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considered in themselves, with respect to others, such as entity or being, and vot-being, essence, existence, act, power, substance, mode, accident, &c.

The other sort of abstracted ideas is relative, as when we compare several things together, and consi. der merely the relations of one thing to another, entirely dropping the subject of those relations, whe. ther they be corporeal or spiritual; such are our ideas of cause, effect, likeness, unlikeness, subject, _object, identity or sameness, and contrariety, order, and other things wbich are treated of in ontology.

Most of the terms of art in several sciences may be ranked under the head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pronoun, verb, in grammar, and the several particles of speech, as wherefore, therefore, when, how, although, howsoever, &c. So connexions, transitions, similitudes, tropes, and their various forms in rhetoric.

The abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative, cannot so properly be said to derive their immediate, complete, and distinct original, either from sensation or reflection, (1.) because the nature and the actions, both of body and spirit, give us occasion to frame ex. actly the same ideas of essence, mode, cause, effect, likeness, contrariety, &c.. Therefore these cannot be called either sensible, or spiritual ideas, for they are not exact representations either of the peculiar qualities or actious of spirit or body, but seem to be a distinct kind of idea framed in the mind, to represent our most general conceptions of things, or their relations to ope another, without any regard to their natures, whether they be corporeal or spiritual. And, (2.) the same general ideas of cause and effect, likeness, &c. may be transferred to a thousand other kinds of being, whether bodily or spiritual, besides those from whence we first derived them: even those abstracted ideas, which might be first occasioned by bodies, may be as properly afterward attributed to spirit.

Now, though Mr. Locke supposes sensation and reflection to be the only two springs of all ideas, and tbese two are sufficient to furnish our minds with all that rich variety of ideas which we have; yet ab


straction is certainly a different act of the mind, whence these abstracted ideas have their original; though perhaps sensation or reflection may furnish us with all the first objects and occasions whence these abstracted ideas are excited and derived. Nor in this sense and view of things can I think Mr. Locke himself would deny my representation of the original of abstracted ideas, nor forbid them to stand for a distinct species.

Note. Though we have divided ideas in this chapter into three sorts, viz. Sensible, spiritual, and abstracted, yet it may not be amiss just to take notice here, that as man may be called a compound substance, being made up of body and mind, and the modes which arise from this composition are called mixed modes, such as sensation, passion, discourse, &c. So the ideas of this substance or being called man, and of these mixed modes may be called mixed ideas, for they are not properly and strictly spiritual, sensible, or abstracted. See a much larger account of every part of this chapter in the Philosophical Essays by I. W. Essay 3, 4, &c. Sect. II-Of simple and complex, compound and

collective Ideas. Ideas, considered in their nature, are either simple or complex.

A simple idea is one uniform idea, which cannot be divided or distinguished by the mind of man into two or more ideas; such are a multitude of our sensations, as the idea of sweet, bitter, cold, heat, white, red, blue, hard, soft, motion, rest, and perhaps extension and duration, such are also many of our spiritual ideas; such as thought, will, wish, knowledge, &c.

A complex idea is made by joining two or more simple ideas together; as a square, a triangle, a cube, a pen, a table, reading, writing, truth, falsehood, a body, a man, a horse, an angle, a beavy body, a swift horse, &c. Every thing that can be divided by the mind into two or more ideas is called complex.

Complex ideas are often considered as single and

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distinct beings, though they may be made up of several simple ideas; so a body, a spirit, a house, a tree, a flower; but when several of these ideas of a different kind are joined together, which are wont to be considered as distinct single beings, this is called a compound idea, whether these united ideas be simple or complex. So a man is compounded of body and spirit, so mithridate is a compound medicine, because it is made of many different ingredients. This I have shewn under the doctrine of substances. And modes also may be compounded; harmony is a compound idea, made up of different sounds united: so several different virtues must be united to make up the compounded idea or character either of a hero or a saint.

But when many ideas of the same kind are joined together, and united in one name, or under one view, it is called a collective idea ; so an army, or a parliament, is a collection of men; a dictionary, or nomenclature, is a collection of words; a flock is a collection of sheep; a forest, or grove, a collection of trees; a heap is a collection of sand, or corn, or dust, &c. a city is a collection of houses; a nosegay is a collection of flowers; a month or year is a collection of days; and a thousand is a collection of units.

The precise difference between a compound and collective idea is this, that a compound idea unites things of a different kind, but a collective idea of things of the same kind; though this distinction in some cases is not accurately observed, and custom oftentimes uses the word compound for collective. Sect. III..Of universal and particular Ideas, real and

imaginary. Ideas, according to their objects, may first be di. vided into particular or universal.

A particular idea is that which represents one thjug only.

Sometimes the one thing is represented in a loose and indeterminate manner, as when we say some man, any man, one man, another man; some horse, any horse: one city, or another, which is called by the schools individuum vagum.

Sometimes the particular idea represents one thing in a determinate manner, and then it is called a siu. gular idea ; such as Bucephalus, or Alexander's horse, Cicero the orator, Peter the apostle, the palace of Versailles, this book, that river, the New Forest, or the city of London. That idea, which represents one particular determinate thing to me, is called a singular idea, whether it be simple, or complex, or compound.

The object of any particular idea, as well as the idea itself, is sometimes called an individual ; so Peter is an individual man, London is an individual city. So this book, one horse, another horse, are all indi. viduals; though the word individuals is more usually limited to one singular, certain, and determined object.

An universal idea is that which represents a common nature agreeing to several particular things, so a horse, a man, or a book, are called universal ideas, because they agree to all horses, men, or books.

And I think it oot amiss to intimate, in this place, that these universal ideas are formed by that act of the mind which is called abstraction, that is, a withdrawing some part of an idea from other parts of it; for when singular ideas are first let into the mind by sensation or reflexion, then, in order to make them universal, we leave out or drop all those peculiar and determinate characters, qualities, modes, or circumstances, which belong merely to any particular individual being, and by which it differs from other beings; and we only contemplate those properties of it, wherein it agrees with other beings.

Though it must be confessed, that the name of abstracted ideas is sometimes attributed to universal ideas, both sensible or spiritual, yet this abstraction is not so great, as when we drop at of our idea every sensible or spiritual representation, a:d retain nothing but the most general and absolute conceptions of things, or their mere relations to oue another, without any regard to their particular natures, whether they be sensible or spiritual. Aud to this kind of conceptions we more properly give the name of abstracted ideas, as in the first section of this chapter.

An universal idea is either general or special.

A general idea is called by the schools a genus; and it is oue common nature agreeing to several other common natures. So animal is a genus, because it agrees to horse, lion, whale, butterfly, which are also common ideas ; so fisb is a genus, because it agrees to trout, herring, crab, which are common natures also.

A special idea is called by the schools a species ; it is one common nature that agrees to several singular individual beings; so horse is a special idea, or a species, because it agrees to Bucephalus, Troit, and Snowball. City is a special idea, for it agrees to London, Paris, Bristol.

Note. jst. Some of these universals are genuses, if compared with natures more common. So bird is a genus, if compared with eagle, sparrow, raven, which are also common natures; but it is a species, if compared with the more general nature, animal. The same may be said of fish, beast, &c.

This sort of universal ideas, which may cither be considered as a genus or a species, is called subaltern ; but the highest genus, which is never a species, is called the most general; and the lowest species, which is never a genus, is called the most special.

It may be observed here also, that that general nature or property wherein one thing agrees with most other things, is called its most remote genus; so substance is the remote genus of bird or beast, because it agrees not only to all kinds of animals, but also to things inanimate, as sun, stars, clouds, metals, stones, air, water, &c. But animal is the proximate or nearest genus of bird, because it agrees to fewest other things. Those general natures which stand between tbe nearest and most remote are called intermediate.

Note. 2dly. lo universal ideas it is proper to consider their comprehension and their extension*.

The comprehension of an idea regards all the es

• The word exteusion here is taken in a mere logical sense, and not in a physical and mathematical sense,

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