Remark II. Among those various kinds of evidence, some are generally stronger than others in their own nature, and give a better ground for certainty. Inward consciousness and intelligence, as well as divine faith and inspiration, usually carry much more force with them than sense or human faith, which are often fallible; though there are instances wherein human faith, sense, and reasoning lay a foundation also for complete assurance, and leave no room for doubt.

Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright, or it would require us to suspend our judgment where there is want of evidence. But it is our sloth, precipitancy, sense, passion, and many other things, that lead our reason astray in this degenerate and imperfect estate: hence it comes to pass that we are guilty of so many errors in reasoning, especially about divine things, because our reason either is busy to enquire, and resolved to determine about matters that are above our present reach; or because we mingle many prejudices and secret influences of sense, fancy, passion, inclination, &c. with our exercises of reason, and judge and determine according to these irregular influences.

Divine faith would never admit of any controversies or doubtings, if we were but assured that God had spoken, and that we rightly understood his meaning.

Remark III. The greatest evidence and certainty of any proposition does not depend upon the variety of the ways or kinds of evidence whereby it is known, but rather upon the strength and degree of evidence, and the clearness of that light in or by which it appears to the mind. For a proposition that is known only one way may be much more certain, and have stronger evidence, than another that is supposed to be known many ways. Therefore these propositions, nothing has no properties, nothing cannot make it self, which are known only by intelligence, are much surer and truer than this proposition, the rainbow has real and inherent colours in it, or than this, the sun rolls round the earth; though we seem to know

both these last by our senses, and by the common testimony of our neighbours. So any proposition that is clearly evident to our consciousness of divine faith, is much more certain to us than a thousand others, that have only the evidence of feeble and obscure sensations, of more probable reasonings and doubtful arguments, or the witness of fallible men, or even though all these should join together.

CHAP. III.

THE SPRINGS OF FALSE JUDGMENT, OR THE DOC. TRINE OF PREJUDICES.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the end of the foregoing chapter we have surveyed the several sorts of evidence, on which we build our assent to propositions. These are indeed the general grounds upon which we form our judgments concerning things. What remains in this second part of logic is to point out the several springs and causes of our mistakes in judging, and to lay down some rules by which we should conduct ourselves in passing a judgment of every thing that is proposed to us.

I confess many things which will be mentioned in these following chapters might be as well referred to the third part of logic, where we shall treat of reasoning and argument: for most of our false judgments seem to include a secret bad reasoning in them; and while we shew the springs of error, and the rules of true judgment, we do at the same time discover which arguments are fallacious, which reasonings are weak, and which are just and strong. Yet since this is usually called a judging ill, or judging well, I think we may, without any impropriety, treat of it here; and this will lay a surer foundation for all sorts of ratiocination and argument.

Rash judgments are called prejudices, and so are the springs of them. This word in common life sig..

nifies an ill opinion which we have conceived of some other person, or some injury done to him. But when we use the word in matters of science, it signifies a judgment that is formed concerning any person or thing before sufficient examination; and generally we suppose it to mean a false judgment or mistake; at least, it is an opinion taken up without solid reason for it, or an assent given to a proposition before we have just evidence of the truth of it, though the thing itself máy happen to be true.

Sometimes these rash judgments are called prepossessions, whereby is meant, that some particular opinion has possessed the mind, and engaged the assent, without sufficient search or evidence of the truth of it.

There is a vast variety of these prejudices and prepossessions which attend mankind in every age and condition of life; they lay the foundations of many an error, and many an unhappy practice, both in the affairs of religion, and in our civil concernments, as well as in matters of learning. It is necessary for a man who pursues truth to inquire into those springs of error, that as far as possible he may rid himself of old prejudices, and watch hourly against new ones.

The number of them is so great, and they are so interwoven with each other, as well as with the powers of human nature, that it is sometimes hard to distinguish them apart; yet, for method's sake, we shall reduce them to these four general heads, (viz.) prejudices arising from things, or from words, from ourselves, or from other persons; and after the description of each prejudice, we shall propose one or more ways of curing it.

SECT. I.-Prejudices arising from Things.

The first sort of prejudices are those which are from the things themselves about which we judge. But here let it be observed that there is nothing in the nature of things that will necessarily lead us into error, if we do but use our reason aright, and with

hold our judgment till there appear sufficient evidence of them. But since we are so unhappily prone to take advantage of every doubtful appearance and circumstance of things, to form a wrong judgment, and plunge ourselves into mistake, therefore it is proper to consider what there is in the things themselves that may occasion our errors.

I. The obscurity of some truths, and the difficulty of searching them out, is one occasion of rash and mistaken judgment.

Some truths are difficult, because they lie remote from the first principles of knowledge, and want a long chain of argument to come at them: such are many of the deep things of algebra and geometry, and some of the theorems and problems of most parts of the mathematics. Many things also in natural philosophy are dark and intricate upon this account, because we cannot come at a certain knowledge of them without the labour of many and difficult, as well as chargeable experiments.

There are other truths which have great darkness upon them, because we have no proper means or mediums to come at the knowledge of them. Though in our age we have found out many of the deep things of nature, by the assistance of glasses and other instruments; yet, we are not hitherto arrived at any sufficient matters to discover the shape of those lit tle particles of matter which distinguish the vari. ous vapours, odours, and colours of bodies; nor to find what sort of atoms compose liquids or solids, and distinguish wood, minerals, metals, glass, stone, &c. There is a darkness also lie's upon the actions of the intellectual or angelical world; their manners of subsistence and agency, the power of spirits to move bodies, and the union of our souls with this animal body of ours, are much unknown to us on this account.

Now, in many of these cases, a great part of mankind is not content to be entirely ignorant; but they rather chuse to form rash and hasty judgment, to guess at things without just evidence, to believe

something concerning them before they can know them, and thereby they fall into error.

This sort of prejudice, as well as most others, is cured by patience and diligence in inquiry and reasoning, and a suspension of judgment, till we have attained some proper mediums of knowledge, and till we see sufficient evidence of the truth.

II. The appearance of things in a disguise, is another spring of prejudice or rash judgment. The outside of things which first strikes us, is oftentimes different from their inward nature, and we are tempted to judge suddenly according to outward appearances. If a picture is daubed with many bright and glaring colours, the vulgar eye admires it as an excellent piece; whereas the same person judges very contemptuously of some admirable design sketched out only with a black pencil on a coarse paper, though by the hand of Raphael. So the scholar spies the name of a new book in public news-papers, he is charmed with the title, he purchases it, he reads with huge expectations, and finds it all trash and impertinence: this is a prejudice derived from the appearance; we are too ready to judge that volume valuable which had so good a frontispiece. The large head of encomiums and swelling words of assurance that are bestowed on quack-medicines in public advertisements, tempt many a reader to judge them infallible, and to use the pills or the plaister with vast hope, and frequent disappointment.

We are tempted to form our judgment of persons as well as things by these outward appearances. Where there is wealth, equipage, and splendour, we are ready to call that man happy, but we see not the vexing disquietudes of his soul: and when we spy a person in ragged garments, we form a despicable opinion of him too suddenly; we can hardly think him either happy or wise, our judgment is so strangely biassed by outward and sensible things. It was through the power of this prejudice that the Jews rejected our blessed Saviour: they could not suffer themselves to believe that the man who appeared as