SECT. IX.-Of Sense, Consciousness, Intelligence, Reason, Faith, and Inspiration.

After we have considered the evidence of proposi tions in the various degrees of it, we come to survey the several kinds of evidence, or the different ways whereby truth is let into the mind, and which produce accordingly several kinds of knowledge. We shall distribute them into these six, viz. sense, consciousness, intelligence, reason, faith, and inspiration, and then distinguish the propositions which are derived from them.

I. The evidence of sense is when we frame a proposition according to the dictate of any of our senses: so we judge that grass is green; that a trumpet gives a pleasant sound; the fire burns wood; water is soft; and iron is hard; for we have seen, heard, or felt all these. It is upon this evidence of sense that we know and believe the daily occurrences in human life; and almost all the histories of mankind that are written by eye or ear witnesses are built upon this principle.

Under the evidence of sense we do not only include that knowledge which is derived to us by our outward senses of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting and smelling, but that also which is derived from the inward sensations and appetites of hunger, thirst, ease, pleasure, pain, weariness, rest, &c. and all those things which belong to the body; as, hunger is a painful appetite; light is pleasant; rest is sweet to the weary limbs.

Propositions which are built on this evidence, may be named sensible propositions, or the dictates of

sense.

II. As we learn what belongs to the body by the evidence of sense, so we learn what belongs to the soul by an inward consciousness, which may be called a sort of internal feeling, or spiritual sensation of what passes in the mind; as, I think before I speak: I desire large knowledge: I suspect my own practice: I studied hard to-day my conscience bears witness of my sincerity: my soul hates vain thoughts; fear is an uneasy passion: long meditation on one thing is tiresome.

:

Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a multitude of propositions, as well as of single ideas, by those two principles which Mr. Locke calls sensation and reflection: one of them is a sort of cousciousness of what affects the body, and the other is a consciousness of what passes in the mind.

Propositions which are built on this internal consciousness, have yet no particular or distinguishing name assigned to them.

III. Intelligence relates chiefly to those abstracted propositions which carry their own evidence with them, and admit no doubt about them. Our percep tion of this self-evidence in any proposition is called intelligence, It is our knowledge of those first prineiples of truth which are, as it were, wrought into the very nature and make of our mind: they are so evident in themselves to every man who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is the prerogative and peculiar excellence of these propositions, that they can scarce ever be proved or denied: they cannot eas ily be proved, because there is nothing supposed to be more clear or certain, from which an argument may be drawn to prove them. They cannot well be denied, because their own evidence is so bright and convincing, that as soon as the terms are understood, the mind necessarily assents; such are these, whatsoever acteth bath a being; nothing has no proper ties; a part is less than the whole; nothing cannot be the cause of itself.

These propositions are called axioms, or maxims, or first principles, these are the very foundations of all improved knowledge and reasonings, and on this account these have been thought to be innate propositions, or truths born with us.

Some suppose that a great part of the knowledge of angels and human souls in the separate state is obtained in this manner, viz. by such an immediate view of things in their own nature, which is called intuitiou.

IV. Reasoning is the next sort of evidence, and that is when one truth is inferred or drawn from others by natural and just methods of argument; as, if there be

much light at midnight, I infer, it proceeds from the moon, because the sun is under the earth*. If l see a cottage in a forest, I conclude some man has been there and built it. Or when I survey the heavens and earth, this gives evidence to my reason, that there is a God who made them.

The propositions which I believe upon this kind of evidence are called conclusions or rational truths, and the knowledge that we gain this way is properly called science.

Yet let it be noted, that the word science is usually applied to a whole body of regular and methodical observations or propositions which learned men have formed concerning any subject of speculation, deriving one truth from another by a train of arguments. If this knowledge chiefly directs our practice, it is usually called an art. And this is the most remarkable distinction between an art and a science, viz. the one refers chiefly to practice, the other to speculation. Natural philosophy, or physic, and ontology, are sciences; logic and rhetoric are called arts: but mathematics include both art and science; for they have much of speculation, and much of practice in them.

Observe here, that when the evidence of a proposi tion derived from sense, consciousness, intelligence, or reason, is firm and indubitable, it produces such assent as we call a natural certainty.

V. When we derive the evidence of any proposition from the testimony of others, it is called the evidence of faith, and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten thousand things there are which we believe merely upon the authority or credit of those who have spoken or written of them. It is by this evidence that we know there is such a country as China, and there was such a man as Cicero, who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most of the transactions in human life, are managed: we know our parents and our kindred by this means; we know the persons and laws of our present governors, as well as things that are at a vast dis tance from us in foreign nations, or in ancient ages.

Note, Since this work was written, we have so many appear ances of the aurora borealis as reduces this inference only to probability,

According as the persons that inform us of any thing are many or few, or more or less wise, and faithful, and credible, so our faith is more or less firm or wavering, and the proposition believed is either certain or doubtful; but in matters of faith, an 'exceeding great probability is called a moral certainty.

Faith is generally distinguished into divine and human, not with regard to the propositions that are believed, but with regard to the testimony upon which we believe them. When God reveals any thing to us, this gives us the evidence of divine faith; but what man only acquaints us with, produces a human faith in us: the one, being built upon the word of man, arises but to moral certainty; but the other being founded on the word of God, arises to an absolute and infallible assurance, so far as we understand the meaning of this word. This is called supernatural certainty.

Propositions which we believe upon the evidence of human testimony, are called narratives, relations, re ports, historical observations, &c, but such as are built on divine testimony, are termed matters of revelation; and if they are of great importance in religion, they are called articles in faith.

There are some propositions or parts of knowledge, which are said to be derived from observation and experience, that is, experience in ourselves, and the observations we have made on other persons or things; but these are made up of some of the former springs of knowledge joined together, (viz.) sense, conscious ness, reason, faith, &c. and therefore are not reckoned a distinct kind of evidence.

VI. Inspiration is a sort of evidence distinct from all the former, and that is when such an overpowering impression of any proposition is made upon the mind by God himself, that gives a convincing and indubitable evidence of the truth and divinity of it; so were the prophets and the apostles inspired*.

Sometimes God may have been pleased to make use of the outward senses, or the inward workings of the

• Note here, I speak chiefly of the highest sind of inspiration.

imagination, of dreams, apparitions, visions, and voices, or reasoning, or perhaps human narration, to convey divine truths to the mind of the prophet; but none of these would be sufficient to deserve the name of inspiration, without a superior or divine light and power attending them.

This sort of evidence is also very distinct from what we usually call divine faith; for every common Chris tian exercises divine faith when he believes any proposition, which God has revealed in the Bible upon this account, because God has said it, though it was by a train of reasonings, that he was led to believe that this is the word of God; whereas in the case of inspiration, the prophet not only exercises divine faith, in believing what God reveals, but he is under a superior heavenly impression, light and evidence, whereby he is assured that God reveals it. This is the most eminent kind of supernatural certainty.

Though persons might be assured of their own inspiration by some peculiar and inexpressible consciousness of this divine inspiration and evidence in their own spirits, yet it is hard to make out this inspiration to others, and to convince them of it, except by some antecedent or consequent prophecies or miracles, or some public appearances more than human.

The propositions which are attained by this, sort of evidence are called inspired truths. This is divine revelation at first hand, and the dictates of God in an immediate manner, of which theological writers discourse at large, but since it belongs only to a few fa vourites of heaven to be inspired, and not the bulk of mankind, it is not necessary to speak more of it in a treatise of logic, which is designed for the general improvement of human reason.

The various kinds of evidence, upon which we believe any proposition, affords us these three remarks.

Remark 1. The same proposition may be known to us by different kinds of evidence: that the whole is bigger than a part is known by our senses, and it is known by the self-evidence of the thing to our mind. That God created the heavens and the earth is known to us by reason, and is known also by divine testimony or faith.