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Adam was created. And yet these learned men equally detest his error with ourselves. These considerations make us judge it safer to explain righteousness, so as to make it a part of the image of God, after which Adam was created. *
XI. But if we take in the whole extent of the image of God, we say, it is made up of these three parts. 1st. Antecedently, that it consists in the spiritual and immortal nature of the soul, and in the faculties of understanding and will. Adly. Formally and principally, in these enduments, or qualities of the soul, viz. righteousness, and holiness. Sdly. Consequentially, in the immortality of the whole mat, and his dominion over the creatures. The first of these was, 'as one elegantly expresses it, as precious ground on which the image of God might be drawn and formed: the second, that very image itsell, and resemblance of the divinity: the third, the lustre of that image widely spreading its glory, and as rays, not only adorning the soul, but the wbole man, even his very body; and rendering him the lord and head of the world, and at the same time immortal, as being the friend and confederate of the eternal God.'
XII. The principal strokes of this image, Plato certainly knew; who defines bappiness to be budiwedIV TW ew, the resemblance of God: and this resemblance be places in piety, justice, and prudence; this last to temper and regulate the two former : his words are excellent, and deserve to be bere transcribed: την δε δνητήν φύσιν, και τόνδε τον τόπον το κακόν περιπολύ εξ ανάγκης διοπάι πειράσθαι χρη ενθένδε εαι ισι φέυγεν ότι τάχισα φυγή δε ομόνωσις Οεώ καλά το δυνατόν 'Ομόνωσις δε δίκαιον και όσιον μεθα φρονή. GEWS yavsodas. “ This mortal nature, and this place of abode,
γενέσθαι. are necessarily encompassed with evil
. We are therefore, with the utmost expedition, to fly from it: this flight is an assimilation to God as far as may be: and this assimilation is justice and piety, accompanied with prudence. Vid. Lipsū Manuduct. ad. stoicam philosophiam, lib. 2. Dissert: 13.
XIII. God gave to man the charge of this bis image, as the most excellent deposite of heaven, and, if kept pure and inviolate, the earnest of a greater good; for that end he endued him with sufficient powers from his very formation, so as to stand in need of no other habitual grace. It was only requisite, that' God, by the continual influx of his providence, should preserve those powers, and excite them to all and each of their acts. For, there can be no state conceived, in which the creature can act independently of the Creator; pot excepting the angels themselves, though now confirmed in holiness and happiness.
XIV. And thus, indeed, Adam was in covenant with God, as a man, created after the image of God, and furnished with sufficient abilities 10 preserve that image. But there is an other relation, in which he was considered as the head and representative of mankind, both federal and natural. So that God said to Adam, as once to the Israelites, Deut. xxix. 14, 15. “neither with you only do I make this covenant, and this oath; but also with him that is not here with us this day." The whole history of the first man proves, that he is not to be looked upon as an individual person, but that the whole human nature is considered as in him. For it was not said to our first parents only, increase and multiply; by virtue of which word, the propagation of mankind is still continued: nor is it true of Adam only, it is not good that the man should be alone : nor does that conjugal law, therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and they shall be one flesh, concern him alone which Christ still urges, Matt. xix. 5.: por did the penalty, threatened by God upon Adam's sinning, thou shalt surely die, affect him alone, but death passed upon all men, according to the apostle's observation, Rom, va 12. All wbich loudly proclaim, that Adam was bere considered as the head of mankind.
XV. This also appears from that beautiful opposition of the first and second Adam, which Paul pursues at large, Rom. v. 15, &c. For, as the second Adam does, in the Covenant of Grace, represent all the elect, in such a manner that they are accounted to have done and suffered themselves, what he did and suffered, in their name and stead : so likewise the first Adam was the representative of all that were to descend from him.
XVI. And that God was righteous in this constitution, is by no means to be disputed. Nor does it become us to entertain doubts about the right of God, nor enquire too curiously into it; much less to measure it by the standard of any right established amongst us despicable mortals, when the matter of fact is evident and undisputed. We are always to speak in vindication of God; “ that thou mightest be justified when thou speakest, and be clear when thou judgest. Psal. li. 4. He must, surely, be utterly unacquainted with the majesty of the Supreme Being, with his most pure and unspotted holiness, which in every respect is most consistent with himself, who presumes to scan his actions, and call bis equity to account. A freedom this, no earthly father would bear in a son, no king in a subject, nor master in a servant. And do we, mean worms of the earth, take upon us to use such freedom with the Judge of the whole universe! As often as our murmuring flesh dares to repine and cry out, the ways of the Lord are not equal; so often let us oppose thereto, are not thy ways unequal? Ezek. xvi. 25.
XVII. However, it generally holds that we more calmly acquiesce in the detern inations of God, when we understand the reasons of them. Let us therefore see, whether here also we cannot demonstrate the equity of the divine right. For what if we should consider the matter thus? If Adam bad, in his own, and in our name, stood to the conditions of the covenant; if, after a course of probation, he had been confirmed in happiness, and we, his posterity, in him, if, fully satis fied with the delights of animal life, we had, together with him, been translated to the joys of heaven; none certainly would then repine that he was included in the head of mankind : every one would have commended both the wisdom and goodness of God: not the least suspicion of injustice would have arisen on account of God's putting the first man into a state of probation in the room of all, and not every individual for himself. How should that, which in this event would have been deemed just, be unjust on a contrary event? For, neither is the justice nor injustice of actions to be judged of by the event.
XVIII. Besides, what mortal now can flatter himself, that, placed in the same circumstances with Adam, he would have better consulted his own interest ? Adam was neither with, qut wisdom, nor holiness, nor a desire after true happiness, nor an aversion to the miseries denounced by God against the sinner ; nor, in fine, without any of those things, by which be might expect to keep upon his guard against all sin : and yet he suffered himself to be drawn aside by the craft of a flattering seducer. And dost thou, iniquitous censurer of the ways of the Lord, presume thou wouldst have better used thy free will ? Nay, on the contrary, all thy actions cry aloud, that thou approvest, that thou art highly pleased with, and always takest example from that deed of thy first parent, about which thou sp unjustly complainest. For, when thou transgressest the commands of God, when thou settest less by the will of the Supreme Being than by thy lusts, wien thou preferrest earthly to heavenly things, present to future, when, by thine own choice, thou seekest after happiness, but not that which is true; and, instead of taking the right way, goest into bypaths; is not that the very same as if thou didst so often eat of the forbidden tree? Why then dost thou presume to blame God for taking a compendious way, including all in one ; well knowing that the case of each in particular, when put to the test, would have proved the same.
of the Law, or Condition, of the Covenant of Works I. HITHERTO we have treated of the Contracting Parties: let us now take a view of the condition prescribed by this covenant. Where first we are to consider
the Laro of the Covenant, then the Observance of that law. The law of the covenant is twofold. 1st. The law of nature, implanted in Adam at his creation. 2dly. The symbolical laro, concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
Il. The law of nature is the rule of good and evil, inscribed by God un man's conscience, even at his creation, and therefore binding upon him by divine authority. That such a law was connate with, and as it were implanted in the man, ap
from the reliques, which, like the ruins of some noble building, are still extant in every man"; namely, from those common notions, by which the heathens themselves distinguished right from wrong, and by which they were a law to themselves, which shews the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness," Rom. ii. 14, 15. From which we gather, that all these things were complete in man, when newly formed after the image of God.
III. Whatever the conscience of man dictates to be virtuous, or otherwise, it does so in the name of God, whose vicegerent it is, in man, and the depositary of his commands. This, if I mistake not, is David's meaning, Psal. xxvii. 8.23 70x75, to thee, that is, for thee, in thy stead, my heart says, or my conscience. This conscience therefore was also called a God by the heathen: as in this, Iambic, Bporois äraon ý ouvéidnois 0:66; In all men conscience is a God. Plato in Philebus, calls reason a God dwelling in us. And hence we ar not to think that the supreme rule in the law of nature is its agreement or disagreement with the rational nature, but that it is the divine wisdom manifested to, or the notion of good and evil engraven by God, on the conscience. It is finely said by the author of the book de Mundo, c. 11. 66 God is to us a law, tending on all sides to a just equilibrium, requiring no correction, admitting no variation.” With this Cicero agrees,
de Legibus, lib. 2. “ The true and leading law, which is proper both to command and to forbid, is the right reason of the Supreme Being
IV. That author appears not to have expressed himself with accuracy, who said, We here call the law, the knowledge of right and wrong, binding to do what is right, and to avoid what is wrong. For law properly is not any knowledge, but the object of knowledge. This law, we say, is naturally known to man, but it would be absurd to say, knowledge is naturally known. Knowledge is our act, and is indeed to be squared by the rule of the law. The law is a rule prescribed by God for all our actions.
V. That other author is far less accurate, who thus determines : “ Prior to the fall there was properly no law: for then the love of God prevailed, which requires no law. There (as the same author elsewhere explains himself) a state of friendship and love obtained, such as is the natural state of a son with respect to a parent, and which is what nature affects. But when that love is violated, then a precept comes to be superadded : and that love, which before was voluptary, (as best agreeing with its nature; for that can scarcely be called love, unless voluntary) falls under a precept, and passes into a law, to be enforced then with commination and coercion; which rigour of coercion properly constitutes a law.
VI. But this way of reasoning is far from being the effect of thought and attention. For, ist. It is not the rigour of the enforcement properly, that constitutes a law, but the obligatory virtue of what is injoined, proceeding both from the power of the lawgiver, and from the equity of the thing commanded, which is here founded on the holiness of the divine nature, so far as imitable by man. The apostle Jamés, i. 25. commends “ the perfect law of liberty." 2dly. Nor is there any absurdity to affirm, that the natural state of a son with respect to a parent, is regulated by laws. It is certain, Plato de Legib. lib. 3. says, that the first mortals practised the customs and laros of their fathers, quoting that sentence of Homer, Sessver de exasos sandw, every one makes laws for his children, Sdly. Nor, is it repugnant to do a thing by nature, and at the same time by a law. Philo Judæus de Migratione, explain. ing that celebrated old saying of the philosophers, says, that to live agreeably to nature, is done when the mind follows God, remembering his precepts. Crysippus in like manner, as commended by Laertius, lib. 7. on Zeno, says that person lives agreeably to nature, who does nothing prohibited by the common law, which is right reason. In a sublimer strain al.