personal observation of them, or they must be suffici ently attested by others, according to the principles and rules by which matters of human faith are to be judged in the foregoing section Some of those, who lived in the nations and ages where miracles were wrought, were eye and ear-witnesses of the truth and divinity of the revelation ; but we, who live in these distant ages, must have them derived down to us by just and incontestible history and tradition. We also, even in these distant times, may see the accomplishments of some ancient predictions, and thereby obtain that advantage towards the confirmation of our faith in divine revelation beyond what those persons enjoyed who lived when the predictions were pronounced. 6. There is another very considerable confirmation of divine testimony; and that is, when the doctrines themselves, either on the publication or the belief of them, produced supernatural effects. Such were the miraculous powers which were communicated to believers in the first ages of Christianity, the conversion of the Jews or Gentiles, the amazing success of the gospel of Christ without human aid, ts power' in changing the hearts and lives of ignoeant and vicious Heathens, and wicked and profane creatures in all nations, and filling them with a spirit of virtue, piety and goodness. Wheresoever persons have found this effect in their own hearts, wrought by a belief of the" gospel of Christ, they have a witness in themselves of the truths of it, and abundant reason to believe it divine. Of the difference between reason and revelation, and in what sense the latter is superior, see nioré in chap. II. sect. 9. and chap. IV. direct. 6. SECT. VII.-Principles and Rules of Judging concerning things pust, present, and to come, by the mere use of Reason. Though we attain the greatest assurance of things past and future by divine faith, and learning many matters of fact, both past and preseat, by human faith, yet reason also may, in a good degree, assist us to judge of matters of fact, both past, present, and to come, by the following principles. 1. There is a system of beings round about us, of U : which we ourselves are a part, which we call the world and in this world there is a course of nature, or a settled order of causes, effects, antecedents, concomitants, consequences, &c. from which the author of nature doth not vary but upon very important oc casions. 2. Where antecedents, concomitants and consequences, causes and effects, signs and things signified, subjects and adjuncts, are necessarily connected with each other, we may infer the causes from the effects, and the effects from causes, the antecedents from the consequences, as well as consequences from antecedents, &c. and thereby be pretty certain of many things both past, present, and to come. It is by this principle, that astronomers can tell what day and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five hundred years ago, and predict all future eclipses as long as the world shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minute the sun rises or sets this day at Pekin in China, or what altitude the dog-star had at midnight or mid-noon in Rome, on the day when Julius Cæsar was slain. Gardeners, upon the same principle, can foretel the months when every plant will be in bloom, and the ploughman knows the weeks of harvest: we are sure, if there be a chicken, there was an egg: if there be a rainbow, we are certain it rains not far off: if we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it has naturally a root under ground. 3. Where there is a necessary connection between causes and effects, antecedents and consequences, signs and things signified, we know also that like causes will have like effects, and proportionable causes will have proportionable effects, contrary eauses will have contrary effects; and observing meu may form many judgments by the rules of similitude and proportion, where the causes, effects, &c. are not entirely the same. 4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain connection between antecedents, concomitants, and consequences, we can give but a conjecture, or a probable determination. If the clouds gather, or the weather-glass sinks, we suppose it will rain: if a man spit blood frequently with coughing, we suppose his fungs are hurt if very dangerous symptoms appear we expect his death. 5. Where causes operate freely, with a liberty of indifference to this or the contrary, there we cannot certainly know what the effects will be: for it seems to be contingent, and the certain knowledge of it belongs only to God. This is the case in the greatest part of human actions. 6. Yet wise men by a just observation of human nature, will give very probable conjectures in this matter, also concerning things past, or things future, because human nature in all ages and nations has such a conformity to itself. By a knowledge of the tempers of men and their present circumstances, we may be able to give a happy guess what their conduct will be, and what will be the event, by an observatiou of the like cases in former times. This made the Emperor Marcus Antonius to say, "By looking back “into history, and considering the fate and revolu❝tions of governments, you will be able to form a guess and almost prophecy upon the future "things, past, present, and to come, are strangely "uniform, and of a colour; and are commonly cast "in the same mould. So that upon the matter, "forty years of human life may serve for a sample of "ten thousand." Collier's Antonius, Book VII. Sect. 50. For 7. There are also some other principles of judging concerning the past actions of men in former ages, besides books, histories, and traditions, which are mediums of conveying human testimony; as we may infer the skill and magnificence of the ancients, by some fragments of their statues, and ruins of their buildings. We know what Roman legions came into Great Britain by numbers of bricks dug out of the earth in some parts of the island, with the marks of some particular legion upon them, which must have been employed there in brick-making. We rectify some mistakes in history by statues, coins, old altars, utensils of war, &c. We confirm or disprove some pretended traditions and historical writings, by medals, images, pictures, urns, &c. Thus I have gone through all those particular objects of our judgment which I first proposed, and have laid down principles and rules by which we may safely conduct ourselves therein. There is a variety of other objects concerning which we are occasionally , called to pass a judgment, viz. The characters of persons, the value and worth of things, the sense aud meaning of particular writers, matters of wit, oratory, puesy, matters of equity in judicial courts, matters of traffic and commerce between man and mau, which would be endless to enumerate. But if the general and special rules of judgment which have been mentioned in these two last chapters are treasured up in the mind, and wrought into the very temper of our souls in our younger years, they will lay a foundation for just and regular judgment concerning a thousand special occurrences in the religi ous, civil, and learned life. THE THIRD PART OF LOGIC. OF REASON AND SYLLOGISM. As the first work of the mind is perception, whereby our ideas are framed, and the second is judgment, which joins or disjoins our ideas, and forms a proposition, so the third operation of the mind is rea soning, which joins several propositions together, and makes a syllogism, that is, an argument whereby we are wont to infer some things that is less known, from truths which are more evident. In treating of this subject, let ns consider more particularly, 1. The nature of a syllogism, and the parts of which it is composed. 2. The several kinds of syllogisms, with particular rules relating to them. 3. The doctrine of syllogisms, of false reasoning, together with the means of avoiding them, and the manner of solving or answering them.. 4. Some general rules to direct our reasoning. CHAP. I. OF THE NATURE OF A SYLLOGISM, AND THE PARTS OF WHICH IT IS COMPOSED. IF the mere perception and comparison of two ideas would shew us whether they agree or disagree, then all rational propositions would be matters of intelli gence, or first principles, and there would be no use of reasoning, or drawing any consequences. It is the narrowness of the human mind which introduces the necessity of reasoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth or falsehood of a proposition in an immediate manner, by the mere contemplation of its subject and predicate, we are thus constrained to use a medium, and to compare each of them with some third idea, that by seeing how far they agree or disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they agree or disagree among themselves: as, if there are two lines A and B, and I know not whether they are equal or no, I take a third line C, or an inch, and apply it to each of them; if it agree with them both, then I infer that A and B are equal; but if it agree with one and not with the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal: if it agree with neither of them, there can be no comparison. So if the question be, whether God must be worshipped, we seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a creator, and say, Our Creator must be worshipped. Therefore God must be worshipped. The comparison of this third idea, with the two distinct parts of the question, usually requires two proposition, which are called the premises: the third proposition, which is drawn from them, is the conclusion, wherein the question itself is answered, and the subject and predicate joined either in the negative or the affirmative. The foundation of all affirmative conclusions is laid in this general truth, that so far as two proposed ideas agree to any third idea, they agree also among themselves. The character of a creator agrees to God, and worship agrees to a creator, therefore worship agrees to God. The foundation of all negative conclusions is this, that where one of the two proposed ideas agrees with a third idea, and the other disagrees with it, they must needs disagree so far also with one another: as, if no sinners are happy, and if angels are happy, then angels are not sinners. Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion of a syllogism: it is a sentence or argument made up U 3 |