The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of ColourWe say "the grass is green" or "lemons are yellow" to state what everyone knows. But are the things we see around us really colored, or do they only look that way because of the effects of light rays on our eyes and brains? Is color somehow "unreal" or "subjective" and dependent on our human perceptions and the conditions under which we see things? Distinguished scholar Barry Stroud investigates these and related questions in The Quest for Reality. In this long-awaited book, he examines what a person would have to do and believe in order to reach the conclusion that everyone's perceptions and beliefs about the color of things are "illusions" and do not accurately represent the way things are in the world as it is independently of us. Arguing that no such conclusion could be consistently reached, Stroud finds that the conditions of a successful unmasking of color cannot all be fulfilled. The discussion extends beyond color to present a serious challenge to many other philosophical attempts to discover the way things really are. A model of subtle, elegant, and rigorous philosophical writing, this study will attract a wide audience from all areas of philosophy. |
Contents
Introduction The Philosophical Project | 3 |
The Philosophical Conception of an Independent Reality | 21 |
The Idea of Physical Reality | 45 |
Unmasking Explanation and the Unreality of Colour | 69 |
Perception Predication and Belief | 96 |
Perceptions of Colour and the Colours of Things | 118 |
Other editions - View all
The ^AQuest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour Barry Stroud Limited preview - 2002 |
Common terms and phrases
93 million miles accept anthropocentricity ascribe attribute Berkeley Bernard Williams ceptions coloured objects coloured things colours of objects colours of things conception of reality conclusion contents dependent Descartes disposed to produce dispositional theory error theory exclusively physical explain expressed false hold ical idea identify independent world J. J. C. Smart J. L. Mackie jects Jones judgements kinds of perceptions lemons are yellow mean metaphysical project nonpsychological normal human perceivers object's colour objects are coloured ourselves ovoid patch perceptions and beliefs perceptions of colour perceptions of yellow perhaps phys physical facts physical objects physical sciences physical world physicalist possible predicational produce perceptions psychological facts quest for reality relation ripe lemon scientific Scientific Realism sensations of pain sense sentences shape simply specified standpoint statements Strawson subjectivist tion true understand understood vocabulary would-be unmasker yellow lemon yellow objects yellow things