represent very nearly 740,000l. of that aggre- | positions which have yet been made by those gate wealth, and under Mr. Bright's Bill who may be considered the leading men of 660,000l., or a little more; whilst the bo- the day, we think that the first of these bills rough members, one with another, would at the head of our article is best adapted for each of them represent a little less than the first of those points, or extension of the 300,000, and under Mr. Bright's Bill a suffrage, and the third is the best for the short 350,000l. In other words, the property second of those points, or the redistribution which county members represent will be of seats. nearly twice as great as that which borough members represent, while the number of the former is to be 177 only, and the number of the latter 290. Can Mr. Bright have serious-ly than we otherwise could for the fair reprely weighed the effect and the consequences of his own proposal? Or can anything more be needed to show that the attempt to make constitutions and governments by arithmetical rules must always fail? But this is by no means our only objection to these famous schedules. The inequality and injustice which we have just pointed out are enough to condemn them. There is another principle, however, embodied in them which would be as inequitable and also as impolitic, as the unequalness and injustice above adverted to. We allude to the principle of multiplying members in the same constituencies in proportion to population. According to Mr. Bright's plan, this would be done by destroying the representation of smaller places and adding to the representation of the larger. If that were accomplished, the variety in the system, which all statesmen desire to preserve, would be immensely curtailed. At the same time, the dissatisfaction which is now felt by the beaten minority, in not obtaining a single representative, would be proportionately aggravated. Under the present system, different classes may obtain a voice in different localities; different interests are not swallowed up by that which predominates. But, if these classes and interests are either disfranchised or consolidated in any one place, that which predominates must, by reason of that very consolidation, unduly prevail. It is, therefore, a false step to give, as Mr. Bright proposes to do, four, five, and six members to any one place. The predominating interest, as a general rule, will return them all of one colour, and the remaining interest will be unrepresented. In quiet times there may be a compromise, and here and there it would occasionally take place for the sake of peace; but, if there be an agitation or popular excitement on any subject, the minority will be overpowered by the same voices which swell the cry. They would have no chance whatever, of success, and it is more than possible, in such an event, that passion, not reason, would everywhere be triumphant. On a careful review of the first two points which we had to consider, and the only pro By maintaining the distinction which has always existed between the county and the borough franchise, we provide more effectual sentation of those two great interests, in which all others collect and unite-the agricultural and the commercial. By resting the occupation franchise in the one on a juror's qualification and imperial taxation, and in the other on rating and the payment of rates, we make the duties and privileges of citizenship, as near as may be, co-relative terms. By introducing into both those who contribute to the direct taxation of the State-those whose stake in personal property is as great as that of others in real property or land-those whose means and social position are quite as good as the tenant who occupies the whole of a house, though they themselves only occupy a part of it-and those whose industry and commercial prudence raise a presumption of electoral fitness which ought to be encouraged, we confer on many an electoral capacity, whom an arbitrary line, like a 101. occupation value, must often exclude. Moreover, by conferring these qualifications, with such a residence as will give them an interest in that community where the right is claimed, it is almost demonstrable that every person who is entitled to the franchise by reason of his intelligence, station, and independence, will either have or be capable of attaining it; and this he could do without more difficulty than that which pre-supposes the necessary. guarantees for discharging the trust thereby reposed in him. As regards disfranchisement we may also add that, by still preserving those varied constituencies which tend to secure a varied representation; by not breaking up those prescriptive usages which form for the present a connecting link with the past and the future, and so give life and continuity to a nation; and by limiting our changes to those cases where a practical grievance is shown to exist, and a practical remedy requires to be applied, we shall make, or retain, an infinitely better distribution of seats than fanciful theories, ingenious calculations, or mere experiment can ever supply us with. III. The two other points which remain to be considered are the freedom of elections and the duration of Parliaments. To ensure the first, Mr. Roebuck and Mr. Bright would have recourse to the Ballot; and to limit the last in such a manner as to bring our legislature more completely under the control of public opinion, they would shorten the duration of Parliaments by at least four years. All the Bills at the head of our article are silent on both subjects. But the third, by the introduction of voting papers,-not in substitution of, but in addition to the present mode of taking the poll,-sought to facilitate the elector's freedom in giving his vote, and at once to do away with any necessity, either real or supposed, for providing him with refreshment, or paying his expenses in going to the poll. With regard to the Ballot, so much has been said that but little new light can be thrown upon the subject. We need only observe here that the advantages of such a system are all founded on a false assumption -a moral error-and a political mistake. The false assumption is, that a man's opinions, especially in a free country, can ever be kept secret. In the United States we know that the voting is not secret, and we are sure that in England no man's opinions would be hidden from his neighbour, nor indeed is it desirable that they should be. Acting on this conviction, Burke once said, in his usual clenching and powerful style, All contrivance by ballot we know experimentally to be vain and childish to prevent a discovery of inclinations. Where they may best answer the purposes of concealment, they are sure to produce suspicion, and this is a still more mischievous cause of partiality."* Let us suppose, however, that it is possible to preserve secrecy. Then will be seen the moral error into which we shall have run, namely, the error that a man's conscience will work as well in the dark as in the light-thence will follow the political mistake that any one, and every one, can exercise a trust or discharge a duty which may have either a bad or good effect on all his neighbours as well as himself, uncontrolled by public opinion, and entirely exempt from all responsibility, excepting that which he chooses to impose on his own conduct. Can anything be more irrational on abstract reasoning? or can anything be more perilous if we consult experience? Once, we know, that a plan of secret, instead of open voting, was recommended and adopted in the decline of the Roman Empire; and a contemporary witness has given us his opinion of it. He tells us, in one passage, why this remedy was sought. -Quæ nunc, immodico favore corrupta, ad tacita suffragia, quasi ad remedium decurrerunt.' Soon afterwards he points out his See his Works, vol. v., p. 368. 1 apprehensions on the subject; and he does not withhold his reasons for them.-'Sed vereor, ne, procedente tempore, ex ipso remedio vitia nascantur. Est enim periculum, ne tacitis suffragiis impudentia irrepat. Nam quoto-cuique eadem honestatis cura secreto, qua palam? MULTI FAMAM, PAUCI CONSCIENTIAM, VEBENTUR.' Subsequently he shows that his fears were realised: Scripseram tibi, verendum esse, ne ex tacitis suffragiis vitium aliquod exsisteret. Factum est.' And then in another passage, which was quoted by the late Sir Robert Peel with great effect in the House of Commons, the result of this change on the public mind is strikingly given-Tantum licentiæ pravis ingeniis adjicit illa fiducia—Quis enim sciet? Poposcit tabellas, stylum accepit, demisit caput, neminem veretur, se contemnit.' With the knowledge of such results we would rather retain the open manliness of the English character, with the means of detecting, and therefore of punishing all attempts to corrupt and deprave it, than knowingly enable some future historian to say of us what Gibbon said of Rome: 'As long as the tribes gave their voices aloud, the conduct of each citizen was open to the eyes and ears of his friends and countrymen; the aspect of a pure magistrate was a living lesson to the multitude. A new method of secret voting abolished the influences of fear and shame, of honour and interest, and the abuse of freedom accelerated the progress of anarchy and despotism." The history of Parliamentary corruption in England has yet to be written-so said Lord Macaulay, and we believe he is right. But when it is written we also believe the only modes by which it has ever hitherto been checked, or by which alone it can be prevented, are-first, by raising the standard of public morals; and, secondly, by passing such laws as enable us to define and detect the offence, and so to stop by punishing the commission of it. Secret voting never can accomplish either one or the other. In former times, corruption was most prevalent within the walls of Parliament itself: now, it is manifested most strongly outside those walls. We know how mercenary members had become in the reign of Charles II.: nay more, they were shameless pensioners in a French king's pay. To Clifford is attributed the infamous demerit of introducing this plague-spot into our system. He is said to have discovered that a noisy patriot, whom it was no longer possible to send to prison, might be turned into a courtier by a gold bribery, treating, or corrupt practices, distinguishing those cases where the electors were less than 500 from those where they exceeded 1000, and putting in Italics the boroughs created under the Reform Act. Year. Places where Elec tors were less than Places where Electors were more than 1000. 500. Oxford city. Canterbury. Ipswich. Kingston-upon-Hul. Newcastle-under-Lyne. smith's note. Often the wits said that when | book. We have now before us some curious a pump appears to be dry, if a very small returns of those places which have been conquantity is pumped in, a great quantity of victed of bribery between 1851 and 1859. water rushes out; and so when a Parliament It will be interesting to analyse them.* From appears to be niggardly, 10,000l. judiciously 1831 to 1851 there were 76 boroughs congiven in bribes will often produce a million victed of bribery; and according to the testiin supplies.* The evil was not diminished mony of a Liberalt contemporary of these -it was aggravated, if anything-by that only 21 can properly be called small as having revolution which freed our country from so fewer than 500 electors, while some of the many other evils. Happily for us, this state more constantly and frequently impure places of things has long since passed away: partly number their votes by thousands.' A Table through the shame which has gradually at- of them may not be uninstructive-we theretached to the reception of a bribe, though fore subjoin a list of those places where the not to the giving of it; partly from the pub-election has been avoided on the ground of licity with which that shame was made known; and partly by the condemnation of many offenders to heavy fines or imprisonment in the Tower. The corruption of members is now seldom, if ever, heard of. The other kind of corruption, by which the elector's vote was reached, at first took the form of expensive entertainments. This was in the reign of Charles II. A short time afterwards, that is to say in 1701, the buying of votes was scandalously set on foot as a novel practice by the merchants concerned in the new East India Company. According to Burnet, there was so little decency about it, that the electors engaged themselves by subscription to choose a blank person before they were trusted with the names of the candidates. The flood-gates of bribery, however, were not fully opened till the general elections of 1747 and 1754. Hallams then traces it to the increase of wealth by which the rich capitalists sought to counteract the influence of the territorial aristocracy. About this time the sale of seats commenced; and this 'extraordinary traffic' was accompanied in other places by the sale of votes. As soon as this noxious seed sprung up, of course it spread, as all weeds do, until the soil on which they grow is better cleaned. Laws were passed with a view of eradicating it: to a certain extent they succeeded. The riot and debauchery which we can still see in Hogarth's pictures, and read of in Smollett's novels, and the frightful expenses which half ruined the unhappy candidates, are certainly not what they once were. Still, if the truth must be spoken, we fear it will appear that the corruption and extravagance, which all parties desire to put down, exist as much in the larger Towns as in those Boroughs which are peculiarly the theme of Liberal abuse and the convenient scapegoat of Liberal disfranchisement. 1833 None. 1835 None. 1837-8 Evesham. 1839 Ludlow. 1840 Totness. 1841 1842 Cambridge town. Newcastle-under-Lyne. Northampton. Southampton. Newcastle-under-Lyne. Durham. Aylesbury. Carlisle. Cheltenham. Derby. Lancaster. Lincoln. Total 22. So much for the prevalence of corruption down to the end of 1851. Three general elections have since taken place: one in 1852, one in 1857, and one in 1859. All these elections were attended with nearly similar results as regards the corruption of the smaller and larger boroughs. The proportions were still on the side of the latter. Subjoined is a list of these results :—† *See House of Commons Returns,' 1853, No. 431; and see Edinburgh Review.' The + See Edinburgh Review,' No. 200. Review makes the number 72 instead of 76, but we believe we are right according to the re turns. See'House of Commons Returns,' 1854, No. 63, No. 460. free from corruption, or so moderate in their Lambeth.... 684 2 11 3 1219 14 3880 7 7 5784 4 7 1708 0 0 1 2688 15 7 5339 O 1 9735 15 8 expenses, as one could wish to find them. Southwark Blackburn, Chatham, Cheltenham, Huddersfield, and Wakefield, have all had adverse reports upon them; and the revelations at Wakefield, under the recent Commission, are not very cheering to those who would calcu late on purity of election as the probable consequence of a 107. constituency. Moreover, when we look at the expenses of others, as the same have been returned through election auditors, we own we are astonished at some of the sums which the unfortunate It is singular enough that the winning cancandidates have had to pay at some of these didate in these places is usually the man who elections. The returns for the general elec-paid the most; and there are only two of the tion of 1859 are not yet published; but the old boroughs which can at all vie with them returns for the general election of 1857 will show that contests may be as costly or even more costly, in boroughs than in counties. * See 'House of Commons Returns,' 1859, No. 220, Sess. 2. in expense: these are Liverpool and London. | into which this subject appropriately divides But the expenses of Liverpool with three itself-the duration of Parliament-nothing candidates are not near equal to those of is said in any of the three Bills at the head Manchester with four; while the expenses of of our article; but Mr. Roebuck's Committee London with five candidates are under those of Parliamentary Reform would limit their of Southwark, and far less than those of existence to three years. Now it may be Lambeth, which had only three candidates difficult to determine the exact duration each. We recommend the consideration of which would probably be the best; but we the foregoing facts to those who seek for have no hesitation whatever in saying that purity of election either in an extended suf- three years would certainly be the worst. frage or in secret voting. An extended suf- Once it was tried, and it signally failed. frage beyond the point where intelligence Every one who has watched the proceedings and independence may be reasonably assumed, of Parliament, knows full well that the seswill augment instead of diminish the evil; sions which follow and precede dissolution and the Ballot will wholly prevent its detec- are the least advantageous for real business tion, and so increase the temptation to in- and useful legislation. The experience of the dulge in it. Unless certain impunity is the Triennial Bill taught the statesmen of that best preventive of crime, the Ballot would day how much those sessions were wasted neither put down corruption, nor stop intimi- and thrown away. dation, nor diminish expense. Exposure, detection, conviction, and punishment, not dis'The first year of a triennial Parliament,' said proportioned, but suitable to the nature and Sir Richard Steele, 'has been spent in vindictive character of the offence, are the things most elections; the second session has entered into discussions and animosities concerning the late needed. Secret voting will give us none of business, but rather with a spirit of contradiction them; but it will give us dark intrigue, pri- to what the prevailing set of men in former vate spite, cunning treachery, mean suspicion, Parliaments had brought to pass, than of a disreckless indifference to public opinion, and a interested zeal for the public good; the third licensed immunity not only from punishment session languished in the pursuit of what little but also from censure. Having obtained unwas intended to be done in the second; and the der Lord John Russell's Act the power of in-approach of an ensuing election terrified the quiring into the fact of bribery before the proof of agency is established, and having further obtained in the last Act (which consolidated the whole of the laws on this subject) a clear definition of the three offences of bribery, treating, and undue influence, we believe that the desiderata now most requisite to be added are-a readier mode of detecting the offences than that which is furnished by the costly machinery of the Election Committees; a revision of the statutes by which Commissions of Inquiry are regulated, so that the two Houses may be enabled to act in a more judicial manner than they have hitherto done in the disfranchisement of voters or of whole constituencies; and such a punishment, when the delinquency is proved, as will prevent its repetition by destroying the advantage expected to be gained from it. In making this remark, we allude more particularly to a disqualification of the party bribing and the party bribed from sitting in Parliament or exercising his franchise, for such a number of sessions, or such a number of years, as may be deemed suitable, without being excessive. These are matters, however, which ought to be originated by the responsible advisers of the Crown; and we trust that they will state their views on the subject very early in the session, and appoint a committee to inquire into and report upon it. IV. Upon the last of the four great points members into a servile management, according as their respective principles were disposed towards the question before them in the House.** If such was the experience of those times, we must confess it is amply confirmed by our personal observations in these. Nothing is less conducive to deliberate counsel on the part of Ministers, or definite views on the part of the House, than the doubtful state in which they meet after a general election. The right to seats has first to be determined; inquiries broken off have again to be resumed; the opinions of members just fresh from their constituents are imperfectly ascertained; the feeling of the House is rather a feeling of uncertainty and suspense, than that which settles down to practical business and immediate action; and under such circumstances prudent administrations (as it was once observed somewhat quaintly, though not less truly) are slow to resolve upon any measures of consequence, until they have felt not only the pulse of Parliament, but the pulse of the people.' Hence it happens that the first session after a dissolution is generally unproductive, and in some measure lost. The session which precedes an expected dissolution has still less to recommend it. Nothing is more deplorable than the way Lord J. Russell's Modern Europe from the Peace of Utrecht,' vol. i. 364. P. |