OUTLINE OF ROMAN LAW.

Of Law in General.

Law (Jus) is the science of what is just and good. Jurisprudence (Jurisprudentia) is the acquaintance with divine and human affairs, and skill in what is just and unjust. Law is either public or private.

Public law regards the interests of the state, and private law, those of individuals.

Private law is divided into the law of nature (jus naturae) the law of nations (jus gentium) and the civil law (jus civile).

The law of nature is the dictate of nature to man in common with all other animals.

The law of nations (jus gentium) is the law inculcated by natural reason on mankind, and common to all nations.

The civil law is that in force in any state, and was either written or un-written.

I.

Of Persons.

Person (persona) in its strict sense is any being capable of having rights and performing duties.

The signification of the word has, however, been much extended, so that whatever is considered subject to laws is regarded as a person. Thus there are persons physical and moral, although the latter are more properly called juridical or artificial.

The word persona often signifies only capacity, as that any one is subject to certain laws, and capable of

certain duties. Thus, one individual may have in himself several capacities, the duties and rights of which are

various.

Of the capacity of persons in general.

Capacity (status) is natural or civil. Natural, or common capacity, was that of every human being not a monster. An unborn child was regarded as if born in regard to every benefit appertaining to him.

For civil capacity there were several requisites: (1) freedom; (2) citizenship; (3) membership in a family. Freemen were either freeborn (ingenui) or freedmen (libertini).

Freemen were divided into citizens and aliens (peregini). Membership in a family was the position of any one who was himself independent, but might possess other persons in his own power. Agnation with a particular family was also included in the expression membership in a family.

Whoever was not subject to the power of another (in alterius potestate) was independent (sui juris) although sometimes called pater familias. Whoever was subject to the power of another was alieni juris, as a child or a slave. The power of an independent person was threefold. 1, The power of masters over their slaves, and the paternal power over children and grandchildren; 2, Manus, or the power of a husband over a wife. (The ancient modes of marriage were "confarreatio," a religious ceremony in which none but those to whom the jus sacrum was open could take part; "coemptio,' a fictitious sale, in which the wife was sold to the husband; and "usus," cohabitation with the intention of forming a marriage); 3, Mancipium, which was a fictitious sale in a formal manner, as in emancipation or adoption of any freeman.

The loss of capacity was called capitis deminutio and was either the greatest (maxima) which was the loss of liberty, and with it the other two capacities were necessarily extinguished; 2, the middle, the loss of

citizenship, and with it membership in a family, but not freedom, was extinguished; 3, the least, which included every change which befel a Roman citizen in his membership in a family, and not affecting his citizenship. Existimatio was the dignity belonging to any one in the full enjoyment of his capacity (status). It might be lost, as by the greatest, or middle deminutio capitis or impaired, but so that the person would not cease to be a Roman citizen. Persons whose existimatio was thus impaired were designated infamous, if their offence was of a grave character, base, if of a less grave character.

Persons may also be considered in other relations. In regard to sex, persons are either male or female. In regard to age, persons are either of age (majores) or under age (minores).

At twenty-five a person became at age.

Puberity in males was considered to commence at fourteen. Females are regarded fit for marriage at twelve. Children until the age of seven, were called infants (infantes).

Persons in regard to their faculties, are either sane or insane.

Relationship between persons connected by ties of blood, is called cognatio.

This relationship is direct and either ascending, as from the descendant to the ancestors, or descending from the ancestors to the descendant.

Persons descending from a common ancestor are with regard to each other collaterals.

Nearness of cognation is counted by degrees. The degree is found according to the rule: Whatever number of generations is required to determine the cognation between two particular individuals, in a similar degree, are those persons related to each other. Thus, father and son are in the first degree; grandfather and grandson in the second degree; a brother's son and a paternal uncle in the third degree; and children of brothers are in the fourth degree. Collaterals if descended from the same parent, are called bilateral or unilateral, if they

have only one common parent. Collaterals of the former kind are commonly called german. If the common ancestor is a father, unilaterals are called consanguinean, but if a mother uterine. Affinity is the tie which takes place in a marriage between the wife and the relations of the husband. Among artificial persons are the state, the treasury, corporations of every kind, religious institutions, and lastly inheritances in abeyance.

II.

Of Things.

In general, whatever is not a person, but is the object of a right is called in law a thing.

Thing in a particular sense is whatever, from its nature, is capable of being property.

Things incorporeal are rights.

Things corporeal are moveable or immoveable.

Things moveable are those which can be moved from place to place without injury to their substance or shape. Things immoveable are those which from their nature cannot be removed, or in contemplation of law have become so.

Things are also divided into fungible and non-fungible. The former are those which are considered in regard to quality and quantity.

Things non-fungible are those which have to be regarded in species. Thus, corn is a thing fungible, and a painting a thing non-fungible. Things are either simple consisting of similar particles in their nature coherent, or compound, composed of parts united into one, as a house or a ship.

Things are also divisible or indivisible, as an animal. Things are either principal or accessory. The former are those which exist independently of any other things.

Whatever appertains to the principal thing or is united to it, is called accessory.

Things in regard to ownership belong to nobody (nullius) or are owned (alicujus).