case, and is determined that there shall be no hesitation in upholding the declaration of the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, no matter which party is in office. When the nation perceived or suspected that the present Government were about to co-operate with Germany for the construction of a railway to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, it expressed its disapproval in terms of which the Ministry were forced to take note. We think the nation was instinctively right, and saved the Government from committing a blunder. For it would have been a blunder to have given the backing of Great Britain to a scheme which would have placed Germany in a position to control, if not to monopolise, the trade of Asia Minor and western Persia. The text of the convention between the Turkish Government and the Anatolian Railway Company is given by Mr Chirol in the appendices to his book on the Middle Eastern Question. There are two articles in that convention which need to be explained before the dislike to co-operate with Germany in this enterprise is set down to mere Germanophobia. One is article 22, which gives the concessionaires the right of constructing and administering ports at Baghdad, Bassorah, and at the terminus of the branch from Zubeir to the Persian Gulf. The other is article 29, which forbids the working of the section between Baghdad and Bassorah until the

main line between Konia and Baghdad shall have been completed. This provision is certainly not in the interests of the railway, and it does not appear due to any necessities of the Turkish Government. But the line from Bassorah to Baghdad, which might easily be finished long before the completion of the main line, might serve to extend British trade before Germany had secured herself by establishing through railway communication with Europe.

As to the value of the line to India, we doubt if it amounts to much. The author (p. 99) lays stress on the time that would be saved if the railway was made and ran in connection with a service of steamers to Kurrachi. It is calculated that the journey from London would be shortened by three days 16 hours. But it may be questioned whether there would be much substantial gain to India from this acceleration. Everything that demands promptitude, whether in private or public correspondence, is now transacted by telegraph. The bulk of the passengers between England and India are Government officers on leave. It would be no public advantage to accelerate by a few days their transport to and from India; while as a matter of health, and most of them take leave with a view to recruiting their health, there can be no question as to the preference to be given to the sea journey. No one imagines troops could be sent even in times of the most assured peace by the land route,

VOL. CLXXVI.-NO. MLXIX.

or that any economy in their transport could be so effected. That route might be at any time closed to us. To transfer to the railway the subsidy now paid for the mail service to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, as the promoters of the Baghdad Railway scheme suggest, would be a most unwise proceeding. Our strength and our safety lie in the maintenance of a great mercantile marine, on whose assistance we can depend in times of emergency.

It is difficult to imagine a case in which India could derive any strategical advantage from this railway, even if it were more or less under British control. On the other hand, it is comparatively easy to picture to ourselves conditions under which it might be a very serious menace. Its construction, moreover, will bring the question of a port at the head of the Gulf into immediate prominence. Even if such a port is not fortified, it will, as the terminus of a railway running through foreign territory, and presumably in the hands of a foreign and possibly hostile nation, interfere with our predominant position in the Persian Gulf. Lord Ronaldshay, however, although he considers the outcry which arose against the first proposals for British co-operation unreasonable, sees clearly the necessity of securing to this country "that voice in the matter which, in view of her special interests, she is entitled to demand." He would, if possible, insist on placing the section from Baghdad to the

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Gulf in British hands. He thinks that we are in a position to dictate our own terms; and he would at the least insist on the railway being made "as an international undertaking, on the principle of equal powers of construction, management, and control." But would such a condition assure to us "that voice in the matter to which the interests of the empire entitle us"? We have had sufficient experience of international arrangements to fear that in all probability the representatives of the other nations would combine against us and we should be outvoted. If Great Britain is in a position to make her own terms, nothing short of complete control of the line from Baghdad to the Gulf should satisfy her. It may be added that no such position can be maintained unless the British Government is determined to resist any other solution of the question "with all the means at its disposal." "Unsupported diplomatic protest," as Lord Ronaldshay warns the people of this country, "will not always prove efficient in retaining that position of supremacy in southern Asia which is vital to our being" (p. 24).

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Passing to Persia, Lord Ronaldshay's chapters are instructive. So is his exposition of the conflict between England and Russia for influence in the country of the Shah in chapter xxvi. We hope his remarks on this subject will be widely read. British influence in Persia suffered a severe blow when "the incredible foolishness of the British Govern

ment," as MrWhigham describes it, turned a cold shoulder to the Shah in his pecuniary difficulties, and allowed him to become the debtor of Russia in 1900. That transaction riveted the fetters of Russia on the Shah's Government. Lord Ronaldshay leads us to hope that something has of late been done to restore our prestige. He quotes, and to some extent confirms, the assertion of Lord Lansdowne, that "If there have been changes of late, those changes have been on the whole in the direction of the assertion and the protection of British interests.' It is some comfort to know that those interests are in the hands of a strong and capable representative, Sir Arthur Hardinge (p. 145), the British Minister at Teheran.

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But there are some who will ask, What need we care about the politics of Persia? Wherein lies the danger of Russian ascendancy in that country? This question has been answered once for all by Lord Curzon in his work on 'Russia in Central Asia' (p. 376 et seq.)

"I have already pointed out," he writes, "the serious and irremediable loss inflicted thereby upon British trade and it is in Persia that the commercial rivalry between Russia factor of more momentous operation and Great Britain is at present a than in any other part of the East.”

Lord Curzon was writing in 1889.

"With Khorassan," he continues, "a Russianised province, there will be no need to violate any AngloAfghan frontier; the resources of that fertile country will furnish the be approached from the west or for requisite supplies; Herat may either a while may be left severely alone;

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