as regards the truths of moral science, are, at least, very often droll in the images they present. Mr. Combe's philosophy is like a glass in which we see everything upside down. Everything is regarded, as it were, from a cerebral point of view. A man is but an agglomeration of bumps; his conduct the result of their "spontaneous" activities: and historical events but the issue of their combinations. Moral principles are but laws of brain, and cannot be really understood, unless treated of in proper cerebral phraseology. Under the Chapter of calamities arising from the infringement of the moral laws, many examples are given of the new light which this method is supposed to cast. For example, the retribution which arises from the indulgence of cruelty and selfishness in the treatment of the lower animals, is referred to by Mr. Combe, in the supposed case of a carter "who half starves his horse, and unmercifully beats it." Now, the vicious dispositions which such conduct shews, and the higher qualities of mind which it proves to be absent, or in abeyance, are all of them not difficult to specify in the ordinary forms of language. But Mr. Combe evidently thinks that a flood of new light is cast upon the subject, by informing us that this carter "manifests excessive Destructiveness with deficient Benevolence, Veneration, Justice and Intellect." The consequences of such a character are very properly described as pursuing him in every relation of life, and the result, we are told is, that his active cerebral faculties "rouse Combativeness, Destructiveness, Self-Esteem, Secretiveness, and Cautiousness, in his wife, children, or associates, against him, and they inflict on him animal punishment." Very sound moral philosophy all this, doubtless; but, proceeding on a "theory of mind" vastly older than Mr. Combe or his master, and to which their science has added nothing. So far as any novelty in this respect is concerned, Mr. Combe might as well expect it from proceeding to describe, anatomically, the precise nature of that "animal punishment" which the carter's wife, &c., are supposed to have inflicted, and the particular muscles called into play in the course of their laudable exertions. Again, the moral judgment of our time has pretty well settled the character and disposition in which the slave-trade originated, and which the prosecution of it tended to aggravate. Mr. Combe volunteers his phrenological explanation, that England was guilty of this crime, " under the impulses of excessively strong Acquisitiveness, Self-Esteem, and Destructiveness." The first American war, likewise, is rescued from the imperfect judgment of former historians, and Britain is described as having "desired to gratify her Acquisitiveness and Self-Esteem in opposition to Benevolence and Justice." "This roused," we are farther told, "the animal resent

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ment" of the transatlantic colonies, and "the propensities of the two nations came into collision:" "that is to say"--says Mr. Combe, naïvely, aware of the necessity of a translation" they made war upon each other." There is no end to the illumination which this phrenological verbiage is supposed to cast on the most familiar doctrines of moral and mental philosophy. There is one doctrine shortly expressed in the popular proverb, that "Honesty is the best policy," which is made the subject of a very elaborate explanation from a text of Grecian history. It occurred to Themistocles, in a time of profound peace, that it would be very convenient for Athens to destroy the naval power of Sparta, by burning her fleet. Aristides is reported to have said, that doubtless it would be very advantageous, but equally unjust. This verdict was certainly not in a spirit of literal acceptance of the doctrine of our proverb-and Mr. Combe objects that it was still more clearly contradictory and wrong, when tested by the science which deals with brain. He undertakes, therefore, to "trace the project of Themistocles to its result," thus :

"The inhabitants of Sparta possessed the faculties of Self-Esteem, Combativeness, Destructiveness, Intellect, Benevolence, and Conscientiousness. The proposed destruction of their ships would have outraged the higher sentiments and intellect, and these would have kindled Combativeness and Destructiveness into the most intense activity. The greater the injustice of the act the fiercer would the flame of opposition and revenge have glowed. . . . . The Athenians, then, by the very constitution of nature, would have been assailed by this fearful storm of moral indignation and animal resentment, rendered doubly terrible by the most virtuous and intelligent being converted into the most determined of their opponents. Turning to their own State, again, only those individuals among themselves in whom intellect and moral sentiment were inferior to Acquisitiveness and Self-Esteem, which give rise to selfishness and the lust of power, could have cordially opposed the deed."

And so, Mr. Combe proves to his own satisfaction what we think has often been proved before, with at least equal force, and much greater brevity, that dishonesty has a natural tendency to bring about its own reward.

What is the meaning of all this? It may be excellent sense as regards what is old and familiar in moral principles; it is nonsense as regards the new light which the phrenological jargon is supposed to cast upon them. Why does Mr. Combe imagine that the well-known qualities of the human mind become for the first time clearly understood when the initial letters of their names are printed in capitals? It is for the purpose, of

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course, of continually referring our thoughts and his own to the material "organ”-to the little spot of brain. But why does he set such prodigious value on this reference-why does he think it amounts to a new "philosophy of mind?" Why, for example, when he speaks of justice or benevolence, will he insist on withdrawing our contemplation from those familiar ideas of their nature, which the mind immediately apprehends, and for which it loves their names, and force us to fix our outward eyes instead on a bit of skull? What new information does he think that surface can give us of the nature of those glorious spiritual attributes which are the joy of earth and heaven? What can it be that makes him fancy light from such a source-ah! we see the illusion. The notion has arisen in the mind of the phrenologist, that he has discovered not merely the house which is the abode of mind-but a material thing which Is that mind itself, and that the looking at and handling of this substance is a looking at and handling of the faculties of the soul. Such ideas may not be definitely expressed-they may not be even consciously entertained. But this is the direction in which a habit of looking at the phenomena of mind through the mere physiology of the brain will infallibly tend, and nothing else can account for the extravagance of representing the facts of phrenology as constituting a new theory or philosophy of mind. It is the peculiar danger of this particular science, that unless the man who comes to know its facts, habitually regards them with reference to other facts with which it cannot deal, and which are beyond its ken, his pretended philosophy is very apt to degenerate into a gross materialism.

As it is thus a matter of first importance to keep phrenology in its proper place as regards the idea we form of what it is, so also is it important to keep it in its proper place in respect to what it does. A number of inferences will suggest themselves, from the fact that different mental qualities are connected with different portions of brain; but the precise character of these inferences will depend on what the nature of that "connexion" is. Let us push on then to the great question-how far, and in what sense, is the brain and its several parts, the "organ" of the mind and of its various powers?

Mr. Combe, in context with the passage before quoted, says, "Individuals under the impulse of passion, or by the direction of intellect, will hope, fear, wonder, perceive, and act, whether the degree in which they habitually do so be ascertainable by the means which it (phrenology) points out, or not." Here we have an intimation that the connexion between the brain and the mind may be such, that we can determine by external form, the "degree" in which individuals are "habitually" under the influence of

Organs as Indications of Character.

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the several faculties. Now, even supposing this to be strictly and literally true, we need hardly say, that it in no way helps phrenology to assume the rank of a "philosophy of mind." The fact of men differing from each other in natural character, and in the dispositions which exercise habitual influence on their conduct, is as much a matter of instinctive knowledge, as the fact of those dispositions being themselves different. As in relation to the abstract consideration of the human mind, the known division of its powers is the only basis for the partitioning of brain, so it is only the known fact of the variety of individual character which can give meaning to the varieties of organic conformation. Here again, Mr. Combe is perpetually guilty of the confusion of setting more value on the new discovery, that the "organs" vary in size, than on the very old one, that the faculties vary in power. He thinks this of such importance in the "philosophy of man," that the circumstance of its having been unknown until Dr. Gall's discovery of the functions of the brain, is sufficient to explain the past barrenness of mental science, and to render probable the assertion," that a great flood of light on this subject is now pouring forth on the world." If the discovery of a process by which character is to be recognised in external forms be such an event, then must physiognomy also be a "philosophy of mind," and he who reads with discernment the lines of the human countenance, is as great a philosopher as the man who arrives at a similar result by measuring the "organs."

The truth is, we suspect, that the science of nature, which interprets the "human face divine," has forestalled much of what is best established in the "science" of the Man of Bumps. The material forms which tell with such force so many secrets of the spirit, have among them, as one of their component parts, the general aspect and calibre of the head, with many others which are beyond the department of phrenology. Of the dispositions this is eminently true; and in endless cases it is true also of the intellect. Genius often betrays its presence by a glance, where its throne is not visible on the brow.

Now, how far has phrenology really advanced our powers of discerning character, even assuming the whole of its topogra phical survey to be accurately made? We readily admit, that if there be a connexion between the "qualities of mind and certain portions of brain," there must certainly be some corresponding connexion, perhaps a visible one, between the peculiarities of a man's character and the peculiarities of his cerebral development. But when the phrenologist is asked for the formula which his science has enabled him to construct, for arriving at the required result, we find that the powers of his "philosophy" are very

humble indeed, if compared with the pretensions advanced on its behalf.

"It has been ascertained," says Mr. Combe, "that each faculty is connected with a particular portion of brain: and that, OTHER CONDITIONS BEING THE SAME, the power of manifesting each bears a relation to the size of its organ." The form of expression is slightly varied in another passage: The brain is the organ of mind: different parts of it manifest distinct faculties; and the "power of manifestation in regard to each, is proportionate, cateris paribus, to the size and activity of the organ." Nothing can be more satisfactorily vague. Mr. Combe does not tell us that the organ "manifests" the faculty-but only that it has a "power" of manifesting it. He does not tell us any law by which we may determine how often that "power" is put into operation; and with regard to the extent of the "power," he is content to say, "that it bears A relation to the size" of its material counterpart. This is something: but then in the second form, he seems to fear lest even this should be too definite to be free from the danger of contradiction, and so he adds to "size" the important element, "activity." But with all these precautions to avoid a precision incompatible with facts, he is not satisfied, and casts total uncertainty over the whole, by the general rider, "cæteris paribus."

Now what are the mental phenomena, to which the phrenologist must shape and suit his theory-and to be consistent with which he finds it so difficult to express the practical result of his science? True it is, one man differs from another man in natural character: but true it is also, that one man differs during his life, quite as widely from himself. He is a reprobate perhaps for years-living in defiance of every law of God and man; reckless, selfish, intemperate. Sometimes slowly, sometimes suddenly he is changed. Every law which he had broken is now his guide. He is scrupulous, generous, benevolent, and temperate in all things. These latter qualities must have, and must have always had, their appropriate "organs" in his brain; and among the many cases of such a change in character, we are not aware that any corresponding growth has been observed among the bumps. Clearly then, the phrenologist is wise when he qualifies the test of "size" by the more important element of "activity." But then size can be estimated-activity cannot. There have, indeed, been opportunities we are told, of actually seeing the "activity" of a brain. A poor woman in France lost a portion of her skull-and during a sleep of agitated dreams, that mysterious substance which is honoured by this incomprehensible alliance, was seen to be agitated also. But could the curious physicians who saw those movements read the moving