escence in the cautious directions of Ernesti :* To inquire respecting words and phrases, expressing things about which the Greeks were accustomed to speak; and first, whether such single words are spoken in the same sense in which the Greeks used them; and then, whether such phrases have not only the syntax of the Greek, but also the same sense which Greek usages attributed to them. As to the mention of syntax here, Ernesti does not seem to have so understood it, as if purity of style were to be principally estimated in reference to the legitimate construction of words and phrases. It is one thing to observe the grammatical laws of syntax; and it is a different thing to follow the practice of approved writers and men of cultivated minds, so as to express the same things in the same words that they have used, or in the same way, or at least in a similar and congruous manner.

Whether this is actually done, is not so easy to be determined as is generally supposed. For a habit of speaking or writing with purity and correctness, although it may appear to be unrestrained, is nevertheless limited by necessary laws; the reason of which is often so obscured by usage, and so changed in the progress of language, that it cannot in every case be entirely ascertained. Hence it happens, that words and phrases used by the most approved writers, appear to many to have been at first received without ground, and as it were by accident; than which opinion, none can be farther from the truth. But syntax, . properly so called, consists in the mode of correctly joining together all the parts of style, and depends on other grounds than purity of style; although there are some things common to both. Thus the principal laws of both are deduced from reason, the common source of all languages. We wish it therefore to be distinctly understood, that the question about the purity of style in the writers of the New Testament, is entirely foreign to our present discussion; so that no one may suppose, that we rashly desire to renew this ancient controversy. We are to speak only of the grammatical correctness of the writers of the New Testament, and we can now more easily explain in what this accuracy consists.

It is obvious here at the first view, that the grammatical accuracy of any writer must consist in the observance of the gram

Institutio Interp. N. T. Part. I. Sect. II. c. 3. § 6. Stuart's Translation, 117.

matical laws of the language which he uses. What these laws are, and on what causes they depend, seems to be less obvious; inasmuch as those who attempt to expound the grammatical laws of a language, often expend all their labour, either in explaining single forms and parts of style, or in shewing how these may properly be joined together in order to make out a whole sentence. But why this should be done in this particular way, and in no other, they leave unexplained, and rest satisfied with having proved by a multitude of examples, that it is often so in classic writers. And although the assiduous perusal of many writers is necessary, in order correctly to observe the laws of syntax in a language; yet the causes of those laws are not to be discerned, except by a diligent comparison of the genius of the language in question, with the necessary modes of thinking and speaking common to all languages. He, however, who is ignorant of the causes of these laws, cannot properly understand their use; much less can he teach with clearness the mode in which they are to be applied, nor to what extent they may be changed by usage. Such is the case with many interpreters; they know sufficiently well, how a word or construction usually is, but not why it is and ought to be so; and consequently, when they sometimes find it otherwise, they are troubled by the uncommonness of it, and cannot explain why it ought not to be so; or they take refuge in a farrago of exceptions, as they are called. On this account, it is proper here to treat, in a few words, of the causes and sources of all grammatical laws, before we proceed to shew, how far we suppose the writers of the New Testament have observed them.

There are in every language two kinds of laws. The first kind are in their very nature necessary, so that they are and must be found of the same or of a similar character in all languages. The other kind consists of those laws which spring from the peculiar genius of any particular language. The former kind are necessary, because they arise out of the very nature of all human language, that is from reason itself, and can therefore never be violated, but must always be observed. So that if any one should speak in a manner different from what these laws require, he would compel his hearers to connect in thought things which cannot be so joined even in thought; as if a father should say, ¿yévvnoa oov; or if any one should call him who is the son of Philip, Dileллov пaida. Here it is not possible, that he who has begotten another, should at the same time be conceived of as hav

ing the cause of generation in that other, which is the force of the genitive; or that he who is to be represented as the son of Philip, should really be conceived of as a son, when no relation to a father is indicated. The reason of these laws is particularly conspicuous in the Greek prepositions; where their own peculiar force demonstrates the cause, why they are to be necessarily joined with one, two, or three cases. Thus if we accurately consider the proper signification of each preposition, it will not be difficult to see, why aлó, ¿§, and лоó can only be joined with the genitive, and is only with the accusative; as also why did and xarά not only may be, but also ought to be construed, sometimes with the genitive and sometimes with the

accusative.

But there are also other laws, which, as springing from the nature of a particular language, and being in a manner peculiar to it, are not in the same degree necessary; so that it is possible to conceive of a sufficient reason, why a style may be complete and perfect, although these laws are neglected. Hence it arises, that idioms, which are introduced by usage contrary to the general laws of a language,* are not to be regarded as faulty; and that what may appear as solecisms to the unlearned, are sometimes in fact the most elegant figures (onuara) of style. The reason of these grammatical laws then, although in itself perhaps obvious, is often greatly obscured by opposite usage; so that it is not wonderful, that the precepts of grammarians respecting this part of syntax, should either not have been understood by those who judge of the nature of language only by number and case; or should not have been sufficient to enable us in all instances certainly to determine, whether one has written correctly or incorrectly. It is obvious, however, that in estimating the grammatical accuracy of any writer, these different species of grammatical laws must be distinguished. If a writer violate those laws, of which reason and the nature of things always require the observance, he cannot be said to use the language of man; but if he neglect the other species of laws, we must first examine, whether there is not some probable cause for this neglect. On this account it will be well to treat of the two species of laws separately.

* See Hermann ad Vigerum, Leips. 1822, p. 865.

+ Compare Apollonius Alex. Do Constructione Orationis, L. III. p. 197. ed. Bekker.

In the first place then, although it may be taken for granted. that the sacred writers have observed the necessary laws of the Greek language, otherwise they would hardly seem to have spoken like men endowed with reason, yet it may be worth while to look more closely at the subject, than has usually been done. There are those who in interpreting the New Testament, care very little for the observance of any laws; and if the words of any writer interpreted grammatically, that is, according to the laws of language, express a sentiment foreign to their system or to their private opinions, they do not hesitate to disregard entirely those laws, and, neglecting the proper force of the words, contend, that the writer has said what no one in his senses ever could have said by means of such words. And we could show by a multitude of examples, how many false interpretations which have sprung up out of a hatred of orthodoxy, rest solely upon the opinions of men, who, because they have taken it for granted, that the sacred writers did not observe even the necessary laws of language, have supposed that their words might be made to signify just what they themselves pleased. Inasmuch, however, as the interpretation of the New Testament would be destitute of all certain rule and method, unless we observe at least those laws of language, the neglect of which implies also incorrectness of thought, we will endeavour to show by some examples, that the sacred writers have observed even those laws in which few require accuracy or can judge of it.

To begin with the prepositions; for there is no signification, however repugnant, which has not been assigned to each of the prepositions in the New Testament; and moreover we shall learn to estimate more correctly the accuracy of the sacred writers in a grammatical view, if we find them paying a strict regard even to those laws, which, although necessary, are yet by few regarded as necessary. The nature of the prepositions, as I have remarked above, is such, that they can either govern only one case, or they admit two or more cases; in such a way, however, that according to the variety of their signification, they require necessarily some one particular case. I do not however fear, in asserting that this nature of the prepositions has been accurately observed by the sacred writers, that any one will consider me as on this account attributing a refinement to the style of unlearned men. It is necessary rather to be on our guard, lest in denying to the sacred writers those things which

R

are regarded as peculiar to men of more cultivated minds, we should seem to approach them with faults which are scarcely to be excused in persons even of the lowest class.

The force of the prepositions, as Hermann has justly remarked,* does not depend upon the cases which they govern; but it is to be explained from the verbs on which the prepositions themselves depend. It follows from this, that a preposition, even if it retain the same signification as to the general notion of the thing expressed, may yet require a different case, provided the verb on which that preposition depends, changes in any way the mode of conceiving the relation of that thing. For if prepositions serve to indicate the relations of ideas, the cause is apparent, both why they govern cases at all, and why they govern only one case, or why they govern different cases, if the verb on which they depend changes the mode of conceiving that relation. Some govern but a single case, because the idea expressed by the verb on which they depend, necessarily demands that case; for the force of these prepositions is such, that if other cases were joined to them, the very idea of the verb would be contradicted. Others again govern more cases, because the idea contained in them is such, that it may be conceived of in various relations, though in a different manner; and hence they may be joined with verbs of different species, which govern different cases.

By verbs of different species, I mean those which indicate the different modes in which the relation of two things may be conceived. Thus tival and opeσvai are different species of verbs; for when we couple the notion of any two things by means of siva, we signify nothing more, than that these two notions are in some way connected; but your properly indicates motion, by which the relation of place is changed. Now motion may be conceived of in a threefold view, as either in, or from, or to a place; and therefore the verb ozova governs also three cases, and calls to its aid those prepositions, which serve to express those different relations. A person is, therefore, correctly said ὑπὸ ̓Ιλίου εἶναι, and ὑπὸ ̓Ιλίῳ, when he is under (at, near) Ilium; but if he is to be represented as coming to Ilium, so as to be under it, he is said ὑπὸ ̓Ιλιον ἔρχεσθαι. The reason therefore why Homer says: αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ιλιον ήλθε, is to be sought in the verb ἦλθε. Had he said ὑπὸ ̓Ιλίῳ

Hermann, De emendenda ratione Graecae Grammat. p. 162.