SERM. hundred pounds: you deny; but he pleads this rule, saying, CXXIX. If you wanted as much as I, and I had as much as you, you

would desire that I should give you so much, and therefore you ought to give me so much; for what you would that others should do to you, you should do the same to them. But now this doth not follow at all; for although, if you was in his condition and he in yours, you might probably desire as much of him as he desires of you, yet your desires to him would be unreasonable, and so are his to you: for we suppose he hath no absolute necessity of so much money, and therefore he cannot so properly be said to will, as to covet it, his desire of so much proceeding from his corrupt inclination to the things of this world. But supposing a man to be in such circumstances that he is certain to starve, without your supplying him with so much as he hath absolute necessity of; here the rule holds good, so that you are bound to supply him with it, for if you was in his condition and he in yours, you might justly and reasonably will that he should supply you; and by consequence, you are obliged to supply him, because you are bound to "do to others, as you would that they should do to you," in all things which your wills, regulated by the light of Scripture and reason, choose.

The next thing to be considered in my text, is the word "Men." "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you." Men, not God: and men in general, as men, not as lying under such and such particular obligations to one another; for a father would have his children to obey him, but it doth not follow that he must obey his children. A master would have his servants do his work, but he is not therefore bound to do theirs. A prince would have his subjects submit to him, but he is not therefore obliged to submit to them; because in those, and suchlike relations, there are particular obligations, which quite alter the case: for children are bound to obey their parents, servants their masters, and subjects their prince. But there is no such obligation on the other side, for a parent to obey his children, a master his servants, or a prince his subjects: and therefore neither can they be obliged to it by this rule, which obligeth us no further than to perform our other obligations to one another. And so, though it doth not oblige a parent to

obey his children, as he would have them to obey him, because there is no former obligation upon him to do it; yet it obligeth him to perform his duty as a father unto them, as well as them to perform their duty as children unto him; so that as he would that they should carry themselves as obedient children unto him, so is he bound by this rule. to carry himself as a loving father unto them. The same may be said also of the other relations; but we must remember that this rule was intended for our carriage to one another, only as we are men; as we are all fellow-creatures and fellow-servants to the Most High God; and therefore, whatsoever other relation we may stand in to one another, take away that relation and the rule is still to be universally observed. As, suppose a servant to be sick, his sickness hath no relation to his service; and therefore in this case, his master is to deal with him as with his fellow-creature, and do to him as he would be done by was he in his condition; because we are bound to "do to others what we would that men should do to us." That is the next thing to be explained; for here, "by doing," we are not to understand only external actions, or our outward carriage to one another, but likewise the inward motions of our hearts, even our thoughts and affections to each other; for though human laws take no cognisance of what we think of, or how we are affected to each other, yet the Divine Laws do: and therefore, as we would that men should perform their inward as well as outward duties unto us, so are we to do the same to them. Which brings me to the last words to be considered, "Do ye even so to them." That is, unto the utmost of our power; for there are some cases wherein it may be impossible for a man to do so to others, as he may in reason will that others should do to him; as a man that really wants what is necessary for his present sustenance, he may justly desire that others should relieve him, though his own necessity makes him incapable of relieving others, and takes off his obligation to do it; for no man can be bound to do that which in itself is impossible for him to do: and therefore this rule must still be understood with this caution, that it be in our power to do such things to others as we would have others to do to us; which being supposed, “ all

CXXIX.

SERM. things whatsoever we would that men should do to us, we are bound to do even so to them." As also on the other side, as Tertullian observes,' As ye would not that men should do to you, so you must not do to them; or we must not do to others what we would not suffer ourselves.'

Thus we have considered the several words and expressions apart by themselves, which our Saviour used to express this general and comprehensive duty to us; from whence it is easy to gather the true meaning and purport of the whole, which in few terms amounts to this, that all things whatsoever we do, or can in reason and justice will or desire that men, as they are our fellow-creatures, should do either in thought or affection, in word or action for us, the same we are bound, unto the utmost of our skill and power, to do for them, even for all with whom we do converse. And whosoever doth thus, he fulfils and performs whatsoever the Law or Prophets require him to do to others; and by consequence, whosoever doth not observe this rule, inscribed first as the Law of Nature upon the hearts of all men, and afterwards transcribed by Christ Himself into His Gospel; I say, whosoever doth not observe this, transgresses all the Moral Law, so far as it respects our neighbour, and by necessary consequence as it respects God too, forasmuch as he lives in disobedience to His sacred and just commands; and so whosoever offends in this one point breaks the whole Law of God.

II. Now the several parts of this rule being thus explained, and so the true meaning of the whole found out, in the next place we are to consider how to apply it to our particular actions, and to make use of it in our whole life and conversation in this world, which I hope there is none of you but are very desirous to understand; forasmuch as if we fail in this we fail in all things else. And if we observe this rule aright, we shall do whatsoever either the Law written, or the Prophets inspired by God, require of us, in reference to our civil converse with one another, as our Saviour Himself here intimates unto us. Hence it is that I have used all the care and caution that I could, in giving you the true and genuine sense of these words, and shall do the like in shewing you how to use them, hoping that by

this time you do not only understand the general drift of them, but are likewise so convinced of the necessity of observing what our Saviour drives at in them, that you are resolved, by His assistance, not only to keep them always in your minds, but to use them upon all occasions whatsoever, to which they are any ways applicable. And let me tell you, there are no civil actions whatsoever betwixt man and man, but what should be ordered according to this rule; so that this is not a rule to be observed or made use of only now and then, but through the whole course of our lives, in all places and companies whatsoever. And it is that likewise which is always at hand; insomuch, that wheresoever you are, whatsoever you are about to do towards your neighbour, it is but turning your eyes inward, and there you may read the equity or injustice of it, only by considering whether you would be willing, all circumstances considered, that others should do that to you which you are about doing to them.

And, indeed, this is the way whereby we are to apply this general rule to our particular actions, even by observing only which way our own wills are inclined, and ordering our carriage and behaviour towards others accordingly, so as not to do any thing to others which we would that they should not to do us, and whatsoever we would that they should do to us, that we be sure to do the same to them. But seeing instancing in some particulars will conduce very much to your understanding how to apply this rule upon all occasions, I shall give you some examples both of what you would not, and what you would have done unto yourselves, by which you may clearly learn what you ought not, and what you ought to do to others.

First, therefore, do but consult your own hearts, and you may easily find that you would not have others have a bad opinion, or think evil of you; but whatsoever you are in yourselves, I am sure you would all be thought to be good by others whence it is easy to infer that others also should be so esteemed by you; for as you would that others should think of you, so ought you to think of them. But you all would have others think well of you, and by consequence you are to think well of them' too, which also is no more than what we are all bound in charity to do; for, as the

CXXIX.

SERM. Apostle tells us, "charity thinketh no evil," yea, it is our 1 Cor. 13.5. duty likewise to "honour all men;" that is to have a good 1 Pet. 2. 17. esteem and respect for all men; not to undervalue or despise any man whatsoever, as we desire that others should not undervalue or despise us. And what a rare world would it be, was this rule observed but in this one particular? What evil surmises, fears, and jealousies should we be freed from; Rom.12.10. how kindly should we then "be affectioned one to another with brotherly love, in honour preferring one another." And verily, it is observable, that it is a breach of justice, as well as charity, not to observe this rule in this particular; for all men being made in the image of God, and designed to serve and enjoy Him, we are bound to believe all men to be good, and to answer the end of the creation; yea, they have a right and title to our good thoughts and opinions of them, unless they have forfeited it by being publicly convicted to be otherwise; even as our common law itself supposeth all men to be innocent of all crimes which they are not found to be guilty of, either by their own confession, or other proof, which are the only reasons that can justify our condemning others so much as in our very thoughts.

For, in the next place, there is none of you but would have others not believe all evil reports which may be raised of you; neither would you have your credit in the world, and your esteem amongst your neighbours impaired or lessened by such reports and surmises, as envy or malice may invent or spread abroad concerning you. Now, therefore, remember your Saviour's rule, and as you would not that others should believe every thing that is said of you, so likewise, do not you believe every thing that is said of others; neither let your opinion of, nor affection to your neighbour, be any ways abated by any flying reports, which you may hear of him: because some sin in raising scandals upon others, do not you sin too in believing of them; but whatsoever ill may be said of any one, you must be sure to hope and believe the best of all, until you have good information of the truth of what is said.

Furthermore, as ye would not that others should believe the ill they may hear of you, so I am confident there is none of you, but would that no man speak evil of you; you would