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ously obeying the light of reason in matters of pure reason, and the dictates of revelation in things that relate to our faith.

Thus we have taken a brief survey of some of the infinite varieties of prejudices that attend mankind on every side in the present state, and the dangers of error, or of rash judgment, we are perpetually exposed to in this life: This chapter shall conclude with one remark, and one piece of advice.

The remark is this: The same opinion, whether false or true, may be dictated by many prejudices at the same time; for as I hinted before, prejudice may happen to dictate truth sometimes as well as error. But where two or more prejudices oppose one another, as it often happens, the stronger prevails and gains the assent: Yet how seldom does reason interpose with sufficient power to get the ascendaut of them all, as it ought to do!

The advice follows, (viz.) since we find such a swarm of prejudices attending us both within and without; since we feel the weakness of our reason, the frailty of our natures, and our insufficiency to guard ourselves from error upon this account, it is not at all unbecoming the character of a logician or philosopher (together with the advice already given) to direct every person in search after truth, to make his daily addresses to heaven, and implore the God of truth to lead him into all truth, and to ask wisdom of him who giveth liberally to them that ask it, and upbraideth us not with our own follies.

Such a devout practice will be an excellent preparative for the best improvement of all the directions and rules proposed in the two following chapters.

CHAP. IV.

GENERAL DIRECTIONS TO ASSIST US IN JUDGING ARIGHT.

THE chief design of the art of logic is to assist us in forming a true judgment of things; a few proper observations for this end have been dropt occasionally in some of the foregoing chapters: yet it is necessary to mention them again in this place, that we may have a more complete and simultaneous view of the

general directions, which are necessary in order to judge aright. A multitude of advices may be framed for this purpose; the chief of them may, for order sake, be reduced to the following heads.

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I. Direct. When we consider ourselves as philosophers, or searchers after the truth, we should examine all our opinions afresh, and inquire what was the ground of them, and whether our assent built on just evidence; and then we should cast off all those judgments which were formed heretofore without due examination. A man in pursuit of knowledge should throw off all those prejudices which he had imbibed in times past, and guard against all the springs of error mentioned in the preceding chapter, with the utmost watchfulness for the time to come.

Observe here, that this rule of casting away all our former prejudicate opinions and sentiments, is not proposed to any of us to be practised at once, considered as men of business or religion, as friends or neighbours, as fathers or sons, as magistrates, subjects or Christians; but merely as philosophers and searchers after truth: and though it may be well presumed that many of our judgments, both true and false, together with the practices built thereon in the natural, the civil, and the religious life, were formed without sufficient evidence; yet an universal rejection of all these might destroy at once our present sense and practice of duty with regard to God, ourselves, and our fellow-creatures. Mankind would be hereby thrown into such a state of doubting and indifference, that it would be too long ere they reco vered any principles of virtue or religion by a train of reasoning.

Besides, the common affairs of human life often demand a much speedier determination, and we must many times act upon present probabilities: The bulk of mankind have not time and leisure, and advantages sufficient to begin all their knowledge anew, and to build up every single opinion and practice afresh upon the justest grounds of evidence.

Yet let it be observed also, that so far as any persou is capable of forming and correcting his notions

and rules of conduct in the natural, civil, and religious life, by the strict rules of logic; and so far as he hath time and capacity to review his old opinions, to re-examine all those which are any way doubtful, and to determine nothing without just evidence, he is likely to become so much the wiser, and the happier. man, and (if divine grace assist him) so much the better Christian. And though this cannot be done all at once, yet it may be done by prudent steps and degrees, till our whole set of opinions and principles be in time corrected and reformed, or at least established upon juster foundations.

II. Direct. Endeavour that all your ideas of those objects, concerning which you pass any judgment, be clear and distinct, complete, comprehensive, extensive and orderly, as far as you have any occasion to judge concerning them. This is the substance of the last chapter of the first part of logic. The rules which direct our conceptions must be reviewed, if we would form our judgments aright. But if we will make haste to judge at all adventures, while our ideas are dark and confused, and very imperfect, we shall be in danger of running into many mistakes. This is like a person who would pretend to give the sum total of a larger account in arithmetic, without surveying all the particulars; or as a painter, who professes to draw a fair and distinct landscape in the twilight, when he can hardly distinguish a house from a

tree.

Observe here, that this direction does not require us to gain clear, distinct, complete ideas of things in all their parts, powers, and qualities in an absolute sense, for this belongs to God alone, and is impossible for us to attain: but it is expressed in a relative or limited sense; that is, our ideas should be clear, distinct, and comprehensive, &c. at least so far as we have occasion at that time to judge concerning them. We may form many true and certain judgments concerning God, angels, animals, men, heaven, hell, &c. by those partial and very imperfect conceptions of them to which we have attained, if we judge no farther concerning them than our conceptions reach. We may have a clear and distinct idea of the exist

ence of many things in nature, and affirm that they do exist, though our ideas of their intimate essences and causes, their relations and manners of actions,

are very confused and obscure. We may judge well concerning several properties of any being, though other properties are unknown, for, perhaps, we know not all the properties of any being whatsoever.

Sometimes we have clear ideas of the absolute properties of an object; and we may judge of them with certainty, while the relative properties are very obscure and unknown to us. So we may have a clear and just idea of the area of a parallelogram, without knowing what relation it bears to the area of a trian. gle or a poligon. I may know the length of the diameter of a circle, without knowing what proportion it has to the circumference.

There are other things, whose external relative properties with respect to each other, or whose relation to us we know better than their own inward and absolute properties, or their essential distinguishing attributes. We perceive clearly, that fire will warm or burn us, and will evaporate water; and that water will allay our thirst, or quench the fire, though we know not the inward distinguishing particles or prime essential properties of fire and water. We may

know the king, and lord chancellor, and affirm many things of them in their legal characters, though we can have but a confused idea of their persons or natural features, if we have never seen their faces. So the scripture has revealed God himself to us, as our creator, preserver, redeemer, and sanctifier, and as the object of our worship, in clearer ideas than it has revealed many other abstruse questions which may be raised about his own divine essence or substance, immensity or omnipresence.

This, therefore, is the general observation in order to guide our judgments, that we should not allow ourselves to form a judgment concerning things far ther than our clear and distinct ideas reach, and then we are not in danger of error.

But there is one considerable objection against this rule which is necessary to be answered; and there is

one just and reasonable exception, which is as need. ful to be mentioned.

The objection is this: May we not judge falsely concerning some total or complete ideas, when we have a clear perception only of some parts or proper ties of them? May we not affirm, that all that is in God is eternal, or that all his unknown attributes are infinite, though we have so imperfect an idea of God, eternity, and infinity? Again, may we not safely judge of particular objects whose idea is obscure, by a clear idea of the general? May I not affirm, that every unknown species of animals has inward springs of motion because I have a clear idea that these inward springs belong to an animal in general?

Answer. All those supposed unknown parts, pro perties or species, are clearly and distinctly perceived to be connected with or contained in the known parts, properties or general ideas, which we suppose to be clear and distinct as far as we judge of them: and as we have no particular idea of those unknown divine attributes, or unknown species of animals; so there is nothing particular affirmed of them beyond what belongs to the general idea of divine attributes or animals, with which I clearly and distinctly perceive them to be connected.

It may be illustrated in this manner. Suppose a long chain lies before me, whose nearest links I see are iron rings, and I see them fastened to a post near me, but the most distant links lie beyond the reach of my sight, so that I know not whether they are oval or round, brass or iron: now I may boldly af firm the whole length of this chain is fastened to the post, for I bave a clear idea that the distant links are connected with the nearest, if I can draw the whole chain by one link.

Or thus: If two known ideas, A and B, are evidently joined or agree, and if Cunknown be included in A, and also D unknown be included in B, then I may affirm that C and D are joined and agree: for I have a clear perception of the union of the two known ideas A and B; and also a clear perception of the connection of the unknown ideas with the known. So that clear and distinct ideas must still abide as a

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