positions which are more known and evident. So when we have judged that matter cannot think and that the mind of man doth think, we then infer and couclude that therefore the mind of man is not matter.

So we judge that a just governor will make a difference between the evil and the good; we judge also that God is a just governor; and from thence we conclude, that God will make a difference betwixt the evil and the good.

This argumentation may be carried on farther; thus, God will one time or another make a difference between the good and the evil; but there is little or no difference made in this world. Therefore there must be another world wherein this difference shall be made.

These inferences, or conclusions, are the effects of reasoning; and the three propositions, taken altogether, are called a syllogism, or argument.

IV. Disposition is that operation of the mind, whereby we put the ideas, propositions, and arguments, which we have formed concerning one subject, into such an order as is fittest to gain the clearest knowledge of it, to retain it longest, and to explain it to others in the best manner; or, in short, it is the ranging of our thoughts in such order as is best for our own and others conception and memory. The effect of this operation is called method. This very description of the four operations of the mind, and their effects in this order is an instance or example of method.

Now, as the art of logic assists our conception, so it gives us a large and comprehensive view of the subjects we enquire into, as well as a clear and distinct knowledge of them. As it regulates our judgment and our reasoning, so it secures us from mistakes, and gives us a true and certain knowledge of things; and as it furnishes us with method, so it makes our knowledge of things both easy and regular, and guards our thoughts from confusion.

Logic is divided into four parts, according to these four operations of the mind, which it directs, and therefore we shall treat of it in this order.

THE FIRST PART OF LOGIC,

OF PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS.

THE first part of logic contains observations and precepts about the first operation of the mind, perception, or conception; and since all our knowledge, how wide and large soever it grow, is founded upon our conceptions and ideas, here we shall consider, 1. The general nature of them.

2. The objects of our conception, or the archetypes or patterns of these ideas.

3. The several divisions of them.

4. The words and terms whereby our ideas are expressed.

5. General directions about our ideas.

6. Special rules to direct our conceptions.

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF IDEAS.

FIRST, the nature of conception, or perception,* shall just be mentioned, though this may seem to belong to another science rather than logic.

Perception is that act of the mind, (or, as some philosophers call it, rather a passion or impression), whereby the mind becomes conscious of any thing, as when I feel hunger, thirst, or cold, or heat; when I see a horse, a tree, or a man; when I hear a human voice, or thunder, I am conscious of these things, and this is called perception. If I study, meditate, wish, or fear, I am conscious of these inward acts also, and my mind perceives its own thoughts, wishes, fears, &c.

An idea is generally defined a representation of a thing in the mind; it is a representation of something that we have seen, felt, heard, &c. or been conscious

The words Conception and Perception are often used promiscuously, as I have done here, because I would not embarrass a learner with too many distinctions; but if I were to distin-, guish them, I would say perception is the consciousness of an object when present; conception is the forming an idea of the object whether present or absent.

of. That notion or form of a horse, a tree, or a man, which is in the mind, is called the idea of a horse, a tree, or a man.

That notion of hunger, cold, sound, colour, thought, or wish or fear, which is in the mind, is called the idea of hunger, cold, sound, wish, &c.

It is not the outward object or thing which is perceived, viz. the horse, the man, &c. nor is it the very perception, or sense and feeling, viz. of hunger or cold, &c. which is called the idea; but it is the thing as it exists in the mind by way of conception or representation that is properly called the idea, whether the object be present or absent.

As a horse, a man, and a tree, are the outward objects of our perception, and the outward archetypes or patterns of our ideas, so our own sensations of hunger, cold, &c. are also inward archetypes or patterns of our ideas; but the notions or pictures of these things, as they are considered or conceived in the mind, are precisely the ideas that we have to do with in logic. To see a horse, or to feel cold, is one thing; to think of and converse about a man, a horse, hunger, or cold, is another.

Among all these ideas, such as represent bodies are generally called images, especially if the idea of the shape be included. Those inward representations which we have of spirit, thought, love, hatred, cause, effect, &c. are more pure and mental ideas, belonging more especially to the mind, and carry nothing of shape or sense in them. But I shall have occasion to speak more particularly of the original, and the distinction of ideas, in the third chapter. I proceed therefore now to consider the objects of our ideas.

CHAP. II.

OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.

SECT. I.-Of Being in General.

THE object of perception is that which is represented in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern, according to which the idea is formed; and thus judgment, propositions, reasons, and long dis

courses, may all become the objects of perception; but in this place we speak chiefly of the first and more simple objects of it, before they are joined and formed into propositions or discourses.

Every object of our idea is called a theme, whether it be a being or not being; for not being may be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being. But let us first treat of beings, and that in the largest extent of the word.

A being is considered as possible, or as actual.

When it is considered as possible, it is said to have an essence, or nature. Such were all things before their creation. When it is considered as actual, then it is said to have existence also. Such are all things which are created, and God himself the creator.

Essence, therefore, is but the very nature of any being, whether it be actually existing or no. A rose in winter has an essence, in summer it has existence also.

Note. There is but one being which includes existence in the very essence of it, and that is God, who therefore actually exists by natural and eternal necessity; but the actual existence of every creature is very distinct from its essence, for it may be or may not be, as God pleases.

Again, every being is considered either as subsisting in and by itself, and then it is called a substance; or it subsists in and by another, and then it is called a mode, or manner of being. Though few writers allow mode to be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance is, and some modes have evidently more of real entity or being than others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. These things will furnish us matter for larger discourse in the following

sections.

SECT. II-Of Substances, and their various Kinds.

A substance is a being which can subsist by itself, without dependence upon any other created being. The notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to logicians to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, wood, stone, water, fire, a spirit, a body, an angel,

are called substances, because they depend on nothing but God for their existence.

It has been usual also in the description of substance to add, it is that which is the subject of modes or accidents; a body is the substance or subject, its shape is the mode.

But lest we be led into mistakes, let us here take notice, that when a substance is said to subsist without dependence upon another created being, all that we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroyed and reduced to nothing, by any power inferior to that of our Creator, though its present particular form, nature, and properties may be altered and destroyed by many inferior causes; a borse may die, and turn to dust; wood may be turned into fire, smoke, and ashes; a house into rubbish, and water into ice or vapour; but the substance or matter of which they are made still remains, though the forms and shapes of it are altered. A body may cease to be a horse or a house, but it is a body still; and in this sense it depends only upon God for its existence.

Among substances, some are thinking or conscious beings, or having a power of thought, such as the mind of man, God, angels. Some are extended and solid, or impenetrable; that is, they have dimensions of length, breadth, and depth, and have also a power of resistance, or exclude every thing of the same kind from being in the same place. This is the proper character of matter or body.

As for the idea of space, whether it be void or full, that is, a vacuum or a plenum; whether it be interspersed among all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the bounds of the creation, it is an argument too long and too hard to be disputed in this place what the nature of it is. It has been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a mere conception of the mind; whether it be the immensity of the divine nature, or the mere order of co-existent beings; whether it be the manner of our conception of the distances of bodies, or a mere nothing. There fore I drop the mention of it here, and refer the